Jon,
The term 'objective idealism' could characterize a huge family of
theories from antiquity to the present. As an example, see the
article by Einstein that was published in The Christian Register,
June 1948. (Copy below)
As Peirce wrote in CP 4.237, "It's easy to be certain. One has
only to be sufficiently vague." That point implies that the
following five vaguely defined terms could be considered synonyms:
Theos = Logos = Tao = Dharma = God of Spinoza.
But more precise definitions of those term would have more variations
than the number of speakers or authors who used them. Certainty
depends on vagueness. Precision destroys certainty, except in
very narrow subjects, such as formal theories of mathematics.
The statement "matter is effete mind" says something different
from the claims by Einstein, Spinoza, Buddha, Lao Zi, Heraclitus,
Philo of Alexandria, and John the Evangelist. But all three words
in CP 6.25 -- matter, effete, and mind -- are "sufficiently vague"
that "it's easy to be certain."
JFS: That statement [by JAS] has a very dogmatic tone:
JAS: No more so than the entire passage by Peirce that I was
summarizing, which Gary R. already quoted in full.
The difference is not in the conclusion, but in the method of
reasoning and in the choice of words that describe the reasoning.
JFS: The phrase "There are only three options" puts all the
variations over the millennia into three distinct lumps.
JAS: Yes, that is my straightforward reading of the cited passage.
Would you like to offer an alternative interpretation?
The best interpretation of CP 6.24 is an exact quotation of what
Peirce wrote. Nobody other than Peirce himself could produce a
better explanation of what he intended. The best way to clarify
what he wrote is to relate it to other passages (a) by Peirce himself,
(b) by quotations from sources that influenced Peirce, or (c) by
quotations from future authors who addressed related topics.
The following attempt to make it precise destroys the certainty.
It makes a dogmatic claim of three and only three distinct options,
of which the third is the unambiguous conclusion of a formal proof.
JAS
The whole point of CP 6.24-25 (1891) is that once dualism is
dismissed in favor of monism, there are only three options--mind
and matter are independent (neutralism), matter is primordial such
that mind depends on matter (materialism), or mind is primordial
such that matter depends on mind (idealism). Peirce unambiguously
endorsed the last alternative and rejected the others, and as far
as I know, he never abandoned that view.
First, Peirce said a great deal more in those two paragraphs.
That brief statement is not the whole point.
Second, the word 'unambiguous' is never justified for anything
stated in ordinary language. In CP, Peirce used that word only
for statements about mathematics or logic.
Third, the JAS argument has the form "The options A, B, and C
exhaust all the possibilities. But A is false, and B is false.
Therefore, C is true."
This argument assumes a two-valued logic in which every statement
must be True or False. There is no third option, such as Unknown
or Undetermined.
But Note what Peirce wrote in CP 5.505:
A sign is objectively vague, in so far as, leaving its
interpretation more or less indeterminate, it reserves for some
other possible sign or experience the function of completing the
determination. "This month," says the almanac-oracle, "a great event
is to happen." "What event?" "Oh, we shall see. The almanac doesn't
tell that." The general might be defined as that to which the
principle of excluded middle does not apply. A triangle in general
is not isosceles nor equilateral; nor is a triangle in general
scalene. The vague might be defined as that to which the principle
of contradiction does not apply. For it is false neither that an
animal (in a vague sense) is male, nor that an animal is female.
This passage shows that a proof by contradiction is unsound, except
in a formal system of mathematics or logic. I once attended a lecture
by Jerry Fodor, who used such a ploy. He claimed that there were
five options -- A, B, C, D, and E. Then he refuted A, B, C, and D.
Finally, he announced that E must be the conclusion.
At the end of the talk, a colleague who was sitting next to me said,
"Jerry, you have left a burning field of strawmen."
If Peirce were still alive, he would be actively applying his ideas
to the many serious issues we are facing today. A selection of
quotations by Peirce that address important issues today would be
an excellent way to honor and apply his legacy.
John
_____________________________________________________________________
Einstein's reply to a greeting sent by the Liberal Ministers' Club of
New York City. It was published in _The Christian Register_, June 1948,
and reprinted in _Ideas and Opinions_, Crown Publishers, New York, 1954.
Does there truly exist an insuperable contradiction between religion and
science? Can religion be superseded by science? The answers to these
questions have, for centuries, given rise to considerable dispute and,
indeed, bitter fighting. Yet, in my own mind there can be no doubt that
in both cases a dispassionate consideration can only lead to a negative
answer. What complicates the solution, however, is the fact that while
most people readily agree on what is meant by "science," they are likely
to differ on the meaning of "religion."
As to science, we may well define it for our purpose as "methodical
thinking directed toward finding regulative connections between our
sensual experiences." Science, in the immediate, produces knowledge and,
indirectly, means of action. It leads to methodical action if definite
goals are set up in advance. For the function of setting up goals and
passing statements of value transcends its domain. While it is true that
science, to the extent of its grasp of causative connections, may reach
important conclusions as to the compatibility and incompatibility of
goals and evaluations, the independent and fundamental definitions
regarding goals and values remain beyond science's reach.
As regards religion, on the other hand, one is generally agreed that it
deals with goals and evaluations and, in general, with the emotional
foundation of human thinking and acting, as far as these are not
predetermined by the inalterable hereditary disposition of the human
species. Religion is concerned with man's attitude toward nature at
large, with the establishing of ideals for the individual and communal
life, and with mutual human relationship. These ideals religion attempts
to attain by exerting an educational influence on tradition and through
the development and promulgation of certain easily accessible thoughts
and narratives (epics and myths) which are apt to influence evaluation
and action along the lines of the accepted ideals.
It is this mythical, or rather this symbolic, content of the religious
traditions which is likely to come into conflict with science. This
occurs whenever this religious stock of ideas contains dogmatically
fixed statements on subjects which belong in the domain of science.
Thus, it is of vital importance for the preservation of true religion
that such conflicts be avoided when they arise from subjects which, in
fact, are not really essential for the pursuance of the religious aims.
When we consider the various existing religions as to their essential
substance, that is, divested of their myths, they do not seem to me to
differ as basically from each other as the proponents of the
"relativistic" or conventional theory wish us to believe. And this is by
no means surprising. For the moral attitudes of a people that is
supported by religion need always aim at preserving and promoting the
sanity and vitality of the community and its individuals, since
otherwise this community is bound to perish. A people that were to honor
falsehood, defamation, fraud, and murder would be unable, indeed, to
subsist for very long.
When confronted with a specific case, however, it is no easy task to
determine clearly what is desirable and what should be eschewed, just as
we find it difficult to decide what exactly it is that makes good
painting or good music. It is something that may be felt intuitively
more easily than rationally comprehended. Likewise, the great moral
teachers of humanity were, in a way, artistic geniuses in the art of
living. In addition to the most elementary precepts directly motivated
by the preservation of life and the sparing of unnecessary suffering,
there are others to which, although they are apparently not quite
commensurable to the basic precepts, we nevertheless attach considerable
importance. Should truth, for instance, be sought unconditionally even
where its attainment and its accessibility to all would entail heavy
sacrifices in toil and happiness? There are many such questions which,
from a rational vantage point, cannot easily be answered or cannot be
answered at all. Yet, I do not think that the so-called "relativistic"
viewpoint is correct, not even when dealing with the more subtle moral
decisions.
When considering the actual living conditions of present day civilized
humanity from the standpoint of even the most elementary religious
commands, one is bound to experience a feeling of deep and painful
disappointment at what one sees. For while religion prescribes brotherly
love in the relations among the individuals and groups, the actual
spectacle more resembles a battlefield than an orchestra. Everywhere, in
economic as well as in political life, the guiding principle is one of
ruthless striving for success at the expense of one's fellow men. This
competitive spirit prevails even in school and, destroying all feelings
of human fraternity and cooperation, conceives of achievement not as
derived from the love for productive and thoughtful work, but as
springing from personal ambition and fear of rejection.
There are pessimists who hold that such a state of affairs is
necessarily inherent in human nature; it is those who propound such
views that are the enemies of true religion, for they imply thereby that
religious teachings are utopian ideals and unsuited to afford guidance
in human affairs. The study of the social patterns in certain so-called
primitive cultures, however, seems to have made it sufficiently evident
that such a defeatist view is wholly unwarranted. Whoever is concerned
with this problem, a crucial one in the study of religion as such, is
advised to read the description of the Pueblo Indians in Ruth Benedict's
book, Patterns of Culture. Under the hardest living conditions, this
tribe has apparently accomplished the difficult task of delivering its
people from the scourge of competitive spirit and of fostering in it a
temperate, cooperative conduct of life, free of external pressure and
without any curtailment of happiness.
The interpretation of religion, as here advanced, implies a dependence
of science on the religious attitude, a relation which, in our
predominantly materialistic age, is only too easily overlooked. While it
is true that scientific results are entirely independent from religious
or moral considerations, those individuals to whom we owe the great
creative achievements of science were all of them imbued with the truly
religious conviction that this universe of ours is something perfect and
susceptible to the rational striving for knowledge. If this conviction
had not been a strongly emotional one and if those searching for
knowledge had not been inspired by Spinoza's Amor Dei Intellectualis,
they would hardly have been capable of that untiring devotion which
alone enables man to attain his greatest achievements.
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