Dear List,
I was hoping to keep out of this. Mostly I think the deconstruction of
Peirce's writings concerning representamen / sign is a waste of time and
simply unable to produce any meaningful result.
This message by Frances simply makes no sense to me. How do you,
Frances or Gary, propose a representamen that is prior to "all existent
objects and 'signs' and semiosis" - this assertion makes no sense
ontologically or epistemologically.
Indeed, even if I consider such an argument viable, any such
representamen would not be accessible to apprehension. It leads me to
believe that there is a misunderstanding in Frances argument concerning
the very nature of semeiosis.
I think you are both reading too much into Peirce's exploration - which
he clearly testifies to. Consider the two terms a property of the
immediacy of his manifest refinement (his analysis).
With respect,
Steven
Frances Kelly wrote:
Gary...
Thanks for your search and post.
As you implied, the distinction attempted to be made by me is in deed
the difference between "representamens" that are broader and prior to
all else in the world, including existent objects and "signs" and
semiosis, and that are independent of thought and mind and sense and
life itself. The reason for my making this attempt is simply the
seeming distinction made by Peirce himself in his many passages quoted
here. Agreeably, it may certainly prove useful to distinguish between
"signs" conveying notions to human minds and those "representamens"
which can not or need not do so. My train of thought on this matter
may of course be way off track, in that there may be no substantial
distinction at all. The Peircean writings recently posted to the list
by you on the terms "representamen" and "representamens" and
"representamina" will be read by me in detail for some insight.
-Frances
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