> On Apr 5, 2024, at 5:35 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Edwina, List: > > ET: I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the > ’phaneroscopic analysis' differs from the ‘classification of signs’. > > I will try one more time to explain, and then I will likely have to leave it > at that. Peirce's well-known 1903 taxonomy for sign classification includes > only three correlates--the sign (or representamen) itself, its (dynamical) > object, and its (final) interpretant. However, its three trichotomies that > result in ten sign classes are for the first correlate itself and its dyadic > relations to the other two correlates (S, S-Od, S-If). These are divisions > based on Peirce's three categories.
1] ET: I’m not sure why you have defined the object as ‘dynamical’; and the interpretant as ‘final’. Peirce didn’t do that in this section.. Again - my problem is with your focus on the Final Interpretant. > > CSP: Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the sign > in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law > [qualisign/sinsign/legisign]; secondly, according as the relation of the sign > to its [dynamical] object consists in the sign's having some character in > itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to > an interpretant [icon/index/symbol]; thirdly, according as its [final] > Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a > sign of reason [rheme/dicisign/argument]. (CP 2.243, EP 2:291, 1903) ET: I note that you have added, without informing the reader, all the terms in brackets; they are not in the original writing of Peirce. Again - Peirce does not write ’the relation of the sign to its (dynamical) object; he writes only: ‘the relation of the sign to its object". And he also does not write ‘according as its [final] Interpretant…but only “in its relation to an interpretant”. > > Phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of > representing/mediating soon leads Peirce to recognize that there are really > six correlates, not just three--each sign has two objects and three > interpretants. The sign itself is the first and simplest correlate of that > relation, with no degenerate sub-correlates. The object is the second > correlate of that relation, of middling complexity, with not only the genuine > (dynamical) correlate, but also a degenerate (immediate) sub-correlate. The > interpretant is the third and most complex correlate of that relation, with > not only the genuine (final) correlate and a degenerate (dynamical) > sub-correlate, but also a doubly degenerate (immediate) sub-correlate. This > is all grounded in the principle that in addition to genuine 1ns, 2ns, and > 3ns, "there is such a thing as the 1ns of 2ns and such a thing as the 1ns of > 3ns; and there is such a thing as the 2ns of 3ns" (CP 1.530, 1903). In this > context, the sub-correlates that correspond to 1ns of 2ns (immediate object) > and 1ns of 3ns (immediate interpretant) are internal to the first correlate > (sign), such that they have only degenerate dyadic relations with it--like > the inherence of a quality in a thing. 2] ET: I don’t agree that the fact that the Representamen/Sign is not split up [ as the object is into the DO and IO] snd the Interpretant is into the II, DI, FI] means that these can be defined as ‘degenerate sub-correlates'. I understand them instead, within their functional semiosic role, where the IO is understood as the data accepted within the capacities of the S/R to process it. That is - even though an entity’s S/R may be interacting with an external Object [ DO], it is a fact that not all of the data input of that DO can be processed/received by that individual S/R. A baby receives different sensual data from an adult; a bee, a dog, a plant..can interact with that same DO but can only accept receive different sensual data [IO]. . > > Accordingly, Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies for sign classification (e.g., EP > 2:478-490, 1908 Dec 23-25) have ten trichotomies that result in 66 sign > classes. Those trichotomies are for the six correlates themselves (Od, Oi, S, > If, Id, Ii), their three genuine dyadic relations (S-Od, S-If, S-Id), and the > genuine triadic relation (S-Od-If). Instead of the three categories, they are > divisions into the three universes of possibles, existents, and necessitants. > Tony Jappy suggests that this reflects a shift in Peirce's approach from > phenomenology to ontology for classifying signs, but that would be blatantly > inconsistent with his architectonic arrangement of the sciences. Speculative > grammar, the first branch of the normative science of logic as semeiotic, > provides principles to ontology, the first branch of metaphysics--not the > other way around. As John Sowa observes, the shift is instead from > phenomenology to phaneroscopy--hypostasizing the three categories > (predicates) into the constituents of the three universes (subjects). 