Jurriaan wrote: > The credit for the interpretation of Marx’s theory of value as an > “objectivist” interpretation is due to Sombart.
I stand corrected. > In The German Ideology manuscript, if I remember correctly, Marx and Engels > showed themselves well aware of the subjective utility theory. If anything, conventional price theories (just like certain interpretations of Marxism) are too *objective*, metaphysically so, in that they *assume* individuals as completely powerless vis-a-vis phenomena of their own doing -- like value or "history." In these theories, only collectively are individuals allowed to make a difference. This is, of course, how things appear in a capitalist society, and these appearances are not sheer illusions that can be altered by one's change of mind. The starting point of partial and general equilibrium price theories are *individuals* facing constraints. That does not make the theories "subjectivist." These theories conclude with *objective* prices (again, too objective) emerging from the interaction of individuals under the constraints. So, they are trying to explain social structures as a result of the action of individuals under conditions that they inherit *and* impose on one another through their actions. One may question this or that premise (and, of course, the conclusions will be only as good as the premises allow them to be, gigo), but the thrust of the theories cannot be faulted. "Individuals producing in Society – hence socially determined individual production – is, of course, the point of departure," wrote Marx. As for pre-existing objective conditions limiting the scope of individual actions, here's Marx again: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past." > That theory > already existed long before the marginalist revolution, as mentioned by > Schumpeter: > > "But let us bear in mind that it was the 'subjective' or 'utility' theory of > price that had the wind until the influence of the Wealth of Nations [by > Adam Smith] - and especially Ricardo's Principles [of Political Economy and > Taxation] - asserted itself. Even after 1776, that theory prevailed on the > Continent, and there is an unbroken line of development between Galiani and > J.B. Say. Quesnay, Beccaria, Turgot, Verri, Condillac, and many minor lights > contributed to establishing it more and more firmly. " (History of Economic > Analysis, p. 302). > http://ricardo.ecn.wfu.edu/~cottrell/OPE/archive/0703/0097.html I don't know whether, how the Physiocrats contributed to the "'subjective' or 'utility'" theory of price, but I know that in the German Ideology and other works, Marx praised them. Their theory was, to paraphrase Marx, a bourgeois political economy under a feudal cloak. > Marx’s theory cannot be simply a theory of objective value, since part of > his aim is precisely to show why value is “perceived” in a particular way, > and indeed why the phenomena of economic value are frequently perceived in a > way that inverts the real societal relationship involved. I don't see any problem here. You can have an object and then the subject may perceive it in a distorted manner. Actually, the fact that the subject is different from the object ensures by definition that the reflection of the object will be distorted. We can say that value is a socially objective phenomenon and, at once, that the way individuals perceive it and experience it subjectively is twisted. > Use-value is just as “objective and subjective” as value is. I view this differently. There are different layers of social objectivity. A socially objective phenomenon is a human made one that is (relatively) independent from individual consciousness and action. In other words, the general *quality* of this phenomenon, what makes it what it is as opposed to being something else, cannot be altered by individual consciousness or action. In this sense, use value is more objective than value. I've used this example before. Oranges stored in a refrigerated facility in the Tropicana juice factory in Florida. They are a form of capital ("productive capital") as they are means for production of juice privately owned, used to pump not only juice but also surplus value. But the objectivity of these oranges as capital only holds for as long as Tropicana is a privately owned business. If, for example, the state of Florida expropriates the factory and begins producing juice to supply public schools, hospitals, etc. with orange juice, these oranges are capital no more, or at least not directly. As capital, the oranges are only objective up to a change in the social structure or production relations. The objectivity of the oranges as commodities (or as value) is of a harder character. Insofar as the state of Florida does not abolish the orange market altogether, it will have to buy the oranges from private producers. Thus, at least in part, the oranges will remain commodities. The objectivity of commodity value is crustier. But even if the orange market disappeared and oranges were to be produced directly for productive or direct personal consumption, they would remain objectively use values. Or, even with the oranges being capital for a capitalist farmer and commodities traded in a market, as soon as they are purchased and taken home, they pretty much stop being commodities and become plain use values. Most people buy oranges to eat them, not to resell them. Their objectivity as use values is of a thicker kind. You'd need people to change their tastes altogether (say, because a study finds that oranges and their derivatives are not fit for human use and people stop consuming them altogether) for oranges to stop being use values. Human action can stop oranges from being use values, but it is a more drastic transformation than merely subtracting them from a market or capitalist setting. The objectivity of oranges as a physical object is of course the hardest. Even if they are no longer use values, oranges will remain physical objects, and there's nothing people can do to change that. I find this understanding of the various layers of social objectivity to be very helpful. I owe it to Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, a Spanish exile in Mexico who wrote various books on Marx's philosophy, ethics, and aesthetics. Monthly Review published at least one of them. _______________________________________________ pen-l mailing list [email protected] https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
