BTW, I think it's useful when talking about "what economists think" to
distinguish the crude ones (who I call the Ekon) who currently
dominate the profession and more sophisticated ones (such as Sen).
Jay Hanson wrote:
> Humans evolved behavioral "algorithms" (rules of behavior in the form "IF
> this THEN that") to solve specific reproductive problems in the EEA
> [environment of evolutionary adaptedness] ... We also grow and modify
> behavioral algorithms throughout our lives. <
"Behavioral algorithms" seem to be much the same as "habits" (part of
the bounded rationality theory of Herbert Simon et al.) that help us
deal with incomplete information and the inability to process all the
information we get. Bounded rationality sees us as trying to maximize
(optimize) but as usually failing. It's really just a version of
standard economic "rationality" (systematic goal-seeking) with extra
constraints thrown in.
IMHO, habits play a role, but we also use heuristics in order to
figure things out conceptually.
> So, to make a long story short, advertisers appeal to behavioral algorithms
> to sell their products. Typical behavior might be initiated when someone sees
> an advertisement that produces "feel good" neurotransmitters in the brain
> (e.g., dopamine) which then causes the consumer to buy the product. The
> logical behavior is rationalized after the decision is made subconsciously.
> Neither "utils," nor anything else, is optimized.<
A key difference between this and the standard economic view is that
the latter pays absolutely no attention to biology (or, for that
matter, sociology, anthropology, or social psychology) in determining
what we want. The problem, therefore, is that economists have
absolutely no idea about why some things give us "utils" and other
things don't. The only way the get this kind of knowledge is by
looking at what people actually buy ("revealed preference"). And
there's no theory of why some goods are "inferior" and others are
"normal" except to examine how spending on them responds to income or
wealth changes.
Models of economic rationality or utility maximization thus end up
being (close to) tautological, basically an abstract framework for
organizing empirical evidence (what people want) and as part of an
ideological vision of humanity as a socially atomized bunch of
individual maximizers.
The predictive content of such models come totally from the attention
to the constraints on human choice. The maximization part (which is
also part of the bounded rationality theory) doesn't really add much
except that it fits with the usual theoretical prior among economists,
i.e., that the economy -- or at least a useful model of it -- is
always in equilibrium. (There's a big disease among the Ekon, BTW, of
confusing a model of the economy with the economy itself, especially
if the model suggests happy thoughts about markets.)
FWIW, all but the Ekon admit that our "tastes" as manipulated by
advertising. It's just that it's not part of the core theory (since
economists don't care about the origins of tastes). Then, the role of
advertisers' influence is minimized because (in theory) one
advertiser's influence is canceled out that of others.
> It's almost like a reflex. The doctor whacks someone on the knee and the
> innate reflex makes the leg pop up. Advertisers whack people with an image
> that causes them to invent reasons to buy their products. It's more
> complicated than that, but you should get the general idea...<
The problem with a reflex theory is that the question that Ronald
Reagan always had for his handlers: "what's my motivation?" It makes
sense to me that there's _something_ driving people ahead, to "solve
specific reproductive problems" etc. Habits serve some sort of purpose
for the individual person, so what purpose is that? For what purpose
do we "grow and modify behavioral algorithms"? In biology, reflexes
have some sort of purpose for the organism, no?
>SELFISH GENES: Richard Dawkins' "selfish genes" metaphor has been almost
>universally misunderstood. "Selfish genes" does not mean a selfish person.
>It's simply a way of looking at evolution as though animals act on behalf of
>their genes:<
Of course, "act on behalf of their genes" is (ugly and for most
people, deceptive) short-hand for "engage in behaviors that result
from the influence of genes that have so far survived the process of
natural selection (being spread to a bunch of offspring who survive to
have more offspring)."
In economics outside of the Ekon tribe, people aren't really "selfish"
either. (As Robert Gassler points out, there's a big difference
between individual selfishness and economic rationality.) In
economics, people act _as if_ they were selfish, just as genes act
only as if they were selfish in Dawkins' theory (as I understand it).
The standard economic kind of "being selfish" (i.e., economic
rationality) involves trying to attain specific goals. Since economic
theory provides no explanation for what those goals are or how they
are determined, they can and often do involve seeing personal benefits
from helping others.
Typically, economists see individuals as being altruistic (however
defined) within their immediate families (and with near relatives),
which fits pretty well with the Dawkins theory. (Standard economics
sees a hard-and-fast division between "markets" and "households," with
different rules applying in each.) The difference is that Dawkins has
a biological theory of where tastes come from, while economists tend
to take their _homo economicus_ models for granted.
The more economics I read, the more I think that the phrase "homo
economicus" should be replaced by "homo mercatorius" (the market
person, representing the behavior of a market by the microcosm of an
individual person). Of course, economists and especially the Ekon
implicitly assume that the world is nothing but one big market[*] with
various imperfections (such as government) keeping complete attainment
of market totalitarianism (which for some is a utopia) from being
attained, so these two _homos_ are really the same (just as "economic"
and "market" are often equated). But the standard models of people
that litter economics books are nothing but models of _shoppers_, who
know what they want ahead of time and then try to find bargains.
(Behavioral/experimental economics points out that the typical models
of homo mercatorius aren't very good.)
If what's called "homo economicus" (HE) is nothing but a
representation of market behavior by the microcosm of an individual
person, then one of the big Ekon conceits is totally bogus. They claim
to explain (or help us understand) market behavior. But since it's
explained by an individual who acts like a market, then it's a matter
of garbage in/garbage out.
> So-called "selfish genes" create people who both cooperate and compete at the
> same time (e.g., the best team player). <
I think the Dawkins theory is weak, since it doesn't explain why
anyone would sacrifice his or her life to save a drowning child (who's
not a relative) or to patriotically defend the Nation. The problem
with Dawkins as I see it (as a non-biologist) is his utter
reductionism, the use genes alone (and their survival in natural
selection) to explain individual behavior.
I think an alternative theory of "altruism" is highly superior: we
humans are herd animals and have been so even before we were _homo
sapiens_. Living and working in groups has been a key adaptive
advantage for humans. (For example, some biologists believe that a key
reason why our brains are so big and can do so much is because we live
in social groups.) Thus, language, morality, etc. are part of what
makes us human and allows not only groups but individuals to survive.
(The specific content of language and morality varies among groups, of
course.) We pass genes down to our offspring, yes, but we also pass
down culture (which is more than a bunch of independent "memes").
> With respect to "selfishness," it's actually our innate drive for "status"
> that has been transmogrified into a drive for money (political power). The
> drive for "status" is one of our most-powerful innate drives.<
where does the drive for status come from? I would see it as largely a
result of the the fact that people have always lived in groups (we are
social animals). See above.
--
Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own
way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante.
[*] One example: Krugman and Wells' introductory textbook, which
should be more sophisticated than most (given its lead author),
defines "factors of production" in totally market terms: "a factor of
production earns income from the selling of its services over and over
again" (1st ed., page 282). Aren't gifts of nature -- such as sunlight
-- crucial contributors to production, even though they provide
services without selling them or earning income?
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