Tom Lane wrote: > Joshua Tolley <eggyk...@gmail.com> writes: > > Agreed. As long as a trusted language can do things outside the > > database only by going through a database and calling some function to > > which the user has rights, in an untrusted language, that seems decent > > to me. A user with permissions to launch_missiles() would have a > > function in an untrusted language to do it, but there's no reason an > > untrusted language shouldn't be able to say "SELECT > > s/untrusted/trusted/ here, right?
One thing that has always bugged me is that the use of "trusted/untrusted" for languages is confusing, because it is "trusted" users who can run untrusted languages. I think "trust" is more associated with users than with software features. I have no idea how this confusion could be clarified. -- Bruce Momjian <br...@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers