Jim W. says:
"Pyrryo, of course, claimed that 'suspension' yields peace of mind."
REPLY:
Yes, but then again Pyrrho wasn'y supposed to be making any assertions at all, being the sort of sceptic he purported to be! But, yes, sure, This or something like this has always seemed to me to be the central puzzle for philosophy, central or maybe fundamental: fundamental, when we consider that there is reason to think that the whole point to Socrates as paradigmatic philosopher is that he is a model for philosophy as the answer to the question of what the good life is like, but how can permanent dissatisfaction be in the recipe for the good life? This is perhaps why his interlocuters so persistently accuse him of acting like he doesn't know when he surely does! Of course we can do some distinction drawing to clarify all this, but there seems to be an unlimited quantity of more such distinctions to be drawn to keep the paradoxes at bay! On the other hand, I have no doubt that quite a few of us here would have to admit that we can't think of anything better to do than doing philosophy, if only we had all the time in the world to do it right, in the leisurely fashion that it requires to do really well! There is a lot of puzzling paradoxicality in connection with detachment generally: we praise it in order to promote objectivity and condemn it as indicative of callousness and insensitivity. for example.
But back to Pyyrho: I suppose we might point out that Buridan's ass does starve to death, notwithstanding all of that food at hand. Or less facetiously, we might point out that the bundles of hay (or whatever) must be absolutely identical in attractive power, and the passing of time assures us that even if an equality of opposiite attractors is achieved it will only be for a very short time, and as the dissymmetry sets in which enables us to move along in the process the movement toward success is experiened as gratifying.
Lurking just below the surface in this, though, is the question of "feigned doubt or hesitation," too, i.e. treating something as being in question even though one is only entertaining the hypothetical possibility of a doubt. But isn't that necessary for raising a question at times? There is something on this in a footnote to one of the early pragmatism papers, as I recall, possibly attached by the editors of the Collected Papers which they culled from some MS. I recall not being altogether happy with what he was saying there.
Joe
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
"Pyrryo, of course, claimed that 'suspension' yields peace of mind."
REPLY:
Yes, but then again Pyrrho wasn'y supposed to be making any assertions at all, being the sort of sceptic he purported to be! But, yes, sure, This or something like this has always seemed to me to be the central puzzle for philosophy, central or maybe fundamental: fundamental, when we consider that there is reason to think that the whole point to Socrates as paradigmatic philosopher is that he is a model for philosophy as the answer to the question of what the good life is like, but how can permanent dissatisfaction be in the recipe for the good life? This is perhaps why his interlocuters so persistently accuse him of acting like he doesn't know when he surely does! Of course we can do some distinction drawing to clarify all this, but there seems to be an unlimited quantity of more such distinctions to be drawn to keep the paradoxes at bay! On the other hand, I have no doubt that quite a few of us here would have to admit that we can't think of anything better to do than doing philosophy, if only we had all the time in the world to do it right, in the leisurely fashion that it requires to do really well! There is a lot of puzzling paradoxicality in connection with detachment generally: we praise it in order to promote objectivity and condemn it as indicative of callousness and insensitivity. for example.
But back to Pyyrho: I suppose we might point out that Buridan's ass does starve to death, notwithstanding all of that food at hand. Or less facetiously, we might point out that the bundles of hay (or whatever) must be absolutely identical in attractive power, and the passing of time assures us that even if an equality of opposiite attractors is achieved it will only be for a very short time, and as the dissymmetry sets in which enables us to move along in the process the movement toward success is experiened as gratifying.
Lurking just below the surface in this, though, is the question of "feigned doubt or hesitation," too, i.e. treating something as being in question even though one is only entertaining the hypothetical possibility of a doubt. But isn't that necessary for raising a question at times? There is something on this in a footnote to one of the early pragmatism papers, as I recall, possibly attached by the editors of the Collected Papers which they culled from some MS. I recall not being altogether happy with what he was saying there.
Joe
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
-----Original Message-----
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Sent: Fri, 22 Sep 2006 6:21 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 12:22:52 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
Joe and list,
It is difficult to tell exactly what those two psychological laws
are from the text. (preceding the quote below) It is also difficult to
frame them universally. Either we talk of all men at all times or some
men at all times or all men at some time or another. I think we could
talk of all men at some time or
another "systematically keeping out of view all that might
cause a change in his opinions." That is what needs explaining.
The explanation is teleological. What causes people to avoid changing
their opinions? Why do people avoid changing their opinions? Peirce
says,
1. an instinctive dislike of an undecided state of mind.... makes men cling spasmodically to the views they already take.
2. a steady and immovable faith yields great peace of mind. (sec. 5 FOB)
Pyrryo, of course, claimed that 'suspension' yields peace of
mind. But this was only after the method of science or
experience was brought to bear. Furthermore, an undecided
state of mind motivates inquiry as much as it closes it down.
Effectively, this reflects the problem of framing a law universally.
How about "The truth is too painful." If the man following the "method
of ostriches" knew this about himself, however,it is difficult to see
how it could yield peace of mind. Can s/he coherently say "I am
impervious to the truth and I am happy." What can be said here? In any
case, I am not sure what the two psychological laws are. #1 looks like
a candidate.
Jim W
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From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Sent: Fri, 22 Sep 2006 6:21 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
In "The Fixation of Belief" Peirce says that
"a man may go through life, systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change n his opinions, and if he only succeeds -- basing his method, as he does, on two fundamental psychologicl laws -- I do not see what can be said against his doing so".
This is in Part V, where he is explaining the method of tenacity, where he then goes on to say that "the social impulse" will nevertheless somehow cause him, at times, to face up to some contradiction which impels recourse to adopting the second method, which is the method of authority.
His explanation of this is very unsatisfactory, far too sketchy to be very informative, and I wonder if anyone has run across any place where he says anything that might flesh that out or, regardless of that, whether anyone has any plausible explanation themselves of exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible?
Joe Ransdell
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
"a man may go through life, systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change n his opinions, and if he only succeeds -- basing his method, as he does, on two fundamental psychologicl laws -- I do not see what can be said against his doing so".
This is in Part V, where he is explaining the method of tenacity, where he then goes on to say that "the social impulse" will nevertheless somehow cause him, at times, to face up to some contradiction which impels recourse to adopting the second method, which is the method of authority.
His explanation of this is very unsatisfactory, far too sketchy to be very informative, and I wonder if anyone has run across any place where he says anything that might flesh that out or, regardless of that, whether anyone has any plausible explanation themselves of exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible?
Joe Ransdell
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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