RE: Re: The number 8. A TOE?
Hal Finney wrote: Bruno Marchal writes: Methodologically your ON theory suffers (at first sight)the same problem as Wolfram, or Schmidhuber's approaches. The problem consists in failing to realise the fact that if we are turing-emulable, then the association between mind-dynamics and matter-dynamics cannot be one-one. You can still attach a mind to the appearance of a machine, but you cannot attach a machine to the appearance of a mind, you can only attach an infinity of machines, and histories, to the appearance of a mind. I think what you are saying is that if a mind can be implemented by more than one machine, there is first-person indeterminacy about which machine is immplementing it. Yes. However, wouldn't it still be the case that to the extent that the mind can look out and see the machine, learn about the machine and its rules, that it will still find only a unique answer? There would be a subjective split similar to the MWI splits. For all possible observations in a given experiment to learn the natural laws of the universe/machine that was running the mind, the mind will split into subsets that observe each possible result. Yes. So it is still possible to make progress on the question of the nature of the machine that is the universe, just as you can make progress on any other observational question, right? Almost right. We can make progress on the question of the nature of the average machine that is the average universe (computational history) which defined our most probable neighborhood. Also, isn't it possible that, once enough observations have been made, there is essentially only one answer to the question about what this machine is like? Just as there will often be only one answer to any other factual question? Only if you observe yourself above your level of substitution. Below that level, repeated observations should give you trace of the comp indeterminacy. Like in QM. For example, you will discover that precise position of some of your particles are undefined. Below the level of substitution the statistics will be non classical for they must take into account our inability to distinguish the computational histories. Of course, it's always possible that the machine is itself being emulated by another machine, since one computer can emulate another. But we could still at least say that the observed laws of physics correspond to a particular computer program which could be most naturally implemented on a particular architecture. I don't think that that could be the case. It could only be an approximation. Below the level of substitution we must find a sort of vagueness related to our incapacity to distinguish one computation from the many others which are possible. With comp the laws of physics must emerge from that average. You are coherent because this follows from the UDA part which you admittedly have still some problem with. cf: http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3817.html A little TOE-program is still possible, but then it must be extracted from that average---in fact it must run the definition of that average, in the case such a computational definition exists, and that is doubtful. But even if that was the case, that definition must be derived from that comp average. That's why I suspect a quantum universal dovetailer is still a possible candidate of our uni/multiverse. We can never be sure that the universe machine isn't sitting in someone's basement in a super-universe with totally different laws of physics, but we can at least define the laws of physics of our own universe, in terms of a computer program or mathematical model. I don't think so. We belong to an infinity of computational histories from which the (beliefs of the) laws of physics emerge, from which the appearance of a universe emerges too. our universe is a not well defined expression (provably so with the comp hyp). Bruno
RE: Re: The number 8. A TOE?
See my web page for links to papers, and archive addresses with more explanations, including the basic results of my thesis. (Mainly the Universal Dovetailer Argument UDA and its Arithmetical version AUDA). I read your argument for the UDA, and there's nothing there that particularly worries me. You seem to be making points about the limitations of the folk-psychology notion of identity, rather than about the actual nature of the universe... When you say sum over all computational histories, what if we just fix a bound N, and then say sum over all computational histories of algorithmic info. content = N. Finite-information-content-universe, no Godel problems. So what's the issue? The main reason is that, once we postulate that we are turing emulable, (i.e. the computationalist hypothesis comp), then there is a form of indeterminacy which occurs and which force us to take into account the incompleteness phenomenon. ?? I'm sorry, but I don't get it. Could you please elaborate? thanks Ben
re:RE: Re: The number 8. A TOE?
