Tony, specifically, you mused on whether the IETF should work on specifications that enhance pervasive monitoring, DPI and data retention.
I think RFC 2804 set out a very clear, principled IETF position on interception of communications. I think it would be strange if, at the first IETF since the Snowden revelations, the consensus was to do more to enhance the technology of wiretapping, rather than to reaffirm the principles on which 2804 was based. I hope this makes it clearer why there were parts of your email that I found hard to accept at face value. Yrs., Robin Robin Wilton Technical Outreach Director - Identity and Privacy On 11 Nov 2013, at 19:10, Tony Rutkowski <[email protected]> wrote: > On 11/11/2013 12:56 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >> IETF specifications need to be designed to protect against >> pervasive monitoring where possible. This list is intended >> for technical discussions attempting to meet that goal. > Where "possible," or where "appropriate." > > Surely you are not inferring that every "specification" > needs to be so designed? It seems context dependent. >> Discussion is limited to specific technical proposals for >> improvements in IETF protocols and to IETF process changes >> aiming to increase the liklihood that implementation and >> deployment of IETF protocols results in better mitigation >> for pervasive monitoring. > What if one believes that mitigation is not > appropriate, or that it pervasive monitoring > should be enhanced? Those apostates should > go somewhere else? > > Guess you don't want discuss improving the > protocols to enhance DPI or data retention. :-) > > cheers, > tony > _______________________________________________ > perpass mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass _______________________________________________ perpass mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
