On Fri, May 21, 2010 at 2:04 PM, Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
> Joshua Tolley <eggyk...@gmail.com> writes:
>> Agreed. As long as a trusted language can do things outside the
>> database only by going through a database and calling some function to
>> which the user has rights, in an untrusted language, that seems decent
>> to me. A user with permissions to launch_missiles() would have a
>> function in an untrusted language to do it, but there's no reason an
>> untrusted language shouldn't be able to say "SELECT
> s/untrusted/trusted/ here, right?

Er, right. Sorry.

>> launch_missiles()".
> To me, as long as they go back into the database via SPI, anything they
> can get to from there is OK.  What I meant to highlight upthread is that
> we don't want trusted functions being able to access other functions
> "directly" without going through SQL.  As an example, a PL that has FFI
> capability sufficient to allow direct access to heap_insert() would
> have to be considered untrusted.

That I can definitely agree with.

Joshua Tolley / eggyknap
End Point Corporation

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