Jon, List, I've changed the subject line to reflect a change in emphasis. You wrote:
JAS: I have said several times now that one of the ways in which my speculative grammar deviates from Peirce's is by rejecting qualisigns, and I have given my primary reason for this each time--a quality *in itself* cannot represent something else, it can only present itself; and therefore, a quality *in itself *cannot be a sign. So far no one has actually *argued *against this position or offered any example of a quality that is a sign *in itself*, rather than a tone that inheres in a token. I recalled reading a while back this proposed example of a quality capable of signifying, that is, a quality in itself acting as a sign. Examples of signs whose sign-vehicle relies upon a quality are difficult to imagine, but a particularly clear example, used by David Savan, is this: […] I use a color chip to identify the color of some paint I want to buy. The color chip is perhaps made of cardboard, rectangular, resting on a wooden table etc., etc. But it is only the color of the chip that is essential to it as a sign of the color of the paint. (Savan 1988, 20) There are many elements to the colored chip as a sign, but it is only its color that matters to its ability to signify. Any sign whose sign-vehicle relies, as with this example, on simple abstracted qualities is called a qualisign. "Peirce's Theory of Signs" (Albert Atkin) in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/ What do you think?Best,Gary "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 9:21 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > John, List: > > I seem to recall a recent on-List assertion that "Peirce would cringe at > most, if not all attempts to paraphrase his thoughts." That is exactly > what the first sentence below constitutes, unless it can be supported by a > direct quotation from Peirce in which he explicitly states that a theory > being "fallible" does not mean that we are "free to make adjustments" to it. > > I seem to recall another recent on-List assertion that Peirce "would be > horrified at the thought that anybody would attempt to pick and choose some > rigid set of quotations as a definitive formulation of his thought." > Besides being another (presumably cringe-worthy) attempt to paraphrase his > thoughts, this statement apparently prohibits us from taking his writings > about semeiotic (or anything else) as a definitive formulation of his > theory. > > In any case, Kuhn's concept of "normal science" is by no means limited to > finding new applications of an established theory. If every theory is > fallible, then every theory is susceptible of further theoretical > adjustments, which need not overturn the *entire *theory. In other > words, there is a huge difference between proposing changes to some of the > *details > *of the theory--which is all that I am doing--and advocating a > fundamental paradigm shift. > > I have said several times now that one of the ways in which my speculative > grammar deviates from Peirce's is by rejecting qualisigns, and I have given > my primary reason for this each time--a quality *in itself* cannot > represent something else, it can only present itself; and therefore, a > quality *in itself *cannot be a sign. So far no one has actually *argued > *against this position or offered any example of a quality that is a sign *in > itself*, rather than a tone that inheres in a token. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > >> >>
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
