Gary R., List: I would say that the color of the paint chip is a tone that inheres in a token, not a quality that *in itself* is a sign. The paint chip is certainly not a pure icon, as a qualisign would have to be, since it is also an index of the paint that the shopper intends to buy. In that sense, it is false that *only *the color of the chip is essential; the shopper is also relying on the consistency of the paint's chemical composition to *produce* the same color on whatever surface will be painted, as well as the same texture and perhaps other properties. Moreover, consider what Peirce wrote in the context of contrasting the *real* with the *external*, and the *external* with the *mental*.
CSP: On the other hand, the colors of objects of human experience and in particular the contrast between the color of the petals of a Jaqueminot rose and that of the leaves of the bush, although it is relative to the sense of sight, is not *mental*, in my sense of that word. It is true that all colors are relative to the sense of sight. Yet there is a difference between a color and a sensation of color. For a color is a quality of a thing which remains the same whether it be exposed to one kind of illumination or to another, and whether it be seen by a normal or by a color-blind eye. Such is the established signification of the word "color." For we do not say that the petals and leaves of a rose-bush have the same color when they are viewed by color-blind people: on the contrary, we say that such people cannot distinguish those colors. (CP 6.327, 1907) As I have pointed out before, "there is a difference between a color [or other quality] and a sensation of" it. I happen to have red-deficient vision myself, so I routinely have trouble telling apart certain shades of blue/purple and green/brown. Consequently, my evaluations of paint chips bearing those colors are considerably less reliable than my wife's, whose color vision is normal. Sometimes even yellow and red traffic lights look very similar to me, so I have to fall back on whether the top/left or middle one is glowing in order to tell them apart. In any case, Peirce himself affirms that a qualisign "cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied," and likewise, "Every legisign signifies through an instance of its application" (CP 2.244-246, EP 2:291, 1903). That is why I focus primarily on analyzing sign *tokens *(sinsigns)--they are the only *actual* signs that determine dynamical interpretants, which can vary for tokens of the same type that possess different tones. Atkin's unfortunate use of the non-Peircean term "sign-vehicle" in the SEP article obscures this. Already in 1904, while still employing his 1903 terminology, Peirce anticipates his later definitions. CSP: As it is in itself, a sign is either of the nature of an appearance, when I call it a *qualisign*; or secondly, it is an individual object or event, when I call it a *sinsign* ... or thirdly, it is of the nature of a general type, when I call it a *legisign*. As we use the term 'word' in most cases, saying that 'the' is one 'word' and 'an' is a second 'word,' a 'word' is a legisign. But when we say of a page in a book, that it has 250 'words' upon it, of which twenty are 'the's, the 'word' is a sinsign. A sinsign so embodying a legisign, I term a 'replica' of the legisign. The difference between a legisign and a qualisign, neither of which is an individual thing, is that a legisign has a definite identity, though usually admitting a great variety of appearances. Thus, &, *and*, and the sound are all one word. The qualisign, on the other hand, has no identity. It is the mere quality of an appearance and is not exactly the same throughout a second. Instead of identity, it has *great similarity*, and cannot differ much without being called quite another qualisign. (CP 8.334) By 1906 (CP 4.537), "qualisign" becomes "tone," "sinsign" becomes "token," "legisign" becomes "type" (as foreshadowed here), and "replica" becomes "instance" (as foreshadowed even earlier, quoted above). A qualisign "has no identity" and a tone is an "indefinite significant character," while a legisign "has a definite identity" and a type is "a definitely significant Form." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 11:54 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I've changed the subject line to reflect a change in emphasis. You wrote: > > JAS: I have said several times now that one of the ways in which my > speculative grammar deviates from Peirce's is by rejecting qualisigns, and > I have given my primary reason for this each time--a quality *in itself* > cannot > represent something else, it can only present itself; and therefore, a > quality *in itself *cannot be a sign. So far no one has actually > *argued *against this position or offered any example of a quality that > is a sign *in itself*, rather than a tone that inheres in a token. > > I recalled reading a while back this proposed example of a quality capable > of signifying, that is, a quality in itself acting as a sign. > > Examples of signs whose sign-vehicle relies upon a quality are difficult > to imagine, but a particularly clear example, used by David Savan, is this: > > […] I use a color chip to identify the color of some paint I want to buy. > The color chip is perhaps made of cardboard, rectangular, resting on a > wooden table etc., etc. But it is only the color of the chip that is > essential to it as a sign of the color of the paint. (Savan 1988, 20) > > There are many elements to the colored chip as a sign, but it is only its > color that matters to its ability to signify. Any sign whose sign-vehicle > relies, as with this example, on simple abstracted qualities is called a > qualisign. "Peirce's Theory of Signs" (Albert Atkin) in Stanford > Encyclopedia of Philosophy > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/ > > What do you think?Best,Gary > "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >
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