Jin Devine writes:
Marvin Gandall:
That was then, this is now. There's faster growth in capital formation
and
wages in developing countries than in developed countries, suggesting the
beginnings of a world-historic shift in the centre of gravity of the
global
economy from the old imperialist powers, including the US, to China,
India,
Brazil, and other former colonies and semi-colonies. This trend departs
from
classical Marxist theories of imperialism, predicated on the export of
surplus capital from the more advanced to the less developed countries,
rising working class standards in the advanced countries producing a
labour
aristocracy, and increased pauperization and the "development of
underdevelopment" on the periphery.
two comments:
first of all, it's a mistake to focus on the division between the
central capitalists (the US, etc.) and those in the periphery or what
used to be the periphery (China & India). Yes, new competitors are
rising, with an Indian company trying to buy Spielberg's film
corporation, etc. But they are joining the nascent world capitalist
class, not changing it significantly. The lust for profits persists as
the dominant principle.
MG: We're not in disageement. I drew attention to the division to illustrate
how
the classic relationship between the core and periphery has been turned on
its head, particularly in relation to growth and the export of capital. I
wasn't implying that the new economic powers are destined to come into
conflict with the old. In fact, as you suggest, their appearance has given
global capitalism new markets and new life. Thanks to technological advances
in transport and communciations and the spread of international education
and managerial employment, the global economy is more integrated than it was
during the periods of inter-imperialist rivalry before each of the world
wars. Foreign governments, consumers, investors, and workers have become as
essential to the profits of the transnationals as their home markets and
nation states.
second, I agree that the era of the "aristocracy of labor" in the
center has come and gone. The classical era of imperialism (1870?? to
1980??) created a hierarchy of nation-states with the "core" (and
especially the US) at the top. That's because the accumulation process
was so "autocentric," oriented toward investment inside nation-states
or inside the rich countries themselves as a group. But since 1980 or
so, the raw material created by the classical era -- i.e., a reserve
army of newly-proletarianized labor-power in the periphery or
ex-periphery -- has been increasingly exploited. So the old
"aristocracy of labor" in the core finds itself increasingly in direct
competition with that of the (ex)periphery.
There still is a labor aristocracy in the core (and as a tenured
professor at a financially secure university, I can see it from the
inside). But it is my impression that there is also one in the
(ex)periphery. There's a movement toward equalization of the relative
role of the aristocracies in different areas of capitalism.
MG: We agree here also. I had in mind the more conventional notion of a
labour
aristocracy as comprising the organized industrial workers. Their relatively
privileged position has declined markedly as production has shifted to the
developing nations, where the industrial working class is growing rather
than contracting and it's real wages are rising than falling. As these
countries move up the value chain, the "new working class" of
administrators, technicians, and professionals in the OECD countries is also
becoming increasingly vulnerable to global labour arbitrage. While
outsourcing affects only a small percentage of jobs, the fear of outsourcing
at all levels of the workforce in tradable sectors has a depressing effect
on wages and benefits.
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