Jon, Jeff, list,

Peirce’s explains the difference between nominal and real definitions in 
Baldwin’s Dictionary under “Nominal 
<https://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Nominal> .”

 

Love, gary

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

From: [email protected] <[email protected]> On 
Behalf Of Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: 18-Sep-24 14:39
To: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>; Peirce-L 
<[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Verbal Definitions vs. Real Definitions (was A 
Scientific Religion)

 

Hi Jon, List,

 

I don’t feel a need to provide a definition of these two types of definitions. 
My aim is to use the terms in a manner that respects the traditional uses in 
philosophy. Aristotle is often taken to be an important touchstone for 
understanding the logical character of the distinction. See, for instance:  
https://www.academia.edu/1082689/Aristotle_and_Nominal_Definitions?auto=download

 

If you think I am misusing the terminology, let me know. Here are some other 
places where Peirce uses and discusses this distinction between different types 
of definitions: [CP 8.191-2; 5.553; 6.367; 6.377). Richard Smyth puts the 
distinction to work in Reading Peirce Reading when he reconstructs several 
strands of Peirce’s arguments concerning our grasp of key conceptions in a 
logica utens and docens in the cognition series. In my own readings of the 
texts, I draw on Smyth as a model for interpreting Peirce’s works.

 

There are other distinctions used by those who make a career of writing 
definitions. For instance, there is a distinction between descriptive and 
prescriptive definitions and a distinction between semasiological and 
onomasiological dictionaries. For starters, one might consider the distinctions 
between definitions and dictionaries found here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definition

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictionary

 

For my part, I find the various strands of reasoning in “A Neglected Argument” 
somewhat difficult to interpret. As such, I would rate my own level of 
confidence to be in the range of low to moderate with respect to whether I am 
properly tracking what Peirce is doing. 

 

For instance, my initial guess in interpreting the first section is that he is 
not offering a definition of “God” in the first sentence. Rather, he is 
describing how he is using the word and pointing out that, as the proper name, 
it is definable. Saying that it is definable is different from offering a 
definition. 

 

He then states his own personal belief. The definitions that follow are part of 
an attempt to clarify the statement of his belief. He suspects that many others 
hold similar beliefs, and he is well aware that many reject such beliefs in 
God. 

 

My hunch is that the definitions are, at this stage of the discussion, offered 
as both descriptive of how he is using the terms and prescriptive for a reader 
of this essay. They are offered as nominal definitions of how he is using the 
words, but they are not even onomasiological in character. Rather, the use of 
the definitions is restricted to this essay—and they are offered for the sake 
of getting the argument off the ground. After all, Peirce doesn’t want to spend 
the day on mere definitions. He offers the definitions for the sake of avoiding 
having to engage in long and drawn-out arguments about the real definitions of 
the concepts of Real, Experience, Argument, etc. So, he just stipulates the 
definitions for the sake of argument.

 

I tend to think that Peirce is fully aware that some readers, such as some 20th 
century Analytically minded philosophers who are convinced Hume’s arguments 
concerning miracles and the divine are sound, will likely find Peirce’s 
arguments less than persuasive. Having said that, his target audience includes 
both the lay person and philosophers (such as James and Royce) who are willing 
to suspend such judgments and see where the arguments might lead.

 

Yours,

 

Jeff

 

From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>  
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> >
Date: Wednesday, September 18, 2024 at 10:43 AM
To: Peirce-L <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Verbal Definitions vs. Real Definitions (was A Scientific 
Religion)

Jeff, List:

 

What exactly do you have in mind by "real definitions" as distinguished from 
"nominal (i.e., verbal) definitions" in this context? As far as I know, 
Peirce's only explicit discussions of "verbal definition" vs. "real definition" 
are these two passages.

 

CSP: The concept which is a logical interpretant is only imperfectly so. It 
somewhat partakes of the nature of a verbal definition, and is as inferior to 
the habit, and much in the same way, as a verbal definition is inferior to the 
real definition. The deliberately formed, self-analyzing habit,--self-analyzing 
because formed by the aid of analysis of the exercises that nourished it,--is 
the living definition, the veritable and final logical interpretant. 
Consequently, the most perfect account of a concept that words can convey will 
consist in a description of the habit which that concept is calculated to 
produce. But how otherwise can a habit be described than by a description of 
the kind of action to which it gives rise, with the specification of the 
conditions and of the motive? (CP 5.491, EP 2:418, 1907)

 

CSP: To anybody who has no notion of logic this may seem a queer attempt to 
explain what is meant by a cyclic system; and it is true that it would be a 
needlessly involved verbal definition; a verbal definition being an explanation 
of the meaning of a word or phrase intended for a person to whose mind the idea 
expressed is perfectly distinct. But it is not intended to serve as a verbal, 
but as a real definition, that is, to explain to a person to whom the idea may 
be familiar enough, but who has never picked it to pieces and marked its 
structure, exactly how the idea is composed. As such, I believe it to be the 
simplest and most straightforward explanation possible. (CP 4.622, 1908)

 

Do "verbal definition" and "real definition" have the same definitions in these 
two texts? Either way, is Peirce providing verbal definitions or real 
definitions of "verbal definition" and "real definition"?

 

Regards,

 

Jon

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