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Neither Theresa nor I disagree
with what you are saying about the vernacular word "sign" being more narrow in
scope of application than the word "representamen" and I assume you agree that
there are several quotations which make clear that he regards the one as a
technical explication of the other. If so there is no disagreement
there. I think I was mistaken, though, in identifying confusion about the
nature of that distinction as being what would account for the unintelligibility
I find (or think I find) in her message.
Also, I agree with Theresa in
objecting to what Frances says in the passage she quotes from her:
========quote
Frances=============
In my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of
things
"representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive
then
"signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be
say
triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens"
may
not.
===========end
quote==============
I take it that what she objects to
in Frances saying that representamens need not be triadic. Are they
not defined as being triadic, just as signs are? We are talking about
entities which represent in either case, and that is surely a
relation. Can a monad, considered as such, be a
representation? Can a mere other as such be a representation? What
would be the point in calling a monad or a dyad something that represents?
Perhaps we could make sense of it if he means to say that a representamen
is a sign that is not a symbol but only an icon or an index, but then why talk
about it as a definitional explication of the idea of a sign and define it
again and again in just the way he defines sign? The only other
possibility I can see is that it is -- as Frances seems to think --
a term for referring to things as they would be if there were no
minds to take account of them. Are we to suppose that he would put this
forth as his basic term for the sort of entity which semiotic is particularly
concerned to study?
Peirce did not invent the term, by
the way. In the Century Dictionary, Peirce defines it as
follows: "In metaph., representation, an object serving to represent
something to the mind." This is attributed to Sir W. Hamilton.
Joe
Ransdell
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Sunday, March 12, 2006 7:54
PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Design and
Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from "Peircean elements" topic)
Joe, Frances, and
List,
Joseph Ransdell wrote:
I can only say that I find
Frances's usage of words so idiosyncratic in sentence after sentence that I
cannot figure out any way to restate her view in sentences that make any
sense to me.
Perhaps because at one
point several years ago I studied rather intensely for a few weeks some of
Frances's work and consequently go rather familiar with her admittedly
idiosyncratic terminology, I am having none of this difficulty whatsoever.
Indeed, I find her thinking quite clear and, as earlier mentioned,
persuasive--that is, for one who is not totally turned off and revulsed by her
strange locutions. I will, however, await Ben's response to Frances to comment
much further regarding the substantive issues.
I thought perhaps there might
be some one misunderstanding that would account for this in a systematic
way, and guessed that it might be due to taking the distinction between
"sign" and "representamen" as a distinction to be drawn within semiotic
analysis, so that e.g. one can speak of signs as if they are a special case
of representamens, whereas in fact it is a distinction between a
vernacular term and a technical term which Peirce used as a
replacement for theoretical purposes and it makes no sense to
talk that way: if you are going to talk in semiotical terms using
"sign" that is okay; if you are going to talk instead using "representamen"
that is okay; but it is not okay -- because it makes no sense -- to try
to talk in semiotical terms using both. So maybe
that mistake accounts for the impenetrable prose in this particular
message. Or maybe it doesn't.
Well, I would tend to disagree with you
as to the sign/representamen distinction being merely that
"between a vernacular term and a
technical term" as my recent response to Theresa Calvet may have
suggested.
Perhaps a better explanation,
though, might be that Frances has followed a practice of accumulating
vocabulary from a variety of theoretical sources and
made the mistake of
thinking that one can treat every different technical term from whatever
theoretical source as adding a new conceptual element to an overall eclectic
theory of her own that simply combines all others indiscriminately, as is
suggested by her speaking at one point about something being "all in
the Morrisean pragmatic manner". I have noticed before that a lot
of her vocabulary is actually terminology that has been used in this or that
other theory rather than being the neologism it seems at first to be.
If so this is surely a mistake, certain to induce incoherence and, worse
than that, discourage critical thinking by causing an insensitivity to just
such incoherence since it is of her own intentional making (though with
unintended consequences of which she is not sufficiently aware).
Moreover, it is perhaps what encourages her to keep coming up with ever new
neologisms, without any tendency to explain what they mean, as if it ought
to be obvious what she means. But in fact it is not at all
obvious what, say, "tychastics" means even if one knows what "tychastic"
means. The move from an adverb or an adjective to a noun is
not a trivial move nor is it a move which necessarily results in a sentence
that makes any sense. I suggest that she should resolve to start
to work at stripping her terminology down to an absolute minimum of
technical terms from any source, even avoiding all but a minimum of
Peirce's technical terms when writing about Peirce. Just write in
plain vernacular everyday English as far as possible and do philosophy in
that way for a while. Better to have a few clear ideas than a vast
quantity of confused ones, for philosophical purposes, I should think.
I would agree with you, Joe, that
Frances ought continue to consider the terminology she uses, although is not
meant to suggest that I necessarily approve of all your
recommendations to her. However, that's a matter for her to reflect upon, and
I believe I have now said all that I care to say on the matter.
More
when Ben posts a response to Frances (which, again, seems quite likely, while
I understand that he shares some of your consternation, Joe, with Frances's
locution).
Gary
Anyway, Frances, I'm not
intending to be discouraging but wanting to register strongly a belief that
you are defeating your purposes by this indulging this penchant for verbal
embellishments to no good purpose. The points you are wanting to make
are not going to be successfully made this way.
That's it, for what it's
worth. Gary, if you think I am wrong about this please say so straight
out. You are right to defend her against merely negative
criticism that is of no help, but isn't there something that needs to be
dealt with here by way of systematic correction?
Joe
Ransdell
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