or Law Academics
Subject: RE: Harm to Others as a Factor in Accommodation Doctrine
Actually, there is a considerable difference between, for want of a better
term, the squabbling and accommodation between Catholics and Anglicans and
the permissible gender of priests. The differences are rooted
priests who become Catholics).
-Original Message-
From: Jean Dudley [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2005 8:42 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Harm to Others as a Factor in Accommodation Doctrine
Marci said:
> I would disagree, beca
Though this isn't a theology list, a clarification is in order; the Catholic
Church does not recognize the validity of Episcopalian ordinations. They were
rejected by the Church as early as 1554, and definitively in 1896.
Episcopalian ministers who convert
to Catholicism must be ordained as Ca
Marci said:
I would disagree, because any woman who wants to be a priest is
clearly at odds with heavily document ecclesiology in the Church that
forbids them becoming a priest. Their views, therefore, cut them out
of the picture before you even get to gender.
As a side note, the Episcopal chur
: Mon 3/14/2005 1:01 PM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: Harm to Others as a Factor in Accommodation Doctrine
Mark-- Elvig does not gainsay my point that if an abusive or discriminatory
practice is not motivated by a sincere religious belief, the claim can go
forward in the courts. S
Mark-- Elvig does not gainsay my point that if an abusive or discriminatory
practice is not motivated by a sincere religious belief, the claim can go
forward in the courts. So the ministerial exception is not some blanket
protection for anything that happens between clergy and religious
in
This is rather far afield, actually. These are questions of what
evidence can be adduced in court. Penitent-minister communications are
generally not fair game and have been excluded, unless the penitent waives the
privilege. Patient-doctor privileges essentially get the same
treatment.
With respect to religious speech, there is no difference. When it
comes to conduct, though, it is fairly obvious that conduct must be capable of
greater regulation than speech, because of its greater potential for harm.
This is a principle that has a distinguished pedigree, Locke, Jefferso
3/14/2005 7:18 AM
Subject: Re: Harm to Others as a Factor in Accommodation Doctrine
Doesn't that render the Free Exercise clause powerless as a guarantor of
religious freedom? Suppose, for instance, we were talking about freedom
of speech instead of the free exercise of religion. I can
Title: Re: Harm to Others as a Factor in Accommodation Doctrine
Although Marci’s point is well-taken, I think another way to understand Marc’s (BTW, how cute is that, “Marci and Marc”?) point is to change Marci’s counter-example from church’s protecting pedophiles under the free exercise clause
Doesn't that render the Free Exercise clause powerless as a guarantor
of religious freedom? Suppose, for instance, we were talking about freedom
of speech instead of the free exercise of religion. I can't
imagine that the legislature would be able to outlaw any type of speech
they wanted t
Just for the record-- I never said never can there be any burden on third
parties, rather that that burden should be assessed by the legislature.
There are arenas where the burden may never be tolerable, though,
e.g., there are few burdens on children's health or safety that can be
justif
exercise of religion qualitatively different than these other examples.
Marc Stern
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2005 9:39
AM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: Harm to Others as a
Factor in Accommodation
The state courts are actually not uniform on this -- except for race.
I could not find a church that was permitted to discriminate according to race,
even if the discrimination was religiously motivated. The ministerial
exception is being argued in many clergy abuse cases as a general right
F. Supp. at
348-49, 359-60; Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at 806-08; and Dolter,
483 F. Supp. at 269-70.
- Original Message -
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2005 8:09
AM
Subject: Re: Harm to Others as a Factor
in Ac
\
I would disagree, because any woman who wants to be a priest is clearly at
odds with heavily document ecclesiology in the Church that forbids them becoming
a priest. Their views, therefore, cut them out of the picture before you
even get to gender.
Marci
Actually, as to the Catholi
My view of accommodation arises from the institutional competencies of the
legislative and judicial branches. This is not a pragmatic view, but
rather one based on the enumerated powers and constitutional limitations on
each branch. The judicial branch lacks the power and investigatory
powe
Not exactly, I think. The law allows sex to be BFOQ. Of course the BFOQ comes from the religious beliefs which in turn are what is protected by the First Amendment. Other BFOQs based on sex include things like restroom attendants and roles in operas and plays and movies -- though Elizabethan the
The answer would be that those religious groups would lobby and obtain what
they want. Just because the courts don't provide something does not mean
religious entities throw up their hands and quit. Quite to the contrary.
Marci
So my question
would be, if Title VII had not included
ginal Message -
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2005 7:45
AM
Subject: Re: Harm to Others as a Factor
in Accommodation Doctrine
There is a structural check on discrimination in the neutral, generally
applicable rule. If the l
In some jurisdictions, the ministerial exemption is not quite as broad as
Marty describes it. It has been held that when the religious entity's
conduct is not religiously motivated, e.g., sexual harrassment of a seminarian
(Bollard, 9th Cir), the ministerial exception has no bite.
Marci
There is a structural check on discrimination in the neutral, generally
applicable rule. If the law is tailored to only burden a religious
entity's religious practices and not other identical secular practices, it is
unconstitutional per Lukumi. If the legislature, though, is willing to
bu
Marci,my comment was responding to Marty's and Tom Berg's earlier post,
about harm to third parties being part of the criteria courts employ in
determing whether an accommodation the legislature has granted should be
struck down on Establishment Clause grounds. Several federal and state
court
ion issues for Law Academics"
Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2005 1:13 PM
Subject: Re: Harm to Others as a Factor in Accommodation Doctrine
There is, of course, an exemption for religious positions in religious
organizations in Title VII and it would be required in a
l Message -
From: "Steven Jamar" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Law & Religion issues for Law Academics"
<religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>
Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2005 2:13 PM
Subject: Re: Harm to Others as a Factor in
Accommodation Doctrine
> The term &qu
The term "hire" refers to any position in which one is employed,
regardless of how one got there or the motivation for doing so.
There is, of course, an exemption for religious positions in religious
organizations in Title VII and it would be required in any event under
the Free Exercise clause
On Mar 13, 2005, at 10:55 AM, Brad Pardee wrote:
...would you say that the Catholic Church is required, by
anti-discrimination laws, to hire women as priests unless the
anti-discrimination law was to specifically exempt the Church?
It seems to me that the Catholic Church in America doesn't "hire
ct: Re: Harm to Others as a Factor
in Accommodation Doctrine
To clarify my earlier postings before I had to run my kids around to 14
different activities--
I did not mean "forced accommodation" in the sense Doug interpreted
it. I meant that there are times when neutral,
To clarify my earlier postings before I had to run my kids around to 14
different activities--
I did not mean "forced accommodation" in the sense Doug interpreted
it. I meant that there are times when neutral, generally applicable laws
require assimilation. Only when an accommodation is ena
harm entitled to protection more narrowly that I did.
-Original Message-
From: A.E. Brownstein [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, March 11, 2005 1:24 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Harm to Others as a Factor in Accommodation Doctrine
To answer Marty&#
To answer Marty's question, we would first have to figure out how to define
what constitutes "harm to third parties" -- which is no easy undertaking
(although there are some easy and obvious examples).
In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan suggested that the challenged tax
exemption for religious p
In connection with the discussion between the interplay between First
Amendment rights and "harm to others," any thoughts on the recent action
by the New York City Board of Health to enjoin a mohel from performing
circumcisions, as he generally performs them? The facts are these:
As part of the c
As usual, it appears that we will not be able to change one another's minds
w/r/t the question whether piecemeal legislative accommodations are superior to,
or more constitutionally acceptable than, judicial accommodations pursuant
to a general statutory mandate. (And we're certainly not mov
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