Helmut, List: Calling something *inveterate *does not mean that "it has come to a natural end-point," it means <https://www.google.com/search?q=Dictionary#dobs=inveterate> that it is "long-established and unlikely to change." Hence physical laws are *inveterate *habits of matter in the sense that they are supposed to be *exceptionless*, as Peirce affirmed in the paragraph right before the passage that we have been discussing.
CSP: The law of habit exhibits a striking contrast to all physical laws in the character of its commands. A physical law is absolute. What it requires is an exact relation. Thus, a physical force introduces into a motion a component motion to be combined with the rest by the parallelogram of forces; but the component motion must actually take place exactly as required by the law of force. On the other hand, no exact conformity is required by the mental law. Nay, exact conformity would be in downright conflict with the law; since it would instantly crystallize thought and prevent all further formation of habit. (CP 6.23, EP 1:292; 1891) Since "matter is effete mind," the theoretically strict physical laws that govern matter emerged from the primordial and less rigid law of habit that governs mind. As Lane highlights in his book (pp. 73-76), Peirce repeatedly reiterated his endorsement of this "objective idealism" in subsequent articles of the same series in *The Monist*, as well as a discarded draft for one of them. CSP: I have begun by showing that *tychism *must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind. (CP 6.102, EP 1:312; 1892) CSP: This obliges me to say, as I do say, on other grounds, that what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound with habits. It still retains the element of diversification; and in that diversification there is life. (CP 6.158, EP 1:331; 1892) CSP: ... physical events are but degraded or undeveloped forms of psychical events ... the phenomena of matter are but the result of the sensibly complete sway of habits upon mind ... (CP 6.264, EP 1:348; 1892) CSP: It may be well here to reflect that if matter has no existence except as a specialization of mind, it follows that whatever affects matter according to regular laws is itself matter. But all mind is directly or indirectly connected with all matter, and acts in a more or less regular way; so that all mind more or less partakes of the nature of matter. (CP 6.268, EP 1:349; 1892) CSP: The ideas spread in conformity to the law of mind, which antedates the very existence of matter. In fact, matter has no existence except as a specialization of mind. Whatever affects matter according to regular laws is matter, in the sense here intended. But there are no laws of mind,--and mind includes matter,--except acquired habits. The very law of habit, itself, is of this nature, as we shall see hereafter. Hence, since all mind is directly or indirectly connected with all matter, it follows that, in this sense, nothing but matter exists. But no habit produces actions absolutely regular; and thus the whole conception of matter is more or less false; and the more feeling there is in any place, the more imperfect the regularity of action is. (W 8:408, cited as R 961A:130, 70-76; 1892) He also made similar comments a few years later. CSP: If I make atoms swerve--as I do--I make them swerve but very very little, because I conceive they are not absolutely dead ... dead matter would be merely the final result of the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete death. Now I would suppose that that result of evolution is not quite complete even in our beakers and crucibles. (CP 6.200, RLT 260-261; 1898) CSP: In view of the principle of continuity, the supreme guide in framing philosophical hypotheses, we must, under this theory, regard matter as mind whose habits have become fixed so as to lose the powers of forming them and losing them ... (CP 6.101; 1902) Perhaps Peirce's clearest restatement of objective idealism was in an unpublished and undated manuscript, which Lane only partially quoted (p. 77). CSP: If we are to use the principle of continuity at all, one of its chief applications should be to explain how one thing can act upon another,--how mind can act upon mind, how matter can act upon matter, and, above all, how mind can act upon matter & matter upon mind. The paradox here has always been that *mind* and *matter* are of disparate natures. But the maxim of continuity will say: this disparateness is a mere matter of degree. Either *mind* is a peculiar kind of *matter*, or else *matter* is a peculiar sort of *mind*. Which is it? If mind is nothing but a highly complicated arrangement of matter,--for which theory there is much to be said,--we are landed in *materialism*, and nominalism is not much in error after all. But if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning, then we are brought to the more elevating theory of *idealism*. (R 936:2-3) I made the case for what I understand to be the corresponding cosmology in my online essay for *Signs - International Journal of Semiotics* ( https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 4:13 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > sorry, Im a little offtopic regarding dogmatic yes or no, but like to talk > about the quote: > > > CSP: The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective > idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical > laws. (CP 6.25, EP 1:293; 1891) > > > First I thought, if a habit is inveterate, meaning it has come to a > natural end-point, then it does not become a physical law, but the physical > law, in the form of this natural end-point, has been there before. I > neither saw a point in calling it habit, but rather adaption (to this > pre-existing law). Like the wings of birds more and more have adapted to > aerodynamic laws. > > But then I thought: Maybe Peirce did not talk about birds, but about the > time right after the big bang, by this way anticipating it: In the chaos of > inflation, merely the laws of logic were existing, and, along with matter, > physical laws emerged. Both matter and physical laws emerged in a process > of adaption to the laws of logic, and this adaption may be called habit, > because the inveterateness was not due to the not yet existing physical > laws, but merely to the laws of logic. > > But what were the pre-existed laws of logic? Mere tautologies, like to say > one plus one is two, as two is defined as two? > > Well, that would be a quite reduced kind of idealism, to define the > primordial ideas as tautologies. But maybe the theory that there is a mind, > that makes things adapt (or to say, adaption/habituation is mind), is > idealism (objective kind) too. And a quite sensible and modern cosmology, > better, I think, than multiverses and anthropocentrism. I could understand, > if some modern physicists had made this up. But how could Peirce? There was > no big bang theory then. > > Best, > Helmut >
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