Jeff, List: JAS: In other words, Peirce denies that excluded middle is an absolutely exceptionless *law* (NEM 4:xiii, no date), which is presumably why he typically prefers to call it a *principle *instead.
JD: On its face, I believe this expresses some confusion about the differences between principles and laws. Here is the passage by Peirce that I cited but did not quote. CSP: Logic requires us, with reference to each question we have in hand, to hope some definite answer to it may be true. That *hope *with reference to each case as it comes up is, by a *saltus*, stated by logicians as a *law* concerning *all cases*, namely, the law of excluded middle. This law amounts to saying that the universe has a perfect reality. (NEM 4:xiii, no date) Logicians typically treat excluded middle "as a *law* concerning *all cases*," but Peirce recognizes that this is "a *saltus*" (leap) grounded in the regulative *hope *that every question has a definite answer, which is only true if "the universe has a perfect reality." Eisele references R 140, but this excerpt does not actually appear in that manuscript, and Robert Lane states in *Peirce on Realism and Idealism*, "I have not been able to identify its actual source" (p. 179 n. 17). As far as I know, it is the only place in Peirce's vast corpus where he uses "law of excluded middle," although he discusses the "law of excluded third" as one of "the three fundamental laws of logic" according to "Boole's system" in a very early manuscript (NEM 3:316-318, 1865-6). By contrast, "law of contradiction" appears five times in CP and is affirmed as such in each instance. JD: According to a neo-Kantian view of rational laws, a law of logic governs the relations between the facts expressed in the premisses and conclusion of an argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our representation of such a law. To clarify, are you claiming that this was *Peirce's *view of the relationship between principles and laws, or suggesting that it is how *we* should distinguish them? If the former, what specific passages in Peirce's writings do you interpret as endorsing such a view? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Aug 5, 2020 at 11:09 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon Schmidt, List, > > I'd like to take up the distinction between principles and laws. > > Jon S: "In other words, Peirce denies that excluded middle is an > absolutely exceptionless *law *(NEM 4:xiii, no date), which is presumably > why he typically prefers to call it a *principle *instead." > > On its face, I believe this expresses some confusion about the differences > between principles and laws. I think Peirce makes the following sort > of distinction between the two. Consider the following argument, which is > from the second section of Kant's *Grounding for the Metaphysics of > Morals*: > > Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being > has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that > is, in accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is required > for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than > practical reason. (Ak 412) > > According to a neo-Kantian view of rational laws, a law of logic governs > the relations between the facts expressed in the premisses and conclusion > of an argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our representation of > such a law. > > A *logic utens* consists of the habits of inference that embody such > principles. Those principles are subject to criticism precisely because > they may not match up with the laws of logic themselves. The purpose of a > philosophical theory of logic (i.e., a *logica docens*) is to build on > the criticism of our common sense principles for the sake of arriving at a > more adequate theoretical representation of the truth concerning the real > laws that govern the logical relations between such facts. > > As such, we can distinguish between the principles embodied in our *logica > utens* and the principles embodied in a philosophical theory of > logic--and either or both of these may deviate in some respects from the > real laws of logic. > > This distinction is at the root of the classification of genuine triadic > relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories > from within". In this classificatory scheme, the laws of logic function as > laws of fact insofar as they govern those facts directly, and they are in a > genuinely triadic relation to the actual facts and those that are possible > (i.e., in the future). > > The principles of logic, on the other hand, function as symbolic > representations that govern the self-controlled growth of our > understanding. The principles of logic, Peirce points out, do not govern > brute facts with mere necessity. Rather, they function as imperatives that > dictate how we ought to think. As such, the principles of logic differ from > the laws of logic insofar as they are in *thoroughly* genuine triadic > relations to the premisses and conclusions that are part of our inquiries. > The principles that govern our deductive inferences are capable of growth > even if the laws of deductive logic are, in some sense, necessary laws. > > Yours, > > Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > >>
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