Jon, List, Jon, although I know that you would like nothing better than to get back to a discussion of Robert Lane's new book, *Peirce on Realism and Idealism, *it is extremely difficult to do this when, instead of discussing Peirce on 'realism' and 'idealism', we are--again--being sidetracked by what I consider to be specious critiques, by John Sowa, regarding your and his "different purposes and respective approaches for studying and discussing Peirce's views on those topics (and others)." JAS
So, while I'm sure this will be misinterpreted by some as a kind of favoritism in your regard by the moderator of this list (it is not--it is rather, once again, an attempt to preserve the culture of peirce-l as established by Joseph Ransdell decades ago), I recommend your post as an excellent and, in my opinion, necessary repudiation--in detail with examples--of John Sowa's (1) nitpicking numerous points in the post, (2) offering examples showing him to be in clear contradiction of his own criticisms, and (3) making it quite clear that he is not dealing much, if at all, with the substantive issues being considered. An example in this last exchange of the 1st: nitpicking, and your response. JFS: The term 'objective idealism' could characterize a huge family of theories from antiquity to the present. JAS: Sure, but we are only discussing the particular theory that *Peirce *called by that name in 1891. There are *many* more. An example of the 2nd, how John's own work contradicts his criticism: JFS: The best interpretation of CP 6.24 is an exact quotation of what Peirce wrote. JAS: Repetition is not interpretation. Why did your response to my post include so many of your own words, rather than only quoting Peirce's? For example, as far as I know, he never said anything that would support your claim that "the best interpretation is an exact quotation." Why did you append a lengthy piece by Einstein? Why did your article <http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/egtut.pdf>, "Peirce's Tutorial on Existential Graphs," include so much commentary--most of the total content, in fact--rather than merely providing a bare transcription of his original text and diagrams? There are many more. An example of the 3rd, how John doesn't address the substantive issues of your posts. JFS: A selection of quotations by Peirce that address important issues today would be an excellent way to honor and apply his legacy. JAS: Indeed, and anyone is always welcome to start a new thread by offering such a selection accordingly. Personally, I would find it helpful if such a post included some opinions about *how *his words "address important issues today," rather than just a series of verbatim quotes. JAS: As for *this *thread, it is supposed to be about Peirce's views on realism and idealism as explored by Lane in his recent book, not our different purposes and respective approaches for studying and discussing Peirce's views on those topics (and others). Indeed, in his post quoted from here, as in many of the last number of weeks, John's responses to your analyses offer little more than examples like these three. I know that I am not alone in finding this 'approach' of his problematic. And, as JAS just wrote: "We already thoroughly covered that ground both on- and off-List not long ago, so now those reading along--or, preferably, joining the conversation--can evaluate for themselves the appropriateness of what we say and/or how we say it." So, let's stop the nitpicking, the self-contradiction, the refusal to address substantive issues and, to add one additional irritant, the absurd hyperbole (JFS: "[Jon's] statement has a very dogmatic tone" ) and get back to the topic of the inquiry: the discussion of Robert Lane's book, *Peirce on Realism and Idealism.* I should add that from private emails I know that Bob Lane, for me a great scholar of especially Peirce's 'extreme realism', is aware of and supports this discussion of his book. Best, Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator) *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Fri, Jul 12, 2019 at 11:02 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > John, List: > > JFS: The term 'objective idealism' could characterize a huge family of > theories from antiquity to the present. > > > Sure, but we are only discussing the particular theory that *Peirce *called > by that name in 1891. > > JFS: The best interpretation of CP 6.24 is an exact quotation of what > Peirce wrote. > > > Repetition is not interpretation. Why did your response to my post > include so many of your own words, rather than only quoting Peirce's? For > example, as far as I know, he never said anything that would support your > claim that "the best interpretation is an exact quotation." Why did you > append a lengthy piece by Einstein? Why did your article > <http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/egtut.pdf>, "Peirce's Tutorial on Existential > Graphs," include so much commentary--most of the total content, in > fact--rather than merely providing a bare transcription of his original > text and diagrams? > > JFS: It makes a dogmatic claim of three and only three distinct options, > of which the third is the unambiguous conclusion of a formal proof. > > > It was not a "dogmatic claim," it was a synopsis of my reading of the > relevant passage, and I went on to provide additional supporting quotations > in a subsequent post. Again, if there are *later *writings by Peirce > that might be understood to *repudiate *objective idealism as he defined > it in 1891, then I would sincerely like to take a look at them. I ask once > more--are you aware of any? > > JFS: First, Peirce said a great deal more in those two paragraphs. That > brief statement is not the whole point. > > > In common parlance, the expression "the whole point of X" means a concise > summary of X. > > JFS: Second, the word 'unambiguous' is never justified for anything > stated in ordinary language. > > > That assertion sounds rather dogmatic, not to mention self-defeating. In > any case, what I characterized as "unambiguous" was not Peirce's statement > itself, but his endorsement of objective idealism. Perhaps I could have > said "unqualified" instead, but how about dealing with the *substance *of > my posts, rather than continually nitpicking at my methodology and choice > of words? > > JFS: Third, the JAS argument has the form "The options A, B, and C > exhaust all the possibilities. But A is false, and B is false. Therefore, > C is true." > > > That is because *Peirce's *argument has the *very same* form, once he > rejected out of hand the fourth option of dualism in favor of monism. > However, his assessment was not quite that neutralism and materialism are > *false*, such that idealism is *true*, but rather that (objective) > idealism is the only *intelligible *theory of the universe. Elsewhere (R > 936:3) he invoked the principle of continuity as narrowing the choice down > to materialism vs. idealism, aligning the former with nominalism--perhaps > the harshest criticism he could apply to it--and calling the latter "the > more elevating theory." > > JFS: A selection of quotations by Peirce that address important issues > today would be an excellent way to honor and apply his legacy. > > > Indeed, and anyone is always welcome to start a new thread by offering > such a selection accordingly. Personally, I would find it helpful if such > a post included some opinions about *how *his words "address important > issues today," rather than just a series of verbatim quotes. > > As for *this *thread, it is supposed to be about Peirce's views on > realism and idealism as explored by Lane in his recent book, not our > different purposes and respective approaches for studying and discussing > Peirce's views on those topics (and others). We already thoroughly covered > that ground both on- and off-List not long ago, so now those reading > along--or, preferably, joining the conversation--can evaluate for > themselves the appropriateness of what we say and/or how we say it. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Jul 12, 2019 at 9:05 AM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon, >> >> The term 'objective idealism' could characterize a huge family of >> theories from antiquity to the present. As an example, see the >> article by Einstein that was published in The Christian Register, >> June 1948. (Copy below) >> >> As Peirce wrote in CP 4.237, "It's easy to be certain. One has >> only to be sufficiently vague." That point implies that the >> following five vaguely defined terms could be considered synonyms: >> Theos = Logos = Tao = Dharma = God of Spinoza. >> >> But more precise definitions of those term would have more variations >> than the number of speakers or authors who used them. Certainty >> depends on vagueness. Precision destroys certainty, except in >> very narrow subjects, such as formal theories of mathematics. >> >> The statement "matter is effete mind" says something different >> from the claims by Einstein, Spinoza, Buddha, Lao Zi, Heraclitus, >> Philo of Alexandria, and John the Evangelist. But all three words >> in CP 6.25 -- matter, effete, and mind -- are "sufficiently vague" >> that "it's easy to be certain." >> >> > JFS: That statement [by JAS] has a very dogmatic tone: >> > >> > JAS: No more so than the entire passage by Peirce that I was >> > summarizing, which Gary R. already quoted in full. >> >> The difference is not in the conclusion, but in the method of >> reasoning and in the choice of words that describe the reasoning. >> >> > JFS: The phrase "There are only three options" puts all the >> > variations over the millennia into three distinct lumps. >> > >> > JAS: Yes, that is my straightforward reading of the cited passage. >> > Would you like to offer an alternative interpretation? >> >> The best interpretation of CP 6.24 is an exact quotation of what >> Peirce wrote. Nobody other than Peirce himself could produce a >> better explanation of what he intended. The best way to clarify >> what he wrote is to relate it to other passages (a) by Peirce himself, >> (b) by quotations from sources that influenced Peirce, or (c) by >> quotations from future authors who addressed related topics. >> >> The following attempt to make it precise destroys the certainty. >> It makes a dogmatic claim of three and only three distinct options, >> of which the third is the unambiguous conclusion of a formal proof. >> >> JAS >> > The whole point of CP 6.24-25 (1891) is that once dualism is >> > dismissed in favor of monism, there are only three options--mind >> > and matter are independent (neutralism), matter is primordial such >> > that mind depends on matter (materialism), or mind is primordial >> > such that matter depends on mind (idealism). Peirce unambiguously >> > endorsed the last alternative and rejected the others, and as far >> > as I know, he never abandoned that view. >> >> First, Peirce said a great deal more in those two paragraphs. >> That brief statement is not the whole point. >> >> Second, the word 'unambiguous' is never justified for anything >> stated in ordinary language. In CP, Peirce used that word only >> for statements about mathematics or logic. >> >> Third, the JAS argument has the form "The options A, B, and C >> exhaust all the possibilities. But A is false, and B is false. >> Therefore, C is true." >> >> This argument assumes a two-valued logic in which every statement >> must be True or False. There is no third option, such as Unknown >> or Undetermined. >> >> But Note what Peirce wrote in CP 5.505: >> > A sign is objectively vague, in so far as, leaving its >> > interpretation more or less indeterminate, it reserves for some >> > other possible sign or experience the function of completing the >> > determination. "This month," says the almanac-oracle, "a great event >> > is to happen." "What event?" "Oh, we shall see. The almanac doesn't >> > tell that." The general might be defined as that to which the >> > principle of excluded middle does not apply. A triangle in general >> > is not isosceles nor equilateral; nor is a triangle in general >> > scalene. The vague might be defined as that to which the principle >> > of contradiction does not apply. For it is false neither that an >> > animal (in a vague sense) is male, nor that an animal is female. >> >> This passage shows that a proof by contradiction is unsound, except >> in a formal system of mathematics or logic. I once attended a lecture >> by Jerry Fodor, who used such a ploy. He claimed that there were >> five options -- A, B, C, D, and E. Then he refuted A, B, C, and D. >> Finally, he announced that E must be the conclusion. >> >> At the end of the talk, a colleague who was sitting next to me said, >> "Jerry, you have left a burning field of strawmen." >> >> If Peirce were still alive, he would be actively applying his ideas >> to the many serious issues we are facing today. A selection of >> quotations by Peirce that address important issues today would be >> an excellent way to honor and apply his legacy. >> >> John >> _____________________________________________________________________ >> >> Einstein's reply to a greeting sent by the Liberal Ministers' Club of >> New York City. It was published in _The Christian Register_, June 1948, >> and reprinted in _Ideas and Opinions_, Crown Publishers, New York, 1954. >> >> Does there truly exist an insuperable contradiction between religion and >> science? Can religion be superseded by science? The answers to these >> questions have, for centuries, given rise to considerable dispute and, >> indeed, bitter fighting. Yet, in my own mind there can be no doubt that >> in both cases a dispassionate consideration can only lead to a negative >> answer. What complicates the solution, however, is the fact that while >> most people readily agree on what is meant by "science," they are likely >> to differ on the meaning of "religion." >> >> As to science, we may well define it for our purpose as "methodical >> thinking directed toward finding regulative connections between our >> sensual experiences." Science, in the immediate, produces knowledge and, >> indirectly, means of action. It leads to methodical action if definite >> goals are set up in advance. For the function of setting up goals and >> passing statements of value transcends its domain. While it is true that >> science, to the extent of its grasp of causative connections, may reach >> important conclusions as to the compatibility and incompatibility of >> goals and evaluations, the independent and fundamental definitions >> regarding goals and values remain beyond science's reach. >> >> As regards religion, on the other hand, one is generally agreed that it >> deals with goals and evaluations and, in general, with the emotional >> foundation of human thinking and acting, as far as these are not >> predetermined by the inalterable hereditary disposition of the human >> species. Religion is concerned with man's attitude toward nature at >> large, with the establishing of ideals for the individual and communal >> life, and with mutual human relationship. These ideals religion attempts >> to attain by exerting an educational influence on tradition and through >> the development and promulgation of certain easily accessible thoughts >> and narratives (epics and myths) which are apt to influence evaluation >> and action along the lines of the accepted ideals. >> >> It is this mythical, or rather this symbolic, content of the religious >> traditions which is likely to come into conflict with science. This >> occurs whenever this religious stock of ideas contains dogmatically >> fixed statements on subjects which belong in the domain of science. >> Thus, it is of vital importance for the preservation of true religion >> that such conflicts be avoided when they arise from subjects which, in >> fact, are not really essential for the pursuance of the religious aims. >> >> When we consider the various existing religions as to their essential >> substance, that is, divested of their myths, they do not seem to me to >> differ as basically from each other as the proponents of the >> "relativistic" or conventional theory wish us to believe. And this is by >> no means surprising. For the moral attitudes of a people that is >> supported by religion need always aim at preserving and promoting the >> sanity and vitality of the community and its individuals, since >> otherwise this community is bound to perish. A people that were to honor >> falsehood, defamation, fraud, and murder would be unable, indeed, to >> subsist for very long. >> >> When confronted with a specific case, however, it is no easy task to >> determine clearly what is desirable and what should be eschewed, just as >> we find it difficult to decide what exactly it is that makes good >> painting or good music. It is something that may be felt intuitively >> more easily than rationally comprehended. Likewise, the great moral >> teachers of humanity were, in a way, artistic geniuses in the art of >> living. In addition to the most elementary precepts directly motivated >> by the preservation of life and the sparing of unnecessary suffering, >> there are others to which, although they are apparently not quite >> commensurable to the basic precepts, we nevertheless attach considerable >> importance. Should truth, for instance, be sought unconditionally even >> where its attainment and its accessibility to all would entail heavy >> sacrifices in toil and happiness? There are many such questions which, >> from a rational vantage point, cannot easily be answered or cannot be >> answered at all. Yet, I do not think that the so-called "relativistic" >> viewpoint is correct, not even when dealing with the more subtle moral >> decisions. >> >> When considering the actual living conditions of present day civilized >> humanity from the standpoint of even the most elementary religious >> commands, one is bound to experience a feeling of deep and painful >> disappointment at what one sees. For while religion prescribes brotherly >> love in the relations among the individuals and groups, the actual >> spectacle more resembles a battlefield than an orchestra. Everywhere, in >> economic as well as in political life, the guiding principle is one of >> ruthless striving for success at the expense of one's fellow men. This >> competitive spirit prevails even in school and, destroying all feelings >> of human fraternity and cooperation, conceives of achievement not as >> derived from the love for productive and thoughtful work, but as >> springing from personal ambition and fear of rejection. >> >> There are pessimists who hold that such a state of affairs is >> necessarily inherent in human nature; it is those who propound such >> views that are the enemies of true religion, for they imply thereby that >> religious teachings are utopian ideals and unsuited to afford guidance >> in human affairs. The study of the social patterns in certain so-called >> primitive cultures, however, seems to have made it sufficiently evident >> that such a defeatist view is wholly unwarranted. Whoever is concerned >> with this problem, a crucial one in the study of religion as such, is >> advised to read the description of the Pueblo Indians in Ruth Benedict's >> book, Patterns of Culture. Under the hardest living conditions, this >> tribe has apparently accomplished the difficult task of delivering its >> people from the scourge of competitive spirit and of fostering in it a >> temperate, cooperative conduct of life, free of external pressure and >> without any curtailment of happiness. >> >> The interpretation of religion, as here advanced, implies a dependence >> of science on the religious attitude, a relation which, in our >> predominantly materialistic age, is only too easily overlooked. While it >> is true that scientific results are entirely independent from religious >> or moral considerations, those individuals to whom we owe the great >> creative achievements of science were all of them imbued with the truly >> religious conviction that this universe of ours is something perfect and >> susceptible to the rational striving for knowledge. If this conviction >> had not been a strongly emotional one and if those searching for >> knowledge had not been inspired by Spinoza's Amor Dei Intellectualis, >> they would hardly have been capable of that untiring devotion which >> alone enables man to attain his greatest achievements. >> >
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