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Kristi, Joe, list:
The human is a social animal, born into a social group
which typically has a full array of habits, customs in place. That strikes
me as a given. "We've always done it that way, and that's the way it will
be done" seems to me what Peirce is talking about as tenacity propped up by
authority. And that too strikes me as a given, even in this empirical,
secular society where tenacity and authority are currently clashing over
Pluto. Peirces "community of investigators" (is that his term?),
the astronomers, settled it with a vote. The experiential evolution in the
conception of Pluto as a planet can be described as the new information that
surprised even the scientists. This scenario seems to me to fit pretty
well Peirce's sketch of the way things necessarily happen in social
groups. But it also involves features I wonder how Peirce would work
out in the terms of his sketch, In some news source, I saw the vote
of the astronomers hailed as a triumph of science over romance. And so it
appears at first glance. But what we have an instance of tenacity ("This
is how we have always defined a planet,") propped up by the authority of
science, the community of investigators. We can certainly say there has
been an advance in information. But has there been an evolutionary advance
in the mode of conception, or just a shift in whose conceptions are
valued?
Dear Joe,
Thanks for your response and the quote. On second
thoughts, informed with the quote you provided, some kind of evolution seems to
be involved. But, being evolution of a conception, it must be of logical nature.
I can't see how it could hold as a hypothesis of evolution of either individual
or social development. Social comes first, no question about it.
But it
might be fruitful to think of the principle of ordering the methods this way in
terms of critical thought involved. The method of tenacity, by definition,
involves none. The method of authority may involve some, though not necessarily
by the believer, but by the authority. It is not excluded, by definition, that
the authority in question may have arrived at the belief by a process involving
critical thought, as well as having gained the authority for a reason.
Well, I don't know. Don't remember Peirce ever writing along these
lines. But it is an ordering of "intellectual enditions". So the method of
tenacity would imply a conscious belief, in contrast to all the beliefs forced
upon us by experience which we are not aware we are holding.
CP 5.524
""...For belief, while it lasts, is a strong habit, and, as such forces the man
to believe until some surprise breaks the habit."
Kirsti
Määttänen/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
25.9.2006
kello 02:02, Joseph Ransdell kirjoitti:
Dear
Kirsti::/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
I'm
short on time today and can't really answer you until tomorrow, but I
ran across a llater passage in Peirce in wihch he describes what he
was doing earlier, in the Fixation article, as follows. (I'm
just quotting it, for what \it's worth , at the moment and will get back
with you tomorrow, when I have some free time again./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
In
a manuscript c. 1906 which was printed in the Collected Papers at 5.564,
Peirce describes "The Fixation of Bellief" (1877) as starting out from the
proposition that "the agitation of a question" ceases only when satisfaction
is attaned with the settlement of belief, and then goes on to consider how: /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
"...the
conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the
action of experience; beginning with willful belief, or self-mendacity [i.e.
the method of tenacity], the most degraded of all intellectual cnditions;
thence rising to the imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized
society [the method of authority]; then to the idea of a settlement of
opinion as the result of a fermentation of ideas [the a priori method]; and
finally reaching the idea of truth as overwelmingly forced upon the mind in
experience as the effect of an independent reality [the method of reason or
science, or, as he also calls it,in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, the method
of experience]."/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
My
words are in brackets/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
Joe
Ransdell/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
[EMAIL PROTECTED]/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
-----
Original Message ----/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> From:
Kirsti Määttänen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> To:
Peirce Discussion Forum <[email protected]>/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> Sent:
Sunday, September 24, 2006 8:50:46 AM/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> Subject:
[peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
Joe
& Bill,/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
Joe,
I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order of /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> the
methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed. But /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> that
wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this response /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> :).
