Charles, List: As far as I know, Peirce never discussed "immediate experience," only "immediate knowledge" and "immediate perception." I generally agree with your other comments, except I am not sure that the word "experience" as a *technical *term in his writings properly applies to what you have in mind. 1ns and 2ns are obviously *present to the mind* along with 3ns, but as he said in a letter to William James, not everything in the Phaneron qualifies as Experience.
CSP: The *phaneron*, as I now call it, the sum total all of the contents of human consciousness, which I believe is about what you (borrowing the term of Avenarius) call *pure experience*,--but I do not admit the point of view of Avenarius to be correct or to be consonant to any pragmatism, nor to yours, in particular, and therefore I do not like that phrase. For me *experience *is what life has forced upon us,--a vague idea no doubt. But my *phaneron *is not limited to what is *forced *upon us; it also embraces all that we most capriciously conjure up, not *objects* only but all modes of contents of cognitional consciousness. (NEM 3:834; 1905 Aug) On the other hand, Experience indeed encompasses more than just perception; it also includes *events*, which are not *Objects *of Percepts, but rather *discontinuities* between them. CSP: We perceive objects brought before us; but that which we especially experience--the kind of thing to which the word "experience" is more particularly applied--is an event. We cannot accurately be said to perceive events ... A whistling locomotive passes at high speed close beside me. As it passes the note of the whistle is suddenly lowered from a well-understood cause. I perceive the whistle, if you will. I have, at any rate, a sensation of it. But I cannot be said to have a sensation of the change of note. I have a sensation of the lower note. But the cognition of the change is of a more intellectual kind. That I experience rather than perceive. It is [the] special field of experience to acquaint us with events, with changes of perception ... It is more particularly to changes and contrasts of perception that we apply the word "experience." We experience vicissitudes, especially. We cannot experience the vicissitude without experiencing the perception which undergoes the change; but the concept of *experience *is broader than that of *perception*, and includes much that is not, strictly speaking, an object of perception. It is the compulsion, the absolute constraint upon us to think otherwise than we have been thinking that constitutes experience. (CP 1.336; 1906) Peirce elsewhere called Experience "the total cognitive result of living," which "includes interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense" (CP 7.538; 1899); "nothing but just that of a cognitive nature which the history of our lives has forced upon us" (CP 5.549; c. 1902); and "what the course of life has *compelled *me to think" (CP 8.330; 1904). And what is it of a *cognitive *nature that is forced upon us--specifically, what does the course of life compel us to *think*? CSP: Consequently, until I am better advised, I shall consider the *perceptual judgment* to be utterly beyond control ... It follows, then, that our perceptual judgments are the first premisses of all our reasonings and that they cannot be called in question. All our other judgments are so many theories whose only justification is that they have been and will [or would] be borne out by perceptual judgments. (CP 5.116, EP 2:191; 1903) Pushing on a door and bumping into a table are the kinds of *familiar *examples that Peirce routinely employed to *explain *what he meant by 2ns, since he would not be able *describe *it effectively to someone who had never actually done those things; and 1ns is similar, since any description involves *comparison*, which brings both 2ns and 3ns into the picture. Nevertheless, the *concepts *of 1ns and 2ns, as well as 3ns--and anything else, for that matter--are *inferences *from Perceptual Judgments, since "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception" (CP 5.212, EP 2:241; 1903). That brings me back to the following passage. CSP: Experience is first forced upon us in the form of a flow of images. Thereupon thought makes certain assertions. It professes to pick the image into pieces and to detect in it certain characters. This is not literally true. The image has no parts, least of all predicates. Thus predication involves precisive abstraction. Precisive abstraction creates predicates. Subjectal abstraction creates subjects. Both predicates and subjects are creations of thought. (NEM 3:885; 1904 Nov 21) I suggest that Experience is the *cumulative *cognitive result of the *involuntary *process of semeiosis in which thought *Retroductively *creates Perceptual Judgments by prescinding predicates and abstracting subjects from the *continuous* flow of perception, which has no *real *parts. Every Perceptual Judgment thus purports to represent *Direct *Experience of an Object or event, and when the latter is interpreted as an Instance of a Sign, the Perceptual Judgment *also *purports to represent *Indirect * Experience of the Object determining that *other *Sign. At least, that is my current thinking about all of this. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 11:11 AM Charles Pyle <[email protected]> wrote: > I don't think it makes sense to try to evade the problem of prior > experience in semiosis by claiming, as in the below quote, and many others, > that some experience mediated by a sign is 'direct' experience. Direct > experience would be immediate, not mediate. And, while percepts may be > relatively more direct than many other types of signs, they are still > signs, and thus are mediated experience. A sign always represents an other. > The problem is, how can we interpret the sign unless we have prior > experience of that other, or at least a similar other. > > As I recall, though I can't put my hands on a quote at this moment, Peirce > frequently asserted that it is possible to experience events at the level > of secondness, which he usually described in terms of a shocking clash in > the nature of brute force, such as the shock of bumping into a table while > walking through a dark room. This sort of experience is not a sign. It is a > direct experience. Though we would automatically, compulsively, > subsequently subject that brute experience to semiotic interpretation. This > is pre-semiotic experience, and I think could be described as direct or > immediate experience. > > Further, I believe Peirce also asserted that one can experience firstness > directly, though in his examples, and in the normal course of events, we > can only experience it fleetingly. However, in at least some schools of > Buddhism they assert that it is possible through the right kind of > meditation practice to experience firstness directly in a more durable way, > and with mastery even permanently. This type of experience is spoken of in > Buddhism as mind experiencing mind directly. And this is why from the very > earliest teachings of the Buddha one of the three modes of liberation has > been taught as the 'signless' liberation. > > So in my view, direct experience would have to be pre-semiotic experience > of firstness and secondness. > > Charles Pyle > > --Begin quote from Jon Alan Schmidt----- > > This points to the distinction that I have suggested > between*direct*knowledge/experience > as what we acquire from Percepts vs.*indirect*knowledge/experience as > what we acquire from other kinds of Signs. > > --End quote from Jon Alan Schmidt----- >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
