JAS, Jeff, Gary R, Helmut, List JAS- you wrote: Moreover, Peirce follows up on the first statement by adding, "Now such being the pragmaticist's answer to the question what he means by the word 'God,' the question whether there really is such a being is the question whether all physical science is merely the figment--the arbitrary figment--of the students of nature" (CP 6.503). He seems to be saying that the reality of God is logically equivalent to the reliability of scientific study of the universe. Why? "But whatever there may be of argument in all this is as nothing, the merest nothing, in comparison to its force as an appeal to one's own instinct, which is to argument what substance is to shadow, what bed-rock is to the built foundations of a cathedral" (ibid). Consider, then, his final words in the main text of "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," right before its published additament that begins by explaining pragmaticism.
I disagree with your interpretation of the underlined above. You write that Peirce seems to be saying “that the reality of God is logically equivalent to the reliability of scientific study of the universe”. You seem to be saying, if I understand your comment, that the ‘reality of God’ is equivalent to the reliability of science. We know that Peirce places an emphasis on the role of empirical scientific analysis - but to me, he seems to be saying that the physical sciences, which cannot prove the existence or non-existence off God, are NOT arbitrary actions. And therefore - have no role in this question. And Peirce’s answer to the.. meaning of the word ‘God’ - is clear. He defines it as ‘Mind’. I know you have previously put the word ‘merely’ in square brackets before Peirce’s reference to Mind, but to Peirce, Mind is a key, THE key agency in the formation of the universe. I won’t detail his many references to the role of Mind [ habit formation, Thirdness]. As for his references to a belief in God, as a ’natural instinct’, that is akin to the a priori method of ‘fixing belief’ - based as it is on an emotional attraction for the idea. But - such a belief is outside of any scientific examination. BUT, following the pragmatist's definition of God as ‘Mind’ then, I can accept that it is a ‘natural instinct’ to believe in the reality of Mind or Reason as an operative force in the universe [a belief which I accept and consider as amenable to scientific methods of proof]. Whether one instead believes in the notion of an agential God - this, I consider is outside of any evidence - it becomes a personal choice. The question then becomes societal - since almost ALL peoples develop some kind of ‘religious’ ideology - whether it be animism, polytheism, monotheism. As I have outlined before, I consider that the type of religious ideology is directly related to population size, which is itself related to economic mode. But, pragmatically, it is a societal fact, that a belief in metaphysical agencies is a ’natural instinct’ in mankind. There must be some psychological and communal need for such a belief. Again - my point is that it’s not a scientific fact but a psychoglocial fact. And of course, I accept that his explanation of the emergence of the universe from nothing [1.412 and elsewhere; 6.215, 6.262] is scientifically viable and not in the least illogical, Edwina > On Sep 16, 2024, at 6:34 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jeff, List: > > Your points below are well taken. Nevertheless, according to Peirce himself, > "If a pragmaticist is asked what he means by the word 'God,' he can only say > that ... if contemplation and study of the physico-psychical universe can > imbue a man with principles of conduct analogous to the influence of a great > man's works or conversation, then that analogue of a mind ... is what he > means by 'God'" (CP 6.502, c. 1906); and, "A full exposition of the > pragmaticistic definition of Ens necessarium would require many pages; but > some hints toward it may be given" (CP 6.490, 1908). These quotations > obviously imply that there is a pragmaticistic definition of God as Ens > necessarium, although unfortunately, he never spells it out in its entirety. > > Moreover, Peirce follows up on the first statement by adding, "Now such being > the pragmaticist's answer to the question what he means by the word 'God,' > the question whether there really is such a being is the question whether all > physical science is merely the figment--the arbitrary figment--of the > students of nature" (CP 6.503). He seems to be saying that the reality of God > is logically equivalent to the reliability of scientific study of the > universe. Why? "But whatever there may be of argument in all this is as > nothing, the merest nothing, in comparison to its force as an appeal to one's > own instinct, which is to argument what substance is to shadow, what bed-rock > is to the built foundations of a cathedral" (ibid). Consider, then, his final > words in the main text of "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," > right before its published additament that begins by explaining pragmaticism. > > CSP: [T]he hypothesis [of God's reality], irresistible though it be to first > intention, yet needs Probation; and that though an infinite being is not tied > down to any consistency, yet man, like any other animal, is gifted with power > of understanding sufficient for the conduct of life. This brings him, for > testing the hypothesis, to taking his stand upon Pragmaticism, which implies > faith in common sense and in instinct, though only as they issue from the > cupel-furnace of measured criticism. In short, he will say that the N.A. is > the First Stage of a scientific inquiry, resulting in a hypothesis of the > very highest Plausibility, whose ultimate test must lie in its value in the > self-controlled growth of man's conduct of life. (CP 6.480, EP 2:445-446, > 1908) > > The following year, Peirce states plainly that "a belief in God is a natural > instinct, comparable with the instinct that leads various insects to lay > their eggs where the larvae will find abundant food (though the mothers have > no experiential acquaintance with eggs, unless they can remember being eggs > themselves; and indeed even this would not, of itself, suffice.) Now it would > certainly be the height of folly to discredit any such natural instinct" > (SWS:283, 1909). After all, returning to "A Neglected Argument," "it is the > simpler hypothesis in the sense of the more facile and natural, the one that > instinct suggests, that must be preferred; for the reason that unless man > have a natural bent in accordance with nature's, he has no chance of > understanding nature, at all" (CP 6.477, EP 2:444). > > In short, scientific study cannot--or at least, should not--be divorced from > human instinct. On the contrary, scientific study depends on human instinct > to supply plausible explanatory hypotheses for the phenomena that are being > investigated. > > For Peirce, the reality of God as Ens necessarium is one such hypothesis. It > arises in metaphysics (not religion) to satisfy the requirement of logic for > a rational explanation of why there are any phenomena for the special > sciences to study in the first place (see R 339:[293r&295r], 1908 Aug 28, > quoted previously > <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-08/msg00050.html>). > Notwithstanding what he wrote two decades earlier (CP 1.412, EP 1:278, > 1887-8), positing that the universe somehow created itself from absolutely > nothing is logically and scientifically untenable because "nothing justifies > a retroductive inference except its affording an explanation of the facts. It > is, however, no explanation at all of a fact to pronounce it inexplicable. > That, therefore, is a conclusion which no reasoning can ever justify or > excuse" (CP 1.139, EP 2:49, 1898). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Mon, Sep 16, 2024 at 10:43 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Jon S, Gary R, Gary F, Edwina, List, >> >> >> >> Consider the following remarks about pragmaticism in relation to Humanism, >> theism, etc. >> >> >> >> “There are certain questions commonly reckoned as metaphysical, and which >> certainly are so, if by metaphysics we mean ontology, which as soon as >> pragmatism is once sincerely accepted, cannot logically resist settlement. >> These are for example, What is reality? Are necessity and contingency real >> modes of being? Are the laws of nature real? Can they be assumed to be >> immutable or are they presumably results of evolution? Is there any real >> chance, or departure from real law? But on examination, if by metaphysics we >> mean the broadest positive truths of the psycho-physical universe -- >> positive in the sense of not being reducible to logical formulæ -- then the >> very fact that these problems can be solved by a logical maxim is proof >> enough that they do not belong to metaphysics but to "epistemology," an >> atrocious translation of Erkenntnislehre. When we pass to consider the >> nature of Time, it seems that pragmatism is of aid, but does not of itself >> yield a solution. When we go on to the nature of Space, I boldly declare >> that Newton's view that it is a real entity is alone logically tenable; and >> that leaves such further questions as, Why should Space have three >> dimensions? quite unanswerable for the present. This, however, is a purely >> speculative question without much human interest. (It would, of course, be >> absurd to say that tridimensionality is without practical consequences.) For >> those metaphysical questions that have such interest, the question of a >> future life and especially that of One Incomprehensible but Personal God, >> not immanent in but creating the universe, I, for one, heartily admit that a >> Humanism, that does not pretend to be a science but only an instinct, like a >> bird's power of flight, but purified by meditation, is the most precious >> contribution that has been made to philosophy for ages.” [CP, Survey of >> Pragmaticism, 5.496] >> >> >> >> In this passage, Peirce makes a distinction between three sets of questions: >> >> >> >> Questions of metaphysical ontology, such as: What is reality? Are necessity >> and contingency real modes of being? Are the laws of nature real? Can they >> be assumed to be immutable or are they presumably results of evolution? Is >> there any real chance, or departure from real law? >> Purely speculative questions in metaphysics concerning the broadest positive >> truths of the psycho-physical universe: “What is the nature of time and >> space?” “At the current stage of the cosmos, why does space appear to have >> three dimensions and time appear to have one dimension?” “Is the number of >> dimensions of space and time fixed, or has the number of dimensions evolved?” >> Questions that have a strong human interest: “Is some sort of life of the >> soul after the biological death of a human being?” “What is the nature of >> that which is most Divine?” >> >> >> If we adopt the methods of pragmaticism, it appears that there are different >> sorts of grounds for affirming or denying various answers to these three >> sets of questions. Once pragmatism is sincerely accepted, Peirce suggests >> that we have logical grounds for adopting some hypotheses and rejecting >> others with respect to the questions that fall into the first group. Given >> the development of scientific methodologies and theories around 1900, some >> questions that fall into the second group were “quite unanswerable for the >> present.” >> >> >> >> Questions that fall into the third group, which include questions about the >> tenability of theism and humanism, bear on our natural instincts, but >> probably should not “pretend” to be scientific. If they are not scientific, >> then we need to consider the limits of philosophical methods in seeking >> answers. James and Schiller seem to claim that pragmatic methods should be >> used to clarify the meanings of the terms used the frame the questions and >> formulate viable hypotheses in the third group. Peirce, on the other hand, >> suggests in this essay and elsewhere that pragmaticist methods have their >> limits, and it may be a mistake to apply them outside the realm of the >> “intellectual conceptions” concerning positive matters of fact (see 5.464-8). >> >> >> >> As such, he may personally find the conception of “One Incomprehensible but >> Personal God, not immanent in but creating the universe” attractive, but he >> is keen to point out that a Humanism that is “only an instinct, like a >> bird's power of flight, but purified by meditation, is the most precious >> contribution that has been made to philosophy for ages.” >> >> >> >> On my view, there are a wide range of possible answers to the third set of >> questions that are of a “strong human interest”, and I don’t see strong >> scientific reasons for insisting that one answer, or another, is the best to >> any of them. I have my personal views, but I recognize that the efforts to >> make scientific methods more exact means those very methods will have their >> limits. >> >> >> >> Yours, >> >> >> >> Jeff >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
