Jeff, List: What exactly do you have in mind by "real definitions" as distinguished from "nominal (i.e., verbal) definitions" in this context? As far as I know, Peirce's only explicit discussions of "verbal definition" vs. "real definition" are these two passages.
CSP: The concept which is a logical interpretant is only imperfectly so. It somewhat partakes of the nature of a verbal definition, and is as inferior to the habit, and much in the same way, as a verbal definition is inferior to the real definition. The deliberately formed, self-analyzing habit,--self-analyzing because formed by the aid of analysis of the exercises that nourished it,--is the living definition, the veritable and final logical interpretant. Consequently, the most perfect account of a concept that words can convey will consist in a description of the habit which that concept is calculated to produce. But how otherwise can a habit be described than by a description of the kind of action to which it gives rise, with the specification of the conditions and of the motive? (CP 5.491, EP 2:418, 1907) CSP: To anybody who has no notion of logic this may seem a queer attempt to explain what is meant by a cyclic system; and it is true that it would be a needlessly involved *verbal *definition; a verbal definition being an explanation of the meaning of a word or phrase intended for a person to whose mind the idea expressed is perfectly distinct. But it is not intended to serve as a *verbal*, but as a *real *definition, that is, to explain to a person to whom the idea may be familiar enough, but who has never picked it to pieces and marked its structure, exactly how the idea is composed. As such, I believe it to be the simplest and most straightforward explanation possible. (CP 4.622, 1908) Do "verbal definition" and "real definition" have the same definitions in these two texts? Either way, is Peirce providing verbal definitions or real definitions of "verbal definition" and "real definition"? Regards, Jon On Tue, Sep 17, 2024 at 10:31 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon S, List, > > > > Again. What types of definitions do you take him to be providing? For > example, is Peirce providing nominal (i.e., verbal) definitions or real > definitions? > > > > --Jeff > > > > *From: *[email protected] <[email protected]> > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Date: *Tuesday, September 17, 2024 at 8:19 PM > *To: *Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject: *Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: > A Peircean Argumentation > > Jeff, List: > > > > Peirce identifies the difference in his first two sentences--"God" is "*the > *definable proper name," while all the other capitalized words are "used, > not as vernacular, but as terms defined" within the article itself. As we > discussed on the List a month ago, a proper name is a rhematic *indexical > *legisign that "denotes a single individual well known to exist by the > utterer and interpreter" (EP 2:307, c. 1901). By contrast, a term is a > rhematic *symbol *that is "connected with its Object by an association of > general ideas" (CP 2.261, EP 2:295, 1903). Hence, "God" as a proper name, > although unique by virtue of being definable, *cannot *be synonymous with > "Mind" as a general term, even if the latter is assigned a peculiar > definition. > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Tue, Sep 17, 2024 at 8:15 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]> wrote: > > Hi Jon S, List, > > > > For the sake of interpreting what Peirce is doing in the first section of > “A Neglected Argument”, what types of definitions do you take him to be > providing? For example, is Peirce providing nominal (i.e., verbal) > definitions or real definitions? > > > > He puts the following words into quotes with a capital first letter: > “God”, “Idea”, “Real”, “Experience”, “Argument”, “Argumentation”. Do these > words require different kinds of definitions, or do they all admit of the > same type? > > > > For my part, I think Peirce is explicitly pointing out that the words have > different functions. As such, they appear to need different types of > definitions. If that is right, then what is the difference between giving > an adequate definition of the word “God” and giving an adequate definition > of “Real” or “Argument”? > > > > --Jeff > >
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