3] ET: Again, I don’t agree with your view about ‘genuine dyadic relations’ and ‘genuine triadic relation’. What do YOU mean by ‘genuine’ and how does that explain the semiotic process? And what is the functional difference between the three categories and the three universes??? > > ET: There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’; or the ‘object > itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the semiosic > process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the ‘interpretant', > of course we are speaking of its relationship with the representamen/sign. > > This is clearly inconsistent with Peirce's own writings. He states explicitly > and repeatedly that the sign (or representamen), the (dynamical) object, and > the (final) interpretant are the three correlates of the genuine triadic > relation of representing/mediating. While it is true that they only serve in > those specific roles within that specific relation to each other, he > nevertheless carefully and consistently distinguishes them from each other > and from their dyadic relations with each other. When we speak of the > "interpretant," we are speaking of the third correlate itself, not its dyadic > relation with the sign--these have separate trichotomies in Peirce's > 1906-1908 taxonomies (If, S-If). In fact, there are six separate trichotomies > for the three interpretants (If, Id, Ii), the two genuine dyadic relations > (S-lf, S-Id), and the genuine triadic relation (S-Od-If). The only one of > these that appears in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy is its third trichotomy, the one > for the sign's genuine dyadic relation with its (final) interpretant (S-If). 4] The fact that these three are the ’three correlates' doesn’t mean that each has any capacity to exist ‘as itself’. Distinguishing them, analytically, from each other within a relationship is conceptually not the same as proving that each is existing ‘in itself’. I disagree that when we are speaking of the ‘interpretant’ we are speaking of it ‘itself’. Again, the interpretant functions only as a form of information within interaction - and that differs according to the type of Interpretant [ Immediate, dynamic, Final] and its modal category. > > ET: I don’t see how the 8.338 reference suggests your conclusion. > > In that passage, Peirce explicitly states that an argument can be submitted, > urged, or presented; a dicisign can be urged or presented; and a rheme can > only be presented. This entails that within the logical order of > determination for sign classification in accordance with his 1906-1908 > taxonomies, the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy (later seme/pheme/delome) > for the sign's genuine dyadic relation with its final interpretant (S-If) > must come before the presented/urged/submitted trichotomy (later > suggestive/imperative/indicative) for the sign's genuine dyadic relation with > its dynamical interpretant (S-Id). "It is evident that a Possible > [rheme/seme] can determine nothing but a Possible [presented/suggestive]; it > is equally so that a necessitant [submitted/indicative] can be determined by > nothing but a Necessitant [argument/delome]" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). I then > take an additional step--since the S-If trichotomy explicitly comes before > the S-Id trichotomy, it makes sense that likewise the If trichotomy comes > before the Id trichotomy. Again, the only one of these four trichotomies that > appears in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy is the one for S-If. 5]ET - I’ve explained my rejection of your placing the Final Interpretant before the S-Id in another post, with an example, and an outline of what I consider the functional role of the FI - in today’s posts. > > ET: My phrase of ‘cognitive movement’ is hardly outside the bounds of > understanding; after all - that’s precisely what is going on within the > semiosic process. > > "Semiosic" is not synonymous with "cognitive"--all cognition is semiosic, but > not all semiosis is cognitive. In my view, this is where Kelly A. Parker goes > wrong in his otherwise generally excellent 1998 book, The Continuity of > Peirce's Thought, when he ascribes to Peirce the opinion "that there are > existent things, characterized predominantly by 2ns, independent of semiosis" > (p. 220). The independence of existent things (as well as possible qualities) > from any actual cognition, which Peirce affirms, does not entail their > independence from all semiosis whatsoever, which Peirce denies. On the > contrary, discrete things with their monadic qualities and dyadic reactions > are degenerate manifestations of continuous and triadic semiosis--3ns > involves 2ns, which involves 1ns. "Thus, 2ns is an essential part of 3ns > though not of 1ns, and 1ns is an essential element of both 2ns and 3ns" (CP > 1.530, 1903). 6] ET: To say that the semiotic process is a cognitive process is hardly outside the Peircean framework, but, in my view, is basic. After all- as I’ve quoted so often, from Peirce, “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals and throughout the purely physical world”. 4.551. That is, cognition does not require a separate brain. Therefore, even a semiosic triad operating in total Secondness, is a ‘cognitive act, based on the nature of the materials of the interaction [eg, a Dicent Sinsign, a weathervane’. > > CSP: Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of > the Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast representamen, a > great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living > realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its > Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these > reactions and these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play > in the Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument. (CP 5.119, EP > 2:193-194, 1903) > > Put another way, the real consists of whatever is as it is regardless of what > anyone thinks about it, and the external consists of whatever is as it is > regardless of what anyone thinks about anything (CP 8.191, c. 1904), but > nothing in the universe of being--i.e., nothing in any of the three Universes > of Experience, which together contain whatever might serve as dynamical > objects of signs--is independent of semiosis. "Whatever is capable of being > represented is itself of a representative nature" (CP 8.268, 1903). "Thus, it > is said to be a necessary result of the analysis that the object represented > by the sign, and whose characters are independent of such representation, > should itself be of the nature of a sign, so that its characters are not > independent of all representation" (EP 2:328, 1904). 7] ET: I fully agree - nothing is independent of semiosis and I don’t think I have ever argued for such a view. > > CSP: [T]he explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire > universe,--not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, > embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all > accustomed to refer to as "the truth,"--that all this universe is perfused > with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, > 1906) 8] ET: Again - I have often quoted this section and fully agree. Please note - ’signs’ is plural. > > Accordingly, I have never stated nor implied that semiosis is confined to > "the linguistic realm." I only mentioned "linguistic signs" in a previous > post because Tony Jappy had mentioned "meaning"--I said that a linguistic > sign's immediate interpretant is the range of what it possibly could mean in > accordance with its constituent word definitions and grammatical syntax, its > dynamical interpretant is what it actually does mean to any one interpreter > of it, and its final interpretant is what it necessarily would mean under > ideal circumstances. I wholeheartedly agree with Peirce that such definitions > are "a sop to Cerberus" (EP 2:478, 1908 Dec 23)--more generally, a sign's > immediate interpretant is the range of effects that it possibly could have, > its dynamical interpretant is any effect that it actually does have, and its > final interpretant is the effect that it necessarily would have under ideal > circumstances. > > Finally, just to be clear, although the terminology is similar, this is not > the same division as possible/existent/necessitant for each individual > trichotomy in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies for sign classification. Again, > the purpose of the final interpretant (ideal effect) is either to produce > feeling (for a gratific sign), to produce action (for an actuous sign), or to > produce self-control (for a temperative sign); the mode of being of the > dynamical interpretant (actual effect) is either that of a feeling (for a > sympathetic sign), that of an exertion (for a percussive sign), or that of > another sign (for a usual sign); and the mode of presentation of the > immediate interpretant (range of possible effects) is either as abstract > qualities (for a hypothetic sign), as concrete inherences (for a categorical > sign), or as real relations (for a relative sign). 9] ET: My discussion has primarily been around your positioning of the Final Interpretant before the Dynamic and Immediate Interpretants - In my post of today, I outlined what I consider to be the function of the FI - and note that it is not always part of the semiosic action. Edwina > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 8:07 PM Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com > <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> I will try to answer in pints: >> >> 1] I’m afraid that I don’t see why or how an ‘abstract classification of >> signs’ can differ from the outline of the pragmatic/concrete process of >> semiosis. Again - who and how and why ‘assign’ ‘universe/categorical modes >> to the interpretants? >> >> 2] I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the’ >> phaneroscopic analysis differs from the ‘classification of signs’. >> >> 3] There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’ ; or the ‘object >> itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the semiosic >> process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the ‘inerpretant, >> of course we ae speaking of its relationship with the representamen/sign. >> >> 4] The above, to me, means that the relation between theSign/representamen >> and the Dynamic Interpretant can be in any one of the three categorical >> modes. >> >> 5] Sorry- I’m simply not convinced; I don’t see how the 8.338 reference >> suggests your conclusion. >> >> 6] My phrase of ‘cognitive movement’ is hardly outside the bounds of >> understanding; after all - that’s precisely what is going on within the >> semiosic process. And I disagree with your conclusion about the purpose of >> the Final Interpretant…..I don’t agree that it ‘constrains the mode of being >> of the DI..and the DI contains the mode of presentation of the II. I don’t >> see how this could functionally occur- and would appreciate an actual >> example. >> >> I also don’t agree that the ‘mode of presentation/being of the II >> ‘constrains’ the mode of being of the DI…and I don’t agree that there is a >> ‘purpose to the FI. Most certainly, if the II is in a mode of 1ns, then, th >> DI is also in a mode of 1ns - but, I’d put that down to the fact that the >> mode of Firstness has a limited amount of information [ being primarily >> feeling] and therefore - can’t provide enough information to the next >> experience [ the Dynamic Interpretant]..to enable it to function within the >> clarity of Secondness. >> >> So- we’ll have to as usual, continue to disagree. >> >> Edwina > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . 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