Robert,
A clear statement, thanks. I have but one remark. You wrote: RM: I begin with a short history that will show that the state of the relationship between proponents of methods described as empirical and those of mathematical methods is not good. -- You go on to describe your discussion with JAS. Frankly, I do not think that that discussion is of any showing value for the discussion between emperical and mathematical oriented semioticians. References outside the corpus of Peirce not being made. That does not mean that I disagree with your statement about the types of semioticians. Of course written from the other side of the fence. I think this only gets better if both types have converging interests. Best, Auke Op 16 mei 2020 om 18:18 schreef robert marty <[email protected]>: The general clash over the role of mathematics in knowledge creation was preceded by a debate between Jon Alan and myself. It was a false debate because Jon Alan only paraphrased Peirce, I'll show it. I begin with a short history that will show that the state of the relationship between proponents of methods described as empirical and those of mathematical methods is not good. In most likely the embodiement of the former by the latter often experienced as a domination while it is an obligatory passage for the increase of knowledge. We will check it in a particular case, without excessive passion even if there will be no charity ... JAS > (07/05) "Unfortunately I am not adept enough with mathematical category theory to make heads or tails of Robert's exposition below. It still seems to me that "category" means something quite different in that context than it does for Peirce when he is writing about 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. Am I wrong? If so, I would appreciate some further explanation of how they relate to each other." RM > (07/05) I create for him a short post that I finally posted on the web: https://www.academia.edu/42974040/Build_the_lattice_of_the_10_classes_of_signs_in_one_lesson https://www.academia.edu/42974040/Build_the_lattice_of_the_10_classes_of_signs_in_one_lesson Here's his polite answer... and treacherous ... JAS > (08/05) "I sincerely appreciate the additional attempt to explain below, but I am afraid that I still cannot detect an answer despite reading it several times, because it remains couched entirely in the unfamiliar vocabulary of mathematical category theory--"morphism," "composition," "functor," "natural transformation," etc. I do not have the requisite acquaintance with that particular system of signs to interpret it successfully". RM > It is clear: for JAS a vocabulary that is not familiar to him can only produce a particular system of signs that he cannot decipher (a bit like hieroglyphics before Champollion). Yet I was exhausted to say that the axiomatized objects I used benefited of the usual universality of mathematics in the sense that Peirce means precisely: CSP > (classifications of sciences) - mathematics, the study of ideal constructions without reference to their real existence, -empirics, the study of phenomena with the purpose of identifying their forms with those mathematics has studied, - Pragmatics, the study of how we ought to behave in the ligth of the truths of empirics." [C.S. Peirce, 1976: NEM , vol.III.2 , 1122] What he notes again in another text: 1. Mathematics, which frames and studies the consequences of hypotheses without concerning itself about whether there is anything in nature analogous to its hypotheses or not. [C.S. Peirce, 1976: NEM , vol. IV, 228] Moreover, the rest is eloquent on Peirce's opinion about the relationship of philosophers with mathematics ... I can provide it on request ... Everyone will understand that I did not appreciate that the work I have been doing for 45 years is relegated to the particular systems ... I find it treacherous to use one's incapacity (and de facto any supposed individual or collective incapacity outside) to marginalize a scientific practice. This debate is also open and I have spoken ... In my opinion what I am trying to do now is to bring it down in the field of semiotics. It is long and difficult but it must be conducted with all the necessary critical sense and restraint, i.e. with "generosity and no charity" ... I'm going to put it all back in place since I now have the information to analyze Jon Allan's system which opens a singular fight between this S → Od-S → S-If chain dated 1903 and the mathematical object "functor" that formalizes the chain of determinations O à S à I dated 1905 and sqq... Indeed he writes in an answer: JAS > (12/05) "Hence the logical order of determination is S → Od-S → S-If, which we use to obtain the familiar ten classes of signs. Note that this has nothing whatsoever to do with which classes of signs can be determined (in a different sense) by other signs. In fact, only a symbolic sign can determine a further sign as its dynamical interpretant. An indexical sign can only produce an exertion or a feeling, and an iconic sign can only produce a feeling. It also has nothing whatsoever to do with which classes of signs are involved in other signs. Every actual replica of a legisign is a sinsign that possesses qualisigns. Every symbolic sign involves indexical and iconic signs, and every indexical sign involves iconic signs. Every argument involves dicisigns and rhemes, and every dicisign involves rhemes." RM > I noted immediately that he wrote that the sign determined his own determination, a strange thing difficult to attribute to Peirce but he gives us incomprehensible details about what some others do in a different sense ... and it states some truisms in reinforcement ... We can forget this because fortunately comes this post the next day: .JAS > 13/05 Part 1 :" In my post https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00117.html yesterday, I was not referring to any particular definition of a sign, but rather Peirce's 1903 taxonomy of ten classes of signs (CP 2.243-265, EP 2:291-297). It should not be controversial at all to say that it is based on three trichotomies--for the sign itself (S) as qualisign/sinsign/legisign, for its dyadic relation with the object (Od-S) as iconic/indexical/symbolic, and for its dyadic relation with the interpretant (S-If) as rheme/dicisign/argument--arranged in logical order as S → Od-S → S-If. Part 2 : "This is not my personal opinion, it is what Peirce himself presents in the referenced passage " Part 3 : Please note, the arrows here do not have anything to do with involution or presupposition, only determination as the logical relation between the different trichotomies for sign classification, such that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908)." RM > These texts CP 2.243-265, EP 2:291-297 are also references that I have been cultivating for decades. There is everything it takes to open (and close) an exemplary debate, far from the anathemas to those who block or not the way of inquiry. I cut it into three parts for convenience reasons. I immediately notice that in Part 1 the term determination has disappeared when compared with the post of the previous day and that in Part 3 Jon Alan brings details on his arrows saying what they are not (presupposition or involution) which is also the case of the arrows of O à S à I which are true determinations. Also in Part3 he adds again says that these are determinations that act as relationships between different trichotomies. I develop them in betraying it as follows: First Trichotomy [ Qualisigne ; Sinsign ; Legisign ] S ↓ Second Trichotomy [ Icon ; Index ; Symbol ] Od-S ↓ Third Trichotomy [ Rhème ; Dicisign ; Argument ] S-If He goes on to say how he intends to combine these trichotomies and cites Peirce's well-known conditions that ""a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant, dated 1908. (which I have shown are equivalent to the presupposition relationships between the coenopythagorean categories he now uses). But what he does was already done a long time ago by Peirce himself (see attachment) [Une image contenant dessin Description générée automatiquement] Jon Alan was absolutely right in his Part 2: "is what Peirce himself presents in the referenced passage" But no more. Conclusion : His whole speech is therefore merely a paraphrase and the famous logical arrangement S → Od-S → S-If is a mystification, just a label on a handyman box that contains CP 2.243-265, EP 2:291-297. To use it you have to do what almost all beginners have done and that I have also done, that is to reinvent the wheel. But when you do this with simple functors as I did, you then have the natural transformations of the functors and the organization of all the classes of signs in a lattice. It helps to understand why Peirce is legitimate when he writes in the class description from 2,254 to 2.2.263 for each sign that embody other signs. I have shown it extensively for a long time. And of course we can do tests like the one I did on nicotine and much more. https://www.academia.edu/42930701/Nicotine_a_semiotic_confrontation_between_life_and_death END OF GAME ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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