Jon S, Gary R, Gary F, Edwina, List, Consider the following remarks about pragmaticism in relation to Humanism, theism, etc.
“There are certain questions commonly reckoned as metaphysical, and which certainly are so, if by metaphysics we mean ontology, which as soon as pragmatism is once sincerely accepted, cannot logically resist settlement. These are for example, What is reality? Are necessity and contingency real modes of being? Are the laws of nature real? Can they be assumed to be immutable or are they presumably results of evolution? Is there any real chance, or departure from real law? But on examination, if by metaphysics we mean the broadest positive truths of the psycho-physical universe -- positive in the sense of not being reducible to logical formulæ -- then the very fact that these problems can be solved by a logical maxim is proof enough that they do not belong to metaphysics but to "epistemology," an atrocious translation of Erkenntnislehre. When we pass to consider the nature of Time, it seems that pragmatism is of aid, but does not of itself yield a solution. When we go on to the nature of Space, I boldly declare that Newton's view that it is a real entity is alone logically tenable; and that leaves such further questions as, Why should Space have three dimensions? quite unanswerable for the present. This, however, is a purely speculative question without much human interest. (It would, of course, be absurd to say that tridimensionality is without practical consequences.) For those metaphysical questions that have such interest, the question of a future life and especially that of One Incomprehensible but Personal God, not immanent in but creating the universe, I, for one, heartily admit that a Humanism, that does not pretend to be a science but only an instinct, like a bird's power of flight, but purified by meditation, is the most precious contribution that has been made to philosophy for ages.” [CP, Survey of Pragmaticism, 5.496] In this passage, Peirce makes a distinction between three sets of questions: 1. Questions of metaphysical ontology, such as: What is reality? Are necessity and contingency real modes of being? Are the laws of nature real? Can they be assumed to be immutable or are they presumably results of evolution? Is there any real chance, or departure from real law? 2. Purely speculative questions in metaphysics concerning the broadest positive truths of the psycho-physical universe: “What is the nature of time and space?” “At the current stage of the cosmos, why does space appear to have three dimensions and time appear to have one dimension?” “Is the number of dimensions of space and time fixed, or has the number of dimensions evolved?” 3. Questions that have a strong human interest: “Is some sort of life of the soul after the biological death of a human being?” “What is the nature of that which is most Divine?” If we adopt the methods of pragmaticism, it appears that there are different sorts of grounds for affirming or denying various answers to these three sets of questions. Once pragmatism is sincerely accepted, Peirce suggests that we have logical grounds for adopting some hypotheses and rejecting others with respect to the questions that fall into the first group. Given the development of scientific methodologies and theories around 1900, some questions that fall into the second group were “quite unanswerable for the present.” Questions that fall into the third group, which include questions about the tenability of theism and humanism, bear on our natural instincts, but probably should not “pretend” to be scientific. If they are not scientific, then we need to consider the limits of philosophical methods in seeking answers. James and Schiller seem to claim that pragmatic methods should be used to clarify the meanings of the terms used the frame the questions and formulate viable hypotheses in the third group. Peirce, on the other hand, suggests in this essay and elsewhere that pragmaticist methods have their limits, and it may be a mistake to apply them outside the realm of the “intellectual conceptions” concerning positive matters of fact (see 5.464-8). As such, he may personally find the conception of “One Incomprehensible but Personal God, not immanent in but creating the universe” attractive, but he is keen to point out that a Humanism that is “only an instinct, like a bird's power of flight, but purified by meditation, is the most precious contribution that has been made to philosophy for ages.” On my view, there are a wide range of possible answers to the third set of questions that are of a “strong human interest”, and I don’t see strong scientific reasons for insisting that one answer, or another, is the best to any of them. I have my personal views, but I recognize that the efforts to make scientific methods more exact means those very methods will have their limits. Yours, Jeff From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Date: Sunday, September 15, 2024 at 11:59 AM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation Helmut, List: Theism (classical or otherwise) and panentheism are two different and mutually exclusive philosophical/metaphysical conceptions of God. Christianity is a religion that traditionally affirms classical theism--as do other religions, including Judaism and Islam--but some (including Gary R.) suggest that it is also compatible with panentheism. Nevertheless, Peirce explicitly and repeatedly affirmed theism (which Gary R. acknowledges), including the classical definition of God as Ens necessarium; and as I have explained before ... * Peirce prepared the entry for "immanent" in The Century Dictionary, which includes the statement, "The doctrine of an immanent deity does not necessarily imply that the world, or the soul of the world, is God, but only that it either is or is in God." * Pantheism is the doctrine that the world or its soul is God, while panentheism is the doctrine that the world or its soul is in God. * Peirce referred to "One Incomprehensible but Personal God, not immanent in but creating the universe" (CP 5.496, EP 2:421, 1907), and likewise emphatically denied that God is "immanent in Nature" or "immanent in the Universes" in four different manuscript drafts for "A Neglected Argument" (R 843, 1908). * Therefore, Peirce plainly rejected both pantheism and panentheism. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Sun, Sep 15, 2024 at 10:43 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: suppsupppsupplement: This classificational thing is becoming complicated, but before I lose mental control, I am, with my last residue of overlook, able to utter a last conclusion: With this whole figure, to say, that Peirce was a theist, and not a panentheist, only works if: -- Panentheism is a kind of theism, -- The term "Panentheism", or the concept, existed at Peirce´s time, -- Peirce was aware of this term or concept, and did not approve of it. Supp-supplement: Ok, classical theism, claiming, that God is unchanging and unaffected, is not something, christianity can be subsumed under, but merely has an influence on christianity and other religions. So, Jon, you are right, of course. Sorry! Supplement: I have googled, and found, that christianity is a kind of theism. Ok, the other way, my post could have been wrong, is, that I was thinking, that panentheism would not be a kind of theism, but maybe it is. This way, panentheism may be compatible with christianity, but not with some other kinds of theism, like, as you wrote, "classical theism", of which I don´t know, what that is. Jon, List, well, I had thought, that christianity is a kind of theism. So it is not, so I am sorry for my post. Best regards, Helmut
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