Joshua Tolley <eggyk...@gmail.com> writes:
> Agreed. As long as a trusted language can do things outside the
> database only by going through a database and calling some function to
> which the user has rights, in an untrusted language, that seems decent
> to me. A user with permissions to launch_missiles() would have a
> function in an untrusted language to do it, but there's no reason an
> untrusted language shouldn't be able to say "SELECT
s/untrusted/trusted/ here, right?
> launch_missiles()".
To me, as long as they go back into the database via SPI, anything they
can get to from there is OK. What I meant to highlight upthread is that
we don't want trusted functions being able to access other functions
"directly" without going through SQL. As an example, a PL that has FFI
capability sufficient to allow direct access to heap_insert() would
have to be considered untrusted.
regards, tom lane
--
Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org)
To make changes to your subscription:
http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
