On fre, 2010-05-21 at 14:22 -0400, Robert Haas wrote:
> On Fri, May 21, 2010 at 2:21 PM, Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
> > Robert Haas <robertmh...@gmail.com> writes:
> >> So... can we get back to coming up with a reasonable
> >> definition,
> >
> > (1) no access to system calls (including file and network I/O)
> >
> > (2) no access to process memory, other than variables defined within the
> > PL.
> >
> > What else?
> Doesn't subvert the general PostgreSQL security mechanisms?  Not sure
> how to formulate that.

Succinctly: A trusted language does not grant access to data that the
user would otherwise not have.

I wouldn't go any further than that.  File and network I/O, for example,
are implementation details.  A trusted language might do some kind of
RPC, for example.  The PL/J project once wanted to do something like

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