Ben Goertzel writes: I read your argument for the UDA, and there's nothing there that particularly worries me. Good. I don't like to worry people. (Only those attached dogmatically to BOTH comp AND the existence of a stuffy substancial universe should perhaps be worried). You seem to be making points about the limitations of the folk-psychology notion of identity, rather than about the actual nature of the universe... Then you should disagree at some point of the reasoning, for the reasoning is intended, at least, to show that it follows from the computationalist hypothesis, that physics is a subbranch of (machine) psychology, and that the actual nature of the universe can and must be recovered by machine psychology. (I do use some minimal Folk Psychology in UDA, and that can be considered as a weakness, and that is one of the motivation--- for eliminating the need---to substitute it (folk psychology) by machine self-referential discourses in the Arithmetical-UDA). When you say sum over all computational histories, what if we just fix a bound N, and then say sum over all computational histories of algorithmic info. content = N. Finite-information-content-universe, no Godel problems. So what's the issue? The main reason is that, once we postulate that we are turing emulable, (i.e. the computationalist hypothesis comp), then there is a form of indeterminacy which occurs and which force us to take into account the incompleteness phenomenon. ?? I'm sorry, but I don't get it. Could you please elaborate? Physics is taken as what is invariant in all possible (consistent) anticipation by (enough rich) machine, and this from the point of view of the machines. If arithmetic was complete, we would get just propositional calculus. But arithmetic is incomplete. This introduces nuances between proof, truth, consistency, etc. The technical part of the thesis shows that the invariant propositions about their probable neighborhoods (for possible anticipating machines) structure themtselves into a sort of quantum logic accompagned by some renormalization problem (which could be fatal for comp (making comp popperian-falsifiable)). This follows from the nuances which are made necessary by the Godel's incompleteness theorems, but also Lob and Solovay fundamental generalization of it. But it's better grasping first the UDA before tackling the AUDA, which is just the translation of the UDA in the language of a Lobian machine. Bruno
Re: turing machines = boolean algebras ?
Dear Ben and Bruno, Your discussions are fascinating! I have one related and pehaps even trivial question: What is the relationship between the class of Turing Machines and the class of Boolean Algebras? Is one a subset of the other? Kindest regards, Stephen
RE: turing machines = boolean algebras ?
Essentially, you can consider a classic Turing machine to consist of a data/input/output tape, and a program consisting of -- elementary tape operations -- boolean operations I.e. a Turing machine program is a tape plus a program expressed in a Boolean algebra that includes some tape-control primitives. -- Ben G -Original Message- From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 9:25 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: turing machines = boolean algebras ? Dear Ben and Bruno, Your discussions are fascinating! I have one related and pehaps even trivial question: What is the relationship between the class of Turing Machines and the class of Boolean Algebras? Is one a subset of the other? Kindest regards, Stephen
The class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines?
Dear Ben, So you are writing that the class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 9:58 AM Subject: RE: turing machines = boolean algebras ? Essentially, you can consider a classic Turing machine to consist of a data/input/output tape, and a program consisting of -- elementary tape operations -- boolean operations I.e. a Turing machine program is a tape plus a program expressed in a Boolean algebra that includes some tape-control primitives. -- Ben G -Original Message- From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 9:25 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: turing machines = boolean algebras ? Dear Ben and Bruno, Your discussions are fascinating! I have one related and pehaps even trivial question: What is the relationship between the class of Turing Machines and the class of Boolean Algebras? Is one a subset of the other? Kindest regards, Stephen
RE: The class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines?
The statement Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines doesn't seem quite right to me, I guess there's some kind of logical typing involved there. A Turing machine is a kind of machine [albeit mathematically modeled], whereas a boolean algebra is an algebra. Boolean algebra is a mathematical framework that is sufficient to model/design the internals of Turing machines... In a conceptual sense, they're equivalent ... -- Ben -Original Message- From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 12:29 PM To: Ben Goertzel; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: The class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines? Dear Ben, So you are writing that the class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 9:58 AM Subject: RE: turing machines = boolean algebras ? Essentially, you can consider a classic Turing machine to consist of a data/input/output tape, and a program consisting of -- elementary tape operations -- boolean operations I.e. a Turing machine program is a tape plus a program expressed in a Boolean algebra that includes some tape-control primitives. -- Ben G -Original Message- From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 9:25 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: turing machines = boolean algebras ? Dear Ben and Bruno, Your discussions are fascinating! I have one related and pehaps even trivial question: What is the relationship between the class of Turing Machines and the class of Boolean Algebras? Is one a subset of the other? Kindest regards, Stephen
Re: The class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines?
Dear Ben, So then it is: Boolean Algebras /equivalent Turing Machines in the mathematical sense. I am asking this to try to understand how Bruno has a problem with BOTH comp AND the existence of a stuffy substancial universe. It seems to me that the term machine very much requires some kind of stuffy substancial universe to exist in, even one that is in thermodynamic equilibrium. I fail to see how we can reduce physicality to psychology all the while ignoring the need to actually implement the abstract notion of Comp. I really would like to understand this! Sets of zero information fail to explain how we have actual experiences of worlds that are stuffy substancial ones. It might help if we had a COMP version of inertia! Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 12:49 PM Subject: RE: The class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines? The statement Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines doesn't seem quite right to me, I guess there's some kind of logical typing involved there. A Turing machine is a kind of machine [albeit mathematically modeled], whereas a boolean algebra is an algebra. Boolean algebra is a mathematical framework that is sufficient to model/design the internals of Turing machines... In a conceptual sense, they're equivalent ... -- Ben -Original Message- From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 12:29 PM To: Ben Goertzel; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: The class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines? Dear Ben, So you are writing that the class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 9:58 AM Subject: RE: turing machines = boolean algebras ? Essentially, you can consider a classic Turing machine to consist of a data/input/output tape, and a program consisting of -- elementary tape operations -- boolean operations I.e. a Turing machine program is a tape plus a program expressed in a Boolean algebra that includes some tape-control primitives. -- Ben G -Original Message- From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 9:25 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: turing machines = boolean algebras ? Dear Ben and Bruno, Your discussions are fascinating! I have one related and pehaps even trivial question: What is the relationship between the class of Turing Machines and the class of Boolean Algebras? Is one a subset of the other? Kindest regards, Stephen
RE: The class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines?
Among other things, Bruno is pointing out that if we assume everything in the universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's, the distinction btw subjective and objective reality is lost, and there's no way to distinguish simulated physics in a virtual reality from real physics. I accept this -- there is no way to make such a distinction. Tough luck for those who want to make one!! ;-) -- Ben G -Original Message- From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 1:38 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: The class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines? Dear Ben, So then it is: Boolean Algebras /equivalent Turing Machines in the mathematical sense. I am asking this to try to understand how Bruno has a problem with BOTH comp AND the existence of a stuffy substancial universe. It seems to me that the term machine very much requires some kind of stuffy substancial universe to exist in, even one that is in thermodynamic equilibrium. I fail to see how we can reduce physicality to psychology all the while ignoring the need to actually implement the abstract notion of Comp. I really would like to understand this! Sets of zero information fail to explain how we have actual experiences of worlds that are stuffy substancial ones. It might help if we had a COMP version of inertia! Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 12:49 PM Subject: RE: The class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines? The statement Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines doesn't seem quite right to me, I guess there's some kind of logical typing involved there. A Turing machine is a kind of machine [albeit mathematically modeled], whereas a boolean algebra is an algebra. Boolean algebra is a mathematical framework that is sufficient to model/design the internals of Turing machines... In a conceptual sense, they're equivalent ... -- Ben -Original Message- From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 12:29 PM To: Ben Goertzel; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: The class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines? Dear Ben, So you are writing that the class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 9:58 AM Subject: RE: turing machines = boolean algebras ? Essentially, you can consider a classic Turing machine to consist of a data/input/output tape, and a program consisting of -- elementary tape operations -- boolean operations I.e. a Turing machine program is a tape plus a program expressed in a Boolean algebra that includes some tape-control primitives. -- Ben G -Original Message- From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 9:25 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: turing machines = boolean algebras ? Dear Ben and Bruno, Your discussions are fascinating! I have one related and pehaps even trivial question: What is the relationship between the class of Turing Machines and the class of Boolean Algebras? Is one a subset of the other? Kindest regards, Stephen
Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's?
Dear Ben, I agree completely with that aspect of Bruno's thesis. ;-) It is the assumption that the 0's and 1's can exist without some substrate that bothers me. If we insist on making such an assuption, how can we even have a notion of distinguishability between a 0 and a 1?. To me, its analogous to claiming that Mody Dick exists but there does not exists any copies of it. If we are going to claim that all possible computations exists, then why is it problematic to imagine that all possible implementations of computations exists as well. Hardware is not an epiphenomena of software nor software an epiphenomena of hardware, they are very different and yet interdependent entities. Additionally, the 1-uncertainty notion seems to require a neglect of the no-cloning theorem of QM or, equivalently, that its ok for TMs to construct (via UDA) QM theories of themselves and yet not be subject to the rules of the theory. Could we not recover 1-uncertainty from the Kochen-Specker theorem of QM itself? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 1:50 PM Subject: RE: The class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing Machines? Among other things, Bruno is pointing out that if we assume everything in the universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's, the distinction btw subjective and objective reality is lost, and there's no way to distinguish simulated physics in a virtual reality from real physics. I accept this -- there is no way to make such a distinction. Tough luck for those who want to make one!! ;-) -- Ben G
Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's?
As I mentioned in an earlier post, titled quantum computational cosmology why don't we assume/guess that the substrate (the fundamental concept of the universe or multiverse) is simply a capacity for there to be difference, but also, a capacity for all possible differences (and thus necessarily all possible configurations of differences) to potentially exist. If we assume that all possible configurations of differences can potentially exist and that that unexplained property (i.e. the capacity to manifest any configuration of differences) is THE nature of the substrate, then a computation can just be defined as a sequence of states selected from all of the potential difference-configurations inherent in the substrate. I don't even think that this notion of a computation requires energy to do the information processing. My main notion in the earlier post was that some selections of a sequence of the substrate's potential states will corresponds to order-producing computations (computations which produce emergent structure, systems, behaviour etc). Such an order-producing sequence of substrate potential-states might be considered to be the observable universe (because the order generation in that sequence was adequate to produce complex systems good enough to be sentient observers of the other parts of that state-sequence). If we number the states in that selected order-producing sequence of substrate states from the first-selected state to the last-selected state, we have a numbering which corresponds to the direction of the time arrow in that observable universe. My intuition is that the potential-states (i.e. potentially existing configurations of differences) of the substrate may correspond to quantum states and configurations of quantum entanglement, and that selection of meaningful or observable sequences of potential states corresponds to decoherence of quantum states into classical states. Eric Stephen Paul King wrote: It is the assumption that the 0's and 1's can exist without some substrate that bothers me. If we insist on making such an assuption, how can we even have a notion of distinguishability between a 0 and a 1?. To me, its analogous to claiming that Mody Dick exists but there does not exists any copies of it. If we are going to claim that all possible computations exists, then why is it problematic to imagine that all possible implementations of computations exists as well. Hardware is not an epiphenomena of software nor software an epiphenomena of hardware, they are very different and yet interdependent entities.
Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's?
Dear Eric, I like your idea! But how do we reconsile your notion with the notion expressed by Russell: From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 18, 2002 5:12 PM Subject: Re: not-sets, not-gates, and the universe There is no problem is saying that all computations exist in platonia (or the plenitude). This is a zero information set, and requires no further explanation. One definition of information is a difference that makes a difference. If we take the substrate to be the capacity for there to be difference as you propose we obviously can not consider Platonia or the Plenitude do be it. If we take these two ideas seriously, is there any way that we can have both? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Eric Hawthorne [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 4:36 PM Subject: Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's? As I mentioned in an earlier post, titled quantum computational cosmology why don't we assume/guess that the substrate (the fundamental concept of the universe or multiverse) is simply a capacity for there to be difference, but also, a capacity for all possible differences (and thus necessarily all possible configurations of differences) to potentially exist. If we assume that all possible configurations of differences can potentially