Jeff, List: JD: Jon S asked for references to texts where Peirce employs the distinction between principles and laws.
I specifically asked for references where Peirce supposedly endorses your claim that "a law of logic governs the relations between the facts expressed in the premisses and conclusion of an argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our representation of such a law." JD: Peirce's definition in the Century Dictionary of the term "principle" is instructive on this point. Quoting those definitions would have been appreciated, rather than expecting everyone on the List to look them up for ourselves, although Ben Udell kindly provided a link to the ones for "principle" (another is below). JD: See the 4th and 5th senses and the examples of uses by Aristotle, Hamilton, etc. CSP: 4. A truth which is evident and general; a truth comprehending many subordinate truths; a law on which others are founded, or from which others are derived: as, the *principles* of morality, of equity, of government, etc. In mathematical physics a *principle* commonly means a very widely useful theorem. ... 5. That which is professed or accepted as a law of action or a rule of conduct; one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of a system: as, the *principles* of the Stoics or the Epicureans; hence, a right rule of conduct; in general, equity; uprightness: as, a man of *principle*. ( http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=06&page=294&query=principle ) There are no accompanying examples of uses by Aristotle, and the only one from Hamilton--which mentions Aristotle--is for the 2nd sense, not the 4th or 5th. CSP: 2. Cause, in the widest sense; that by which anything is in any way ultimately determined or regulated. ... "Without entering into the various meanings of the term *Principle*, which Aristotle defines, in general, that from whence anything exists, is produced, or is known, it is sufficient to say that it is always used for that on which something else depends; and thus both for an original law and for an original element. In the former case it is a regulative, in the latter a constitutive, *principle*." *Sir W. Hamilton*, Reid, Note A, §5, Supplementary Dissertations Aristotle and Hamilton evidently define "principle" as "that on which something else depends," such as "an original law." The 4th sense similarly defines it as "a law on which others are founded, or from which others are derived." The 5th sense seems consistent with my interpretation, rather than yours--excluded middle "is professed or accepted as a law" within *classical *logic, such that it is "one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of [that] system." In any case, Peirce never defines a principle as our *representation *of a law; on the contrary ... JD: Compare that the 3rd sense of "law" in his definition of the term. CSP: 3. A proposition which expresses the constant or regular order of certain phenomena, or the constant mode of action of a force; a general formula or rule to which all things, or all things or phenomena within the limits of a certain class or group, conform, precisely and without exception; a rule to which events really tend to conform. ( http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=04&page=705&query=law ) It is a law, not a principle, that he defines as a proposition--i.e.,. a representation. He goes on to call it "a general formula or rule to which all things ... conform, precisely and without exception." As I said before, excluded middle is *not *a law, because it is *not *exceptionless. JD: Here is a famous passage [CP 1.405-406, c. 1896] where Peirce explicitly employs the Kantian distinction. Where do you see such a distinction in that passage? The only mention of the word "law" in what you quoted is naming it as something that calls for an explanation. Meanwhile, Peirce straightforwardly equates "a regulative principle" with "an intellectual hope," which is perfectly consistent with his description of the *principle *of excluded middle as a *hope *rather than a *law* in what I quoted previously from NEM 4:xiii. JD: At the same time, I'm trying to understand what Peirce is saying by reading what he is reading. That, I think, is necessary to understand what he's saying. I have no doubt that it is helpful and insightful, but I disagree that it is *necessary*. Surely it is not a *requirement *for anyone who wants to understand Peirce's vast corpus of writings to read *everything *that he was reading at the time, which would obviously be another vast corpus of writings. And would we not then also need to read whatever all those *other *authors were reading when they wrote what they wrote, in order to understand what *they *were saying? And so on, *ad infinitum*. On the contrary, I believe that in most cases a good writer is capable of being understood on his/her own terms. As Gary Fuhrman once summarized <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-09/msg00179.html>, "I assume that he [Peirce] means exactly what he says and says exactly what he means, until I have sufficient reason to abandon that working assumption." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Aug 7, 2020 at 5:14 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon Schmidt, John Sowa, Gary Fuhrman, Gary Richmond, Robert Marty, List, > > Jon S asked for references to texts where Peirce employs the distinction > between principles and laws. Peirce's definition in the Century > Dictionary of the term "principle" is instructive on this point. See the > 4th and 5th senses and the examples of uses by Aristotle, Hamilton, etc. > Compare that the 3rd sense of "law" in his definition of the term. > > Here is a famous passage where Peirce explicitly employs the Kantian > distinction. It is especially pertinent to the passage you've quoted: > > But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; > and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort > that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant > calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole > immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to > think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a > self-stultification. ... Among other regular facts that have to be > explained is law or regularity itself. (1.405-6) > > I am confident that each of us is capable of looking up and analyzing > other passages that use the terms "law", "principle" and "logic" in the CP. > As such, I won't offer a laundry list of such passages. > > For my part, I don't think the distinction is new with Kant. In fact it is > quite old. Kant simply tried to clarify well-established use of the > conceptions. Notice how easily we slide from talking about the principles > expressed in a theory, such as the principles of mechanics in Newton's > theory of physics, to talk about the laws. Doing so is often elliptical. We > are often saying *on the supposition that this theory* is true then the > principles express the real laws in nature. It is not odd to say that the > principles in a given theory turned out to be false. It is odd, however, to > say the laws turned out to be false. Rather, we say our supposition that > the laws taken to be real in given theory turned out to be false. > > One reason there the meaning of these two terms appears to have changed > over time is that an original use of the term "law" is its juridical use. > It appears that the English term of a legal requirement was later applied > to the real regularities in nature. The order of Peirce's definitions > suggests that he understands the history of this term. > > Notice the apparent differences in our respective approaches to reading > these texts. In my post, I was drawing on a secondary reference that I hold > in high esteem. Let me state the reference now, which is Richard Smyth's > *Reading > Peirce Reading*. In his interpretation of the early essays, he interprets > key arguments in Peirce's justification of the validity of the laws of > logic drawing on Kantian ideas. This is not surprising given the weight > Peirce places on his reading of Kant's *Critiques* at this stage in the > development of the theory of critical logic. > > When I'm trying to make sense of Peirce's writings, I find it is essential > to draw on the secondary literature and to sort out what seems more and > less helpful. At the same time, I'm trying to understand what Peirce is > saying by reading what he is reading. That, I think, is necessary to > understand what he's saying. > > John Sowa suggests that a richer understanding of Peirce's inquiries can > be gained by seeing where they have taken later reachers who have followed > in his wake. As such, there are five sources that seem important to reading > Peirce: > > > 1. the texts themselves; > 2. the secondary literature on Peirce; > 3. the inquiries of philosophers, scientists, mathematicians (etc.) > Peirce was reading--especially those he was drawing on in a sustained > manner; > 4. the inquiries of those following in Peirce's wake > (self-consciously or not). > > > In addition to asking how Peirce used this or that term in a given text > (as in 1, above), I think that it is essential that we (5) try to > reconstruct his arguments and, at the same time, engage in the inquiries > ourselves. After all, Peirce's writings were not written for armchair > philosophers. Rather, they were written for inquirers willing to engage in > philosophy as an experimental science. > > Are there other resources not on this list that should be considered when > interpreting Peirce's arguments and inquiries? If so, then I think it is > worth saying so. That way, we can talk about the relative importance of > these different resources in our respective approaches. My hope is that we > can compare notes, acknowledge our differences, and learn from one another. > > Doing so will put us all in a better position to engage with philosophers > and other inquirers who are not following in Peirce's wake--and who insist > that they have more fruitful assumptions and better methods than the > pragmatic methods we are looking to Peirce for guidance in putting to > better use. > > Hope that helps. > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > >>
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