It was "the two fundamental psychological laws" on the title you /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> gave,
which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote:/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
>
JR: "...exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> >
second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not
have /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> >
the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> >
authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> >
to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> >
recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> >
on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> >
interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> >
something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> >
believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible? /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
And
later in the discussion you wrote:/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
JR: Well,
I was thinking of the argument one might make that social /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> consciousness
is prior to consciousness of self, and the method of /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> tenacity
seems to me to be motivated by the value of self-integrity, /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> the
instinctive tendency not to give up on any part of oneself, and /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> one's
beliefs are an important aspect of what one tends to think of /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> when
one thinks of one's identity./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
To
my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based on /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> the
degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order in/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> evolution,
or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness has /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> to
do with 'summum bonum", the ultimate aim and purpose, which is not /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> necessarily
an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
So,
the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree of /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> goodness, IS
STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which, if persisted in, will, /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> in
the long run (if the person persisting will live long enough), show /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> to
the person its truth or falsity./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
If
false, it will be some kind of a nasty surprise to the person. If /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> still
persisted in, more nasty surprised are to follow. - Well, it /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> might
as well be a pleasant surprise. For example with the (common) /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> belief
that humans beings are by nature evil and egoistic. Being /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> surprised
in this way, according to my somewhat systematic /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> observations,
follows a different course. But Peirce does not give /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> examples
of this kind./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
But
I do not see any justification given in this particular paper to:/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
CSP:
In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called the /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> method
of authority, we must, in the first place, allow its /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> immeasurable
mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
It
can only be the 'summum bonum', which could act as an (ultimate) /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> justification
in considering the method of authority as far superior to/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> the
method of tenacity. But Peirce does not take that up here./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
Anyway,
the IF's in the following may be worth considering:/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
CSP:
"If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> if
belief is of the nature of a
habit"/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
How
I find, is, that these are the premisses from which Peirce proceeds /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> in
this chapter. So these give the perspective Peirce is here taking in /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> view
of the answers he offers, pertaining as well to the logic of the /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> order
of the methods in presenting them./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
As
to the "two fundamental psychological laws", I assume Peirce is /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> referring
to the laws he himself had arrived at & stated. A relevant/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> quote
on this might be the following, where Peirce puts the question: /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> How
do we know that a belief is nothing
but/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> CP
5.28 ”... the deliberate preparedness to act
according to the /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> formula
believed? My original article carried this back to a /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> psychological
principle. The conception of truth, according to me, was/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> developed
out of an original impulse to act consistently, to have
a /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> definite
intention.”/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> Which,
by the time of writing, Peirce does not find satisfactory. For /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> the
reasons you stated in your later post, with which I agree./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
Best,/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
Kirsti/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> –/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
---/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> Message
from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
Joe
& Bill,/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
Joe,
I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> of
the methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> But
that wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> response
:). It was "the two fundamental psychological laws" on the/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> title
you gave, which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote:/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
<excerpt><fontfamily><param>Times
New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>JR:/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> "...exactly
what accounts for the transition from the first to the/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> second
method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> the
order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> authority
and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> to
justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> recall
anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> on
this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> interest
until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> something
right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> believe,
but can the ordering really be argued for as
plausible? </bigger></bigger></fontfamily>/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
</excerpt>/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
And
later in the discussion you
wrote:/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
<fontfamily><param>New
York</param><bigger><bigger>JR: Well, I was/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> thinking
of the argument one might make that social consciousness is/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> prior
to consciousness of self, and the method of tenacity seems to me/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> to
be motivated by the value of self-integrity, the instinctive/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> tendency
not to give up on any part of oneself, and one's beliefs are/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> an
important aspect of what one tends to think of when one thinks of/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> one's
identity.</bigger></bigger></fontfamily>/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
To
my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based on/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> the
degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order in/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> evolution,
or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness has/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> to
do with 'summum bonum", the ultimate aim and purpose, which is not/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> necessarily
an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
So,
the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree of/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> goodness, IS
STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which, if persisted in, will,/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> in
the long run (if the person persisting will live long enough), show/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> to
the person its truth or falsity.
/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
If
false, it will be some kind of a nasty surprise to the person. If/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> still
persisted in, more nasty surprised are to follow. - Well, it/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> might
as well be a pleasant surprise. For example with the (common)/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> belief
that humans beings are by nature evil and egoistic. Being/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> surprised
in this way, according to my somewhat systematic/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> observations,
follows a different course. But Peirce does not give/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> examples
of this kind./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
But
I do not see any justification given in this particular paper to:/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
<bold><fontfamily><param>Times
New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>CSP:/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> In
judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called the/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> method
of authority, we must, in the first place, allow its/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> immeasurable
mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
</bigger></bigger></fontfamily></bold>It
can only be the 'summum/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> bonum',
which could act as an (ultimate) justification in considering/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> the
method of authority as far superior to the method of tenacity. But/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> Peirce
does not take that up here./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
Anyway,
the IF's in the following may be worth considering:/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
<bold><fontfamily><param>Times
New Roman</param><bigger><bigger>CSP:/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> "If
the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> belief
is of the nature of a habit"/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
</bigger></bigger></fontfamily></bold>/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
How
I find, is, that these are the premisses from which Peirce/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> proceeds
in this chapter. So these give the perspective Peirce is here/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> taking
in view of the answers he offers, pertaining as well to the/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> logic
of the order of the methods in presenting them. /bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
As
to the "two fundamental psychological laws", I assume Peirce is/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> referring
to the laws he himself had arrived at & stated. A relevant/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> quote
on this might be the following, where Peirce puts the question:/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> How
do we know that a belief is nothing
but/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
<fontfamily><param>Times
New Roman</param> CP
5.28 ”... the deliberate/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> preparedness
to act according to the formula believed? My original/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> article
carried this back to a psychological principle. The/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> conception
of truth, according to me, was developed out of an original/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> impulse
to act consistently, to have a definite intention.”/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
Which,
by the time of writing, Peirce does not find satisfactory. For/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily> the
reasons you stated in your later post, with which I agree./bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
Best,/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
Kirsti/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
–</fontfamily>/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
<fontfamily><param>Helvetica</param>Kirsti
Määttänen/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
<<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
</fontfamily>/bigger>/bigger>/fontfamily>
--- Message
from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Kirsti
Määttänen 040-568 4906 013-663 401 Pippurimäentie 37, 82310
Oravisalo /fontfamily>
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