List,
I think, Edwina is right, because anything that happens, like an action of a mind, requires time, and time needs a scale, and a scale needs boundary conditions. These may be a standstill on one side, and light velocity, or something else, maybe infinity, on the other. So i guess, there cannot be a mind at work (at some certain, or any, speed) without the concept of standstill or effeteness, which would be matter. Also, a mind does not only require time, but space too, and space and matter are two things that, according to Einstein, are prerequisites for each other, as you, I forgot who, already have mentioned.
Best,
Helmut
02. August 2019 um 19:41 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]>wrote:
"Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]>wrote:
JAS, Gary R, list:
I continue to disagree with your stance that Peirce's objective idealism is equivalent to idealism - and that 'the psychical law is primordial' - with the psychical law as 3ns.
My reading of Peirce is that NOTHING is primordial - neither Mind nor Matter. Instead, my reading of Peirce is that objective idealism means that Mind is working on Matter. Again, Peirce did not say that his theory was 'idealism'; he specifically used the term of 'objective' added to that idealism. What is 'objective'? An external, non-subjective object; ie, matter. Mind cannot operate on its own; therefore, it is working with/on Matter
My understanding of Peirce is that both Matter and Mind are co-evolving. Neither is primordial; but they co-evolve in complexity. An atom is less complex than a cell, and the Mind that functions as the organization of an atom is less complex than the Mind that organizes the organization of a cell. What is going on in our universe is the co-development of Mind-as-Matter and Matter-as-Mind; both increasing in complexity. Again - neither is primordial.
I consider it an error to think that 3ns, or habit-taking is primordial. As Peirce says, 'three elements are active in the world:first, chance; second, law, and third, habit-taking' 1.409. That is - the three categories are not primordial.
What is primordial? Nothing. As Peirce writes - "in the beginning - infinitely remote - there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being without connections or regularity would properly be without existence" 6.33
That is - there is no 3ns in this state of 'unpersonalized feeling'. This means - there is no 'Mind' or 'idealism.
Edwina
On Fri 02/08/19 9:33 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] sent:
Gary R., List:I have no desire to engage in yet another round of debates about CP 6.24-25. I fully agree with your excellent summary below, as well as your subsequent posts. Peirce's position is quite plainly stated in the text itself--not dualism, neutralism, or materialism, but idealism; specifically, objective idealism, which holds "the psychical law alone as primordial" and "that matter is effete mind."Your comments about Deacon reflect remarks that I came across recently in a 2012 paper by Matthew E. Moore--"We who are already convinced of Peirce’s greatness tend to forget how impenetrable he can look to the rest of the human race. The conceptual overhead of Peirce’s philosophy is almost prohibitively high ..." I suspect that this contributes to at least some of the recurring disputes here on the List--each of us has absorbed different amounts and different portions of that vast "conceptual overhead"--and I have found it to be a formidable obstacle to overcome whenever I want to explain Peirce to a non-Peircean. The " curse of knowledge" comes into play; I tend to forget that others are utterly unfamiliar with certain ideas and principles that I have come to take for granted.Moore went on to suggest that "we will need at least something answering to his categories and his theory of signs if we are to get much philosophical mileage out of Peirce," and the purpose of that particular paper is to question whether "the continuum" also needs to be included, as Peirce seemed to believe. What else (if anything) qualifies as bare minimum for understanding and appreciating Peirce's thought overall? What resources (if any) have you and others found especially helpful for enabling the uninitiated to get up to speed?Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran LaymanOn Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 3:46 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote:Edwina, list,Edwina wrote: "My only quibble with the title is 'How Mind Emerged from Matter'. My own view is that neither was primary; both emerged and function together."I also would quibble--perhaps more than quibble--with Deacon's subtitle. But, and following Peirce's view--objective idealism--I see mind as primordial.Seeing matter as primordial Peirce terms 'materialism', a view which he rejects as "repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel."He also rejects the third option which you support: that the two arose together, which was then, apparently, referred to as 'monism' but which Peirce prefers to call 'neutralism'. He 'condemns' monism-neutralism on the basis of "Ockham's razor": "By placing the inward and outward aspects of substance on a par, it seems to render both primordial."For Peirce the universe does not commence as a peculiar kind of 2ns with the laws of mind and matter 'arising' together and co-equal.('Objective idealism' was recently discussed in another thread here.)CP 6.24-25 (1890) The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to some form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism. Then the question arises whether physical laws on the one hand and the psychical law on the other are to be taken --(a) as independent, a doctrine often called monism, but which I would name neutralism; or,(b) the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law alone as primordial, which is materialism; or,(c) the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism.The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a hypothesis absolutely irreducible to reason -- an ultimate, inexplicable regularity; while the only possible justification of any theory is that it should make things clear and reasonable.Neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known as Ockham's razor, i.e., that not more independent elements are to be supposed than necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of substance on a par, it seems to render both primordial.The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws. But before this can be accepted it must show itself capable of explaining the tridimensionality of space, the laws of motion, and the general characteristics of the universe, with mathematical clearness and precision; for no less should be demanded of every philosophy. (Boldface added to emphasize that Peirce is discussing laws throughout.)As brilliant a thinker as Deacon is, he appears to some, including me, to be a kind of "partial Peirceian," to some I've spoken with, even a "thief of Peirce," an _expression_ Walker Percy used to describe his own use of Peirce: that is, using what is useful to ones own argument and ignoring or discarding what is not. I tend to think of him as much more the former than the latter, for his understanding of Peircean semeiotics seems to me partial (although he uses some of Peircean thinking well in Incomplete Nature, although not very much of his semeiotic). But even if his understanding of Peirce seems partial and 'incomplete', he appears to me to make a good faith attempt to be true to his ownunderstanding.This partial understanding was apparent even in consideration of his first book, The Symbolic Species, and I recall discussions with several Peirceans at an ICCS conference at the UAH in Huntsville, Alabama, a number of years ago who found his thinking both stimulating in some regards, but also somewhat superficial in consideration of some well-established Peircean principles.I will have more to say on Incomplete Nature (and its unfortunate subtitle) including his novel use of 'constraint'. But I'm unexpecedly away from my downtown desk and do not have my copy of Incomplete Nature with me uptown where I am about to be entertaining out of town guests.Best,GaryGary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York
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