Dnia Monday, September 18, 2017 12:27:21 PM CEST jes...@gmail.com pisze:
> My only concern is working to ensure that to an outside observer such as
> webservers and ad networks nothing short of the shared IP address (and via
> Tor or VPN or different IPs honestly allocated to different domains perhaps
> not even that) can act as a reliable indicator that web browsing activity in
> one Qubes security domain is "linked" to activity from another security
> domain via any secretly stored cookie-like reference identifiers that get
> somehow leaked across domains.


> For example: if I browse to a Flash or Silverlight website using Browser X
> in my [untrusted] domain, would those plugins be able to store any kinds of
> LSOs or HTML5 local storage or cached E-tags or anything else deep enough
> into the system backend that they could pull them back out again in my
> [work] domain when I browse back to that same site again?
> (...)

As far as I understand, the answer for Qubes is "this should absolutely not 
happen", but the Qubes developers should probably weigh-in on that. I for one 
would find a "how deep does the rabbit-hole get here" discussion on this very 

Michał "rysiek" Woźniak

Zmieniam klucz GPG :: http://rys.io/pl/147
GPG Key Transition :: http://rys.io/en/147

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"qubes-users" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part.

Reply via email to