Joe, list,
I certainly agree with you. Indeed Peirce even writes: "It
is not to be supposed that the first three methods of settling opinion
present no advantage whatever ovr the scientific method. On the
contrary each has some pecular conveniance of its own." He goes
to discuss this at the end of the "Fixation" essay. Now, I
haven't taken the time to consider this carefully at all (so take
cum grano salis), but if indeed the different "methods"
can be related to the Categorial scheme, then it would be obvious that
they each carry something important. Of the method of tenacity Peirce
says: "But most of all I admire the method of tenacity for its strength, simplicity, and directness. Men who
pursue it are distinguished for their decision of character, which
becomes very easy with such a mental rule. They do not waste time in
trying to make up their minds what they want, but, fastening like
lightning upon whatever alternative comes first, they hold to it to
the end, whatever happens, without an instant's irresolution. This is
one of the splendid qualities which generally accompany brilliant,
unlasting success. It is impossible not to envy the man who can
dismiss reason, although we know how it must turn out at last."
(W3, p. 256)
An aside: I don't know about Pluto -- I haven't followed the
deliberations. The one thing that I found curious was to discover that
Pluto was the only "planet" to have been discovered by an
American (in 1930) and that the debate over its inclusion or exclusion
as a "planet" apparently had a political undercurrent
(probably blocking the "road to inquiry"). One funny thing
about Pluto and America, of course, is that the Roman God Pluto takes
his name from the Greek Ploutos, which meant wealth (he was
also the son of Demeter, the Earth Mother): Pluto, associated to Hades
and to the earth's entrails where wealth and gold (Ploutos) can
be found, is therefore the only God whose wealth grows indefinitely
through the constant arrival of new souls... It is almost as if
looking up in the sky can sometimes tell us something about what goes
on down here on earth...!!!
Martin Lefebvre
Martin -- ad Bill:
Martin, I find what you are saying both plausible and resulting in a gemerally consistent view. Something can be done, too, to put a more positive face on the first two methods, which need not be construed as negatively as Peirce does, e.g. by pointing out that tenacity, in spite of there being nothing that one can cite at a given time that supports one's viewand the evidence seems actually to be against it, this sort of stubborness seems to be a pretty important factor at times in winning through to a better view. Of course everything really depends on good judgment and being willing, finally, to give up on something. But there is a positive element in tenacity that needs to be identified and salvaged finally as part of the fourth method. And so also for authority, which is, in some cases, simply the overwhelming forcefulness of well-deserved good reputations. Peirce is definitely aware of this sort of thing. I ran across a passage within the past day or so that illustrates this and I'll see if I can find it again. Peirce is expressing a kind of scorn, as I recall, about scientists who are overly impressed by the recognition given in official commendations and awards and the like and says that the individual scientist has to be the best judge of his or her own competence. In other words, competence actually requires one's own ability to be the best judge of one's own competence, that is, one ought to regard the matter that way. I think though that you are probably right that it is only in the case of the third method that it even appears that we can reasonably talk about it as being a rational method, that being highly qualified, of course, by noting it as a "degenerate" form, as you suggest.
That goes back to what Bill Bailey was saying about the decision about the planet Pluto being a committee decision. I think myself that it is not correct to say that they really did settle anything by making that decision. I mean their vote may well have the effect of bringing that change about, but this is simply a causal result, not a logical consequence, i.e. they didn't really decide to do anything other than to lend persuasional weight to what will turn out de facto to be accepted about Pluto from now on. I would argue myself -- have argued elsewhere -- that acceptance in science can mean only one thing, namely. the fact that future inquirers do in fact make use of the proposition in question as a premise or presupposition in their own futuire inquiry, essentially including that part of it which consists in making a public claim to a research conclusion which is put forward as based on the propositon in quesion in that way. Otherwise it makes no difference what any scientists say about Pluto's status. It is up to the future to determine whether the resolution to actually use the proposition in that way or not has the effect of actual such use of it. And of course the last word on that is never in. As it stands, the confusion about what is meant by "acceptance" in science -= and inhumanistic scholaraship, too -- is massive and sometimes grotesque, as when it is confused with gettting a paper accepted by a prestigious journal!
Joe
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From Martin Lefebvre
To: Peirce Discussion Forum <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 11:40:01 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
[peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Pei
Joe, Kristi, list,
At the risk of offering a post hoc, ergo propter hoc argument, I'll try looking at the issue from the prespective of Peirce's more mature views.
I consider the "Fixation" essay to be organized around a sort of development/growth principle that leads to the scientific method as the method of choice of reason. I believe that growth here can be thought of categorially. The method of tenacity "works" as long as the individual is considered monadically (the social impulse must be held in check) and as long as there is no attempt to examine a belief against experience. A "monadic" mind (what could that be???) would think what it thinks, irrespective of anything else. Of course, the individual (the self) is not a monad (see Colapietro's work on this) and the social impulse cannot be held in check forever. With the method of authority belief is achieved in relation to the belief of others (those in authority) -- not in relation to experience. There is a growing sense of dualism here with the introduction of "others". With the third, a priori, method we find something interesting. This third method is "far more intellectual and respectable from the point of view of reason than either of the others which we have noticed", says Peirce (italics mine). He adds, however: "It makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste". Now, as you know, Peirce (much) later introduced esthetics to the normative sciences and saw both ethics and logic as requiring the help of esthetics. Esthetics being concerned with the formation of the summum bonum and of ideals or ends. Now there is a strong connection in Peirce between esthetics and abduction (and agapasticism), in the sense that the formation of ideals and the summum bonum lies on the latter's ability to attract us before we can even consider the consequences of adopting them with regards to conduct or thought either by way of imagination through deduction or concretely through induction. This requires insight (il lume naturale), the very principle for the (very) weak form of assurance we can get from abduction. Peirce tells us, in short, that it is rational for us to trust our guesses. Moreover, the Law of Mind explains that instinct, our ability to guess right, is itself subject to growth in concrete reasonableness. (The mind of God, for Peirce, is a mind whose "guesses" are all right guesses). All this to say that, in his later years, Peirce will be brought to recognize the third method of fixing belief (agreeableness to reason) as a keystone to the scientific method of experience. The problem is that this method, on its own, cannot distinguish between accidents and reality. This is why Peirce concludes that the only method likely to obtain a controlled (and growing) representation of reality is the scientific method. However, it seems that both the 3rd and 4th methods are related to the object (reality) through the mediation of reason (the 3rd method, however, only in a somewhat degenerate manner, through insight). Another way of saying it is to consider that neither of the first two methods imply indefinite growth whereas only the scientific method can approximate reality by mimicking (iconically) and being affected (indexically) by it (and not by "accidents" of another nature), understood that reality is that which is independent from us while idefinitely growing in concrete reasonableness (in kalos).
At the time of writing "Fixation" it seems Peirce was not quite ready to see the full impact of the rationality of the 3rd method. Thus his rejection of it as relating to "taste" and his criticism of "taste" as being a matter of fashion. However, his realization that esthetics belongs to the normative sciences and that ethics and logic require its help a realization prepared in part by his cosmological writings -- may impact our retroactive reading of the "Fixation" essay. Thus it could be argued (here might lie the post hoc turn of the argument) that Peirce, in the way he ordered the 4 methods, was already manifesting some insight with regards to esthetics's connection to logic (though somewhat unwittingly)...
Martin Lefebvre
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