Jon AS, you quoted me at the end of your post, but now I’d like to qualify what I said there by quoting Peirce: “we cannot make ourselves understood if we merely say what we mean.” Here’s the context:
[[ The acquiring [of] a habit is nothing but an objective generalization taking place in time. It is the fundamental logical law in course of realization. When I call it objective, I do not mean to say that there really is any difference between the objective and the subjective, except that the subjective is less developed and as yet less generalized. It is only a false word which I insert because after all we cannot make ourselves understood if we merely say what we mean. ] ‘Abstract of 8 lectures’ (NEM IV, 140)] Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: 8-Aug-20 16:36 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs) Jeff, List: JD: Jon S asked for references to texts where Peirce employs the distinction between principles and laws. I specifically asked for references where Peirce supposedly endorses your claim that "a law of logic governs the relations between the facts expressed in the premisses and conclusion of an argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our representation of such a law." JD: Peirce's definition in the Century Dictionary of the term "principle" is instructive on this point. Quoting those definitions would have been appreciated, rather than expecting everyone on the List to look them up for ourselves, although Ben Udell kindly provided a link to the ones for "principle" (another is below). JD: See the 4th and 5th senses and the examples of uses by Aristotle, Hamilton, etc. CSP: 4. A truth which is evident and general; a truth comprehending many subordinate truths; a law on which others are founded, or from which others are derived: as, the principles of morality, of equity, of government, etc. In mathematical physics a principle commonly means a very widely useful theorem. ... 5. That which is professed or accepted as a law of action or a rule of conduct; one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of a system: as, the principles of the Stoics or the Epicureans; hence, a right rule of conduct; in general, equity; uprightness: as, a man of principle. (http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=06 <http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=06&page=294&query=principle> &page=294&query=principle) There are no accompanying examples of uses by Aristotle, and the only one from Hamilton--which mentions Aristotle--is for the 2nd sense, not the 4th or 5th. CSP: 2. Cause, in the widest sense; that by which anything is in any way ultimately determined or regulated. ... "Without entering into the various meanings of the term Principle, which Aristotle defines, in general, that from whence anything exists, is produced, or is known, it is sufficient to say that it is always used for that on which something else depends; and thus both for an original law and for an original element. In the former case it is a regulative, in the latter a constitutive, principle." Sir W. Hamilton, Reid, Note A, §5, Supplementary Dissertations Aristotle and Hamilton evidently define "principle" as "that on which something else depends," such as "an original law." The 4th sense similarly defines it as "a law on which others are founded, or from which others are derived." The 5th sense seems consistent with my interpretation, rather than yours--excluded middle "is professed or accepted as a law" within classical logic, such that it is "one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of [that] system." In any case, Peirce never defines a principle as our representation of a law; on the contrary ... JD: Compare that the 3rd sense of "law" in his definition of the term. CSP: 3. A proposition which expresses the constant or regular order of certain phenomena, or the constant mode of action of a force; a general formula or rule to which all things, or all things or phenomena within the limits of a certain class or group, conform, precisely and without exception; a rule to which events really tend to conform. (http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=04 <http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=04&page=705&query=law> &page=705&query=law) It is a law, not a principle, that he defines as a proposition--i.e.,. a representation. He goes on to call it "a general formula or rule to which all things ... conform, precisely and without exception." As I said before, excluded middle is not a law, because it is not exceptionless. JD: Here is a famous passage [CP 1.405-406, c. 1896] where Peirce explicitly employs the Kantian distinction. Where do you see such a distinction in that passage? The only mention of the word "law" in what you quoted is naming it as something that calls for an explanation. Meanwhile, Peirce straightforwardly equates "a regulative principle" with "an intellectual hope," which is perfectly consistent with his description of the principle of excluded middle as a hope rather than a law in what I quoted previously from NEM 4:xiii. JD: At the same time, I'm trying to understand what Peirce is saying by reading what he is reading. That, I think, is necessary to understand what he's saying. I have no doubt that it is helpful and insightful, but I disagree that it is necessary. Surely it is not a requirement for anyone who wants to understand Peirce's vast corpus of writings to read everything that he was reading at the time, which would obviously be another vast corpus of writings. And would we not then also need to read whatever all those other authors were reading when they wrote what they wrote, in order to understand what they were saying? And so on, ad infinitum. On the contrary, I believe that in most cases a good writer is capable of being understood on his/her own terms. As Gary Fuhrman once summarized <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-09/msg00179.html> , "I assume that he [Peirce] means exactly what he says and says exactly what he means, until I have sufficient reason to abandon that working assumption." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
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