Charles, List: In my last post, I quoted a portion of CP 1.336, which comes from pages 33-36 of "Phaneroscopy: Or, the Natural History of Concepts" (R 299; 1906). It turns out that Peirce said quite a bit more about Experience earlier in the same manuscript, beginning with an explicit definition that evolved from at least five previous attempts, which appear in the various fragments that follow the main text.
CSP: What do we mean by '*Experience*'? Surely, a correct and precise analysis of that will be worth more than a little pains, as long as we hold that all human knowledge, and especially all assurance of knowledge, springs from the soil of Experience. I answer the question thus: *Experience is that state of cognition which the course of life, by some part thereof, has forced upon the recognition of the experient, or person who undergoes the experience, under conditions due usually, in part, at least, to his own action*; and the Immediate object of the cognition of Experience is understood to be what I call its 'Dynamical', that is, its real object. (R 299:8; bold added) He went on to explain each component, beginning with "state of cognition." CSP: By a "cognitive" state, as opposed to a state markedly involving only elements of feeling and volition, I mean a state which, as it is in itself, and not as it may be represented reflectively, is a sign of an object for an interpretant state, which last may involve feeling, volition, or cognition, alone or in combination with either of the other of these elements of mental life. (R 299:9) This confirms that Experience is *semeiosic *in nature, "a sign of an object for an interpretant"; not just upon subsequent reflection, but "as it is in itself." A peculiar aspect of it is that the *Immediate *Object of such cognition is also its *Dynamic *Object, as Peirce reiterated in a discarded draft. CSP: The very last clause of my definition is that the dynamical object of the cognition of experience is no other than the immediate object; or, as it is usually expressed, our experience is only of phenomena not of the real things. For example, let a person in whose veracity and accuracy I have the highest confidence;--so much so that I would rather trust to what he says than to my own memory of my own personal experience,--which may very well be. Then, if that person testifies to something positively as of his own knowledge, though it is conceivable that he should be mistaken, yet I cannot possibly doubt that he had an experience which his words interpret. Nevertheless, impotent as I am to doubt his word, it is not what he tells me that I have experienced, but only the fact that he has told me so. (R 299:66-67[35-36]) At about the same time, he wrote elsewhere, "The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last analysis, the Percept," while "the Perceptual Judgment ... is the direct Dynamical Interpretant of the Percept, and of which the Percept is the Dynamical Object" (CP 4.539; 1906). Knowledge and thought consist entirely of Perceptual Judgments and inferences from Perceptual Judgments, and a Percept serves as *both *the Immediate Object *and *the Dynamic Object of the corresponding Perceptual Judgment. In Peirce's example, the other person presumably testifies about his own *Direct *Experience, which was mediated *only *by Percepts; while for Peirce himself, that testimony is *Indirect *Experience, since his only *Direct *Experience on that occasion is "the fact that he has told me so." Returning to the main text, after a long digression about "this familiar triad (feeling, volition, cognition)," most of which appeared in print as CP 1.332-334, Peirce returned to the subject at hand. CSP: The next phrase of my definition of experience, to the effect that it is forced upon a percipient mind by "the course of life,"--is the kernel of the definition. But the brief phrase fails to convey all that must be understood in order to understand the definition; and there are two parts of this phrase that require comment; namely, the "course of life" and "forced upon" the percipient. I will first say something to elucidate the meaning behind the phrase "course of life." The essence of anything that has an essence, and whose constituents are not thrown together promiscuously, consists in the function that is proper to it,--its virtual purpose. This is more than its ultimate purpose: it includes all the details of the particular way in which the thing in question must carry out that ultimate purpose. The function of a person is twofold; or perhaps I should say threefold; to work out his own nature and impulses, to aid others, and to contribute to the fulfillment of the destiny of his generation. The ultimate utility to him of his experience, is to enable him to do this. But experience has no existence apart from the person to whom it attaches; and therefore its utility to that person is its whole function. But it tends to lead to that purpose in a particular way; namely, by furnishing the person premisses of knowledge. Thus, the essence of experience lies in the manner in which it contributes to knowledge. (R 299:19-20) The *essence *of Experience, "the function that is proper to it," is contributing to a person's *knowledge *by furnishing its premisses; and the *utility *of that knowledge is enabling that person to carry out his/her *ultimate purpose*. This echoes Peirce's statement about the *summum bonum* a few years earlier. CSP: I do not see how one can have a more satisfying ideal of the admirable than the development of Reason so understood. The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an ulterior Reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we can comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is 'up to us' to do so. In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develop knowledge the most speedily. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903). After another long digression, this time regarding induction and Fermatian inference, Peirce finished elaborating on his definition. CSP: It is stated that a cognition is forced upon the experient, willy-nilly, and yet that it is due in part to his own action. For a man who lies, "vividi membra sub arbuto stratus" [under strawberry tree limbs], in entire passivity, gazing in vacancy without a thought or any tendency to act, can receive no cognitive shock until he has first been roused; since no force can be expended upon a object that presents no resistance. It is nothing surprising to see men putting months of hard work and spending besides many thousands that somebody must have earned by the sweat of his brow, in order to undergo the compulsory experience of a solar eclipse that rarely lasts as long as five minutes; and how much effort has been made to undergo the experience of being at the North Pole, which, after all, is just like any other place well within the arctic circle. This illustrates the necessity of action in order to be subjected to any given experience. (R 299:31-32) The course of life *forces *Experience upon us, but we have some say in the *routes *along which it takes us. We can *intentionally* put ourselves into position to have certain Experiences, and to avoid others. This is obviously critical for *science *as the genuine pursuit of knowledge. In summary, "this definition of experience is designed to give an exact and scientifically valuable signification to a word which students of philosophy have hitherto employed in a somewhat vague way. The desire is to conform as closely to philosophic usage as the necessity of precision of thought and as philosophical utility will permit" (R 299:32-33). CP 1.335-336 came next, after which Peirce concluded as follows. CSP: Of course we must distinguish between knowing by experience and experiencing itself. We know all the actual fact that we do know by experience; but our experience itself is limited to that which we are irrationally, immediately and absolutely constrained to accept. (R 299:37) Again, this is consistent with how Peirce typically characterized Perceptual Judgments; and in another alternate draft, he clarified further how Experience is broader than perception. CSP: If the term experience were limited to perception, I should say that it was positive constraint. But it is not so limited. Under "experience," we include, not only perception, but the sequence of one perception upon another; and even a generalization of the character of such sequence; this generalization being limited to the direct cognizance of a single person. Thus we know by experience that particularly vivid flashes of lightenings [ *sic*] are followed particularly speedily by particularly sharp peals of thunder. Here three senses, and many repetitions concur to make one experiential result for each person. We may hesitate for a moment or two to ratify such a statement. It depends upon memory, which is a Judas. Nevertheless, whether I can recall the particular occasions or not, (and most likely not in sufficient number to justify the proposition) I find myself absolutely constrained to aver that such is my experience. (R 299:65-66[34-35]) When I have a Percept of lightning, I make an involuntary Perceptual Judgment that I see lightning; and when I have a Percept of thunder, I make an involuntary Perceptual Judgment that I hear thunder. However, I also make *another *involuntary Perceptual Judgment that I hear thunder *soon after* seeing lightning, and in this case the Object is not a Percept itself but a *relation *among Percepts that I am constrained to acknowledge, which amounts to an *event*. After sufficient repetitions of such Experience, I am likely to *generalize *it and adopt the *belief*--i.e., the *expectation*--that thunder *always* occurs soon after lightning. This is perhaps the most common method of *learning *by Experience, since *everyone *routinely employs it--for the most part without giving it a second thought, if they think about it at all. But if I start to wonder *why *thunder always occurs soon after lightning, then I would do well to follow some specific additional steps in order to find out--first, develop a *hypothesis *that would *explain *my Experience (Retroduction); second, work out its *necessary *consequences (Deduction); and third, conduct *experiments *to test it (Induction), thus *deliberately *taking certain actions to find out whether I have certain Experiences or not. Regards, Jon S. On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 9:34 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Charles, List: > > As far as I know, Peirce never discussed "immediate experience," only > "immediate knowledge" and "immediate perception." I generally agree with > your other comments, except I am not sure that the word "experience" as a > *technical > *term in his writings properly applies to what you have in mind. 1ns and > 2ns are obviously *present to the mind* along with 3ns, but as he said in > a letter to William James, not everything in the Phaneron qualifies as > Experience. > > CSP: The *phaneron*, as I now call it, the sum total all of the contents > of human consciousness, which I believe is about what you (borrowing the > term of Avenarius) call *pure experience*,--but I do not admit the point > of view of Avenarius to be correct or to be consonant to any pragmatism, > nor to yours, in particular, and therefore I do not like that phrase. For > me *experience *is what life has forced upon us,--a vague idea no doubt. > But my *phaneron *is not limited to what is *forced *upon us; it also > embraces all that we most capriciously conjure up, not *objects* only but > all modes of contents of cognitional consciousness. (NEM 3:834; 1905 Aug) > > > On the other hand, Experience indeed encompasses more than just > perception; it also includes *events*, which are not *Objects *of > Percepts, but rather *discontinuities* between them. > > CSP: We perceive objects brought before us; but that which we especially > experience--the kind of thing to which the word "experience" is more > particularly applied--is an event. We cannot accurately be said to perceive > events ... A whistling locomotive passes at high speed close beside me. As > it passes the note of the whistle is suddenly lowered from a > well-understood cause. I perceive the whistle, if you will. I have, at any > rate, a sensation of it. But I cannot be said to have a sensation of the > change of note. I have a sensation of the lower note. But the cognition of > the change is of a more intellectual kind. That I experience rather than > perceive. It is [the] special field of experience to acquaint us with > events, with changes of perception ... It is more particularly to changes > and contrasts of perception that we apply the word "experience." We > experience vicissitudes, especially. We cannot experience the vicissitude > without experiencing the perception which undergoes the change; but the > concept of *experience *is broader than that of *perception*, and > includes much that is not, strictly speaking, an object of perception. It > is the compulsion, the absolute constraint upon us to think otherwise than > we have been thinking that constitutes experience. (CP 1.336; 1906) > > > Peirce elsewhere called Experience "the total cognitive result of living," > which "includes interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of > sense" (CP 7.538; 1899); "nothing but just that of a cognitive nature which > the history of our lives has forced upon us" (CP 5.549; c. 1902); and "what > the course of life has *compelled *me to think" (CP 8.330; 1904). And > what is it of a *cognitive *nature that is forced upon us--specifically, > what does the course of life compel us to *think*? > > CSP: Consequently, until I am better advised, I shall consider the > *perceptual > judgment* to be utterly beyond control ... It follows, then, that our > perceptual judgments are the first premisses of all our reasonings and that > they cannot be called in question. All our other judgments are so many > theories whose only justification is that they have been and will [or > would] be borne out by perceptual judgments. (CP 5.116, EP 2:191; 1903) > > > Pushing on a door and bumping into a table are the kinds of *familiar > *examples > that Peirce routinely employed to *explain *what he meant by 2ns, since > he would not be able *describe *it effectively to someone who had never > actually done those things; and 1ns is similar, since any description > involves *comparison*, which brings both 2ns and 3ns into the picture. > Nevertheless, the *concepts *of 1ns and 2ns, as well as 3ns--and anything > else, for that matter--are *inferences *from Perceptual Judgments, > since "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate > of perception" (CP 5.212, EP 2:241; 1903). That brings me back to the > following passage. > > CSP: Experience is first forced upon us in the form of a flow of images. > Thereupon thought makes certain assertions. It professes to pick the image > into pieces and to detect in it certain characters. This is not literally > true. The image has no parts, least of all predicates. Thus predication > involves precisive abstraction. Precisive abstraction creates predicates. > Subjectal abstraction creates subjects. Both predicates and subjects are > creations of thought. (NEM 3:885; 1904 Nov 21) > > > I suggest that Experience is the *cumulative *cognitive result of the > *involuntary *process of semeiosis in which thought *Retroductively *creates > Perceptual Judgments by prescinding predicates and abstracting subjects > from the *continuous* flow of perception, which has no *real *parts. Every > Perceptual Judgment thus purports to represent *Direct *Experience of an > Object or event, and when the latter is interpreted as an Instance of a > Sign, the Perceptual Judgment *also *purports to represent *Indirect * > Experience of the Object determining that *other *Sign. At least, that > is my current thinking about all of this. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 11:11 AM Charles Pyle <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> I don't think it makes sense to try to evade the problem of prior >> experience in semiosis by claiming, as in the below quote, and many others, >> that some experience mediated by a sign is 'direct' experience. Direct >> experience would be immediate, not mediate. And, while percepts may be >> relatively more direct than many other types of signs, they are still >> signs, and thus are mediated experience. A sign always represents an other. >> The problem is, how can we interpret the sign unless we have prior >> experience of that other, or at least a similar other. >> >> As I recall, though I can't put my hands on a quote at this moment, >> Peirce frequently asserted that it is possible to experience events at the >> level of secondness, which he usually described in terms of a shocking >> clash in the nature of brute force, such as the shock of bumping into a >> table while walking through a dark room. This sort of experience is not a >> sign. It is a direct experience. Though we would automatically, >> compulsively, subsequently subject that brute experience to semiotic >> interpretation. This is pre-semiotic experience, and I think could be >> described as direct or immediate experience. >> >> Further, I believe Peirce also asserted that one can experience firstness >> directly, though in his examples, and in the normal course of events, we >> can only experience it fleetingly. However, in at least some schools of >> Buddhism they assert that it is possible through the right kind of >> meditation practice to experience firstness directly in a more durable way, >> and with mastery even permanently. This type of experience is spoken of in >> Buddhism as mind experiencing mind directly. And this is why from the very >> earliest teachings of the Buddha one of the three modes of liberation has >> been taught as the 'signless' liberation. >> >> So in my view, direct experience would have to be pre-semiotic experience >> of firstness and secondness. >> >> Charles Pyle >> >> --Begin quote from Jon Alan Schmidt----- >> >> This points to the distinction that I have suggested >> between*direct*knowledge/experience >> as what we acquire from Percepts vs.*indirect*knowledge/experience as >> what we acquire from other kinds of Signs. >> >> --End quote from Jon Alan Schmidt----- >> >
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