There is more to be said on the
"sign"/"representamen" distinction, but it will involve appeal to textual
material not in the Collected Papers in which he says that he doesn't need that
distinction after all, and I can't find it in my notes immediately. I won't
be able to work on that further for the next few days, though, because of other
things that have to be done.
As regards the Century
Dictionary definition, it should be noted that although it is attributed to
Peirce, it does not follow that the way the definition is worded is due to
Peirce. If you look at it in the Dictionary itself you will see that it
could be a wording given by quotation from Hamilton. There is an ambiguity
in its presentation in that definition, given the convention usually followed
there of indicating when a quotation of a use is occurring. Thus Peirce
may be responsible for it as an entry but not as author of it. It is
inconsistent with the explicit definition he later gives of "representamen", but
I don't know what to make of that.
Joe
Ransdell
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 12:30
AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Design and
Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from "Peircean elements" topic)
Neither Theresa nor I disagree
with what you are saying about the vernacular word "sign" being more narrow
in scope of application than the word "representamen"
Here we seem to be in agreement (there is a
small question about "the vernacular word" however).
and I assume you agree that
there are several quotations which make clear that he regards the one as a
technical explication of the other.
But
he does not seem to be consistent in this matter. More on this at a later
date.
If so there is no disagreement
there.
If the representamen is broader
in scope and if "the vernacular word "sign" is in fact used as a technical
term in semeiotic--as it most certainly is--then the situation seems more
complex than the simple distinction between a vernacular and a technical term,
at least as I see it at present
I think I was mistaken,
though, in identifying confusion about the nature of that distinction as
being what would account for the unintelligibility I find (or think I find)
in her message.
Well, as earlier noted,
while you find it unintelligible, I do not. Yes, the neologisms are
problematic, irksome, etc. but it seems to me possible to make good sense of
what Frances is arguing (although her last post to Theresa tended to mystify
me a bit).
Also, I agree with Theresa in
objecting to what Frances says in the passage she quotes from her:
========quote
Frances=============
In my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of
things "representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive
then "signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be
say triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens"
may not.
===========end
quote==============
I take it that what she
objects to in Frances saying that representamens need not be
triadic. Are they not defined as being triadic, just as signs
are? We are talking about entities which represent in either case, and
that is surely a relation. Can a monad, considered as such,
be a representation? Can a mere other as such be a
representation? What would be the point in calling a monad or a dyad
something that represents? I think
that you and Theresa are certainly quite correct here: representamen/signs are
all necessarily triadic. If Frances has suggested otherwise, I would think she
may have to retract that assertion.
Perhaps we could make sense of
it if he means to say that a representamen is a sign that is not a
symbol but only an icon or an index, but then why talk about it as a
definitional explication of the idea of a sign and define it again and
again in just the way he defines sign?
Perhaps. But when one looks at the 10-adic
classification of signs one sees that icons and indices are most certainly
triadic as well. So this is not really a way out.
The only other
possibility I can see is that it is -- as Frances seems to think --
a term for referring to things as they would be if there were
no minds to take account of them. Are we to suppose that he would put
this forth as his basic term for the sort of entity which semiotic is
particularly concerned to study?
Probably not. This proto semiotic--for
example, considerations of the early cosmos--are pre-philosophic,
pre-scientific. But there IS a bio- a physio-semiosis, is there not, even if
it can't be semeiotically analyzed--or at least not in much depth--that is,
triadically (but see Thomas Sebeok's Global Semiotics, Indiana U.,
2001, passim).
Peirce did not invent the
term, by the way. In the Century Dictionary, Peirce defines
it as follows: "In metaph., representation, an object serving to
represent something to the mind." This is attributed to Sir W.
Hamilton.
This is most interesting. But
can one really equate representation with the representamen? Perhaps. I
don't know. It remains a question in my mind
Gary Richmond
Joseph Ransdell wrote:
Neither Theresa nor I disagree
with what you are saying about the vernacular word "sign" being more narrow
in scope of application than the word "representamen" and I assume you agree
that there are several quotations which make clear that he regards the one
as a technical explication of the other. If so there is no
disagreement there. I think I was mistaken, though, in identifying
confusion about the nature of that distinction as being what would account
for the unintelligibility I find (or think I find) in her message.
Also, I agree with Theresa in
objecting to what Frances says in the passage she quotes from her:
========quote
Frances=============
In my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of
things "representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive
then "signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be
say triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens"
may not.
===========end
quote==============
I take it that what she
objects to in Frances saying that representamens need not be
triadic. Are they not defined as being triadic, just as signs
are? We are talking about entities which represent in either case, and
that is surely a relation. Can a monad, considered as such,
be a representation? Can a mere other as such be a
representation? What would be the point in calling a monad or a dyad
something that represents? Perhaps we could make sense of it if he
means to say that a representamen is a sign that is not a symbol but
only an icon or an index, but then why talk about it as a definitional
explication of the idea of a sign and define it again and again in just
the way he defines sign? The only other possibility I can see is
that it is -- as Frances seems to think -- a term for referring to
things as they would be if there were no minds to take account of
them. Are we to suppose that he would put this forth as his basic term
for the sort of entity which semiotic is particularly concerned to
study?
Peirce did not invent the
term, by the way. In the Century Dictionary, Peirce defines
it as follows: "In metaph., representation, an object serving to
represent something to the mind." This is attributed to Sir W.
Hamilton.
Joe
Ransdell
-----
Original Message -----
Sent:
Sunday, March 12, 2006 7:54 PM
Subject:
[peirce-l] Re: Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from
"Peircean elements" topic)
Joe, Frances, and
List,
Joseph Ransdell wrote:
I can only say
that I find Frances's usage of words so idiosyncratic in sentence after
sentence that I cannot figure out any way to restate her view in
sentences that make any sense to me.
Perhaps because at one point
several years ago I studied rather intensely for a few weeks some of
Frances's work and consequently go rather familiar with her admittedly
idiosyncratic terminology, I am having none of this difficulty whatsoever.
Indeed, I find her thinking quite clear and, as earlier mentioned,
persuasive--that is, for one who is not totally turned off and revulsed by
her strange locutions. I will, however, await Ben's response to Frances to
comment much further regarding the substantive issues.
I thought
perhaps there might be some one misunderstanding that would account for
this in a systematic way, and guessed that it might be due
to taking the distinction between "sign" and "representamen" as a
distinction to be drawn within semiotic analysis, so that e.g. one can
speak of signs as if they are a special case of representamens,
whereas in fact it is a distinction between a vernacular term and
a technical term which Peirce used as a replacement for
theoretical purposes and it makes no sense to talk that way:
if you are going to talk in semiotical terms using "sign" that is
okay; if you are going to talk instead using "representamen" that is
okay; but it is not okay -- because it makes no sense -- to try to
talk in semiotical terms using both. So maybe
that mistake accounts for the impenetrable prose in this particular
message. Or maybe it doesn't.
Well, I would tend to disagree with
you as to the sign/representamen distinction being merely that
"between a vernacular term and a
technical term" as my recent response to Theresa Calvet may have
suggested.
Perhaps a better
explanation, though, might be that Frances has followed a practice
of accumulating vocabulary from a variety of theoretical sources and
made the
mistake of thinking that one can treat every different technical term
from whatever theoretical source as adding a new conceptual element to
an overall eclectic theory of her own that simply combines all others
indiscriminately, as is suggested by her speaking at one point
about something being "all in the Morrisean pragmatic manner". I
have noticed before that a lot of her vocabulary is actually
terminology that has been used in this or that other theory rather than
being the neologism it seems at first to be. If so this is surely
a mistake, certain to induce incoherence and, worse than that,
discourage critical thinking by causing an insensitivity to just such
incoherence since it is of her own intentional making (though with
unintended consequences of which she is not sufficiently
aware). Moreover, it is perhaps what encourages her to keep
coming up with ever new neologisms, without any tendency to explain what
they mean, as if it ought to be obvious what she means. But
in fact it is not at all obvious what, say, "tychastics" means even if
one knows what "tychastic" means. The move from an
adverb or an adjective to a noun is not a trivial move nor is it a move
which necessarily results in a sentence that makes any
sense. I suggest that she should resolve to start to work at
stripping her terminology down to an absolute minimum of technical terms
from any source, even avoiding all but a minimum of Peirce's
technical terms when writing about Peirce. Just write in plain
vernacular everyday English as far as possible and do philosophy in that
way for a while. Better to have a few clear ideas than a vast
quantity of confused ones, for philosophical purposes, I should
think.
I would agree with
you, Joe, that Frances ought continue to consider the terminology she
uses, although is not meant to suggest that I necessarily approve of
all your recommendations to her. However, that's a matter for her
to reflect upon, and I believe I have now said all that I care to say on
the matter.
More when Ben posts a response to Frances (which,
again, seems quite likely, while I understand that he shares some of your
consternation, Joe, with Frances's locution).
Gary
Anyway, Frances, I'm not
intending to be discouraging but wanting to register strongly a belief
that you are defeating your purposes by this indulging this penchant for
verbal embellishments to no good purpose. The points you are
wanting to make are not going to be successfully made this
way.
That's it, for what it's
worth. Gary, if you think I am wrong about this please say so
straight out. You are right to defend her against merely
negative criticism that is of no help, but isn't there something that
needs to be dealt with here by way of systematic
correction?
Joe
Ransdell
- --- Message from peirce-l forum to
subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free
Edition. Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 268.2.1/278 - Release Date:
3/9/2006
No virus found in this outgoing message.
Checked by AVG Free Edition.
Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 268.2.1/278 - Release Date: 3/9/2006
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free
Edition. Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 268.2.1/278 - Release Date:
3/9/2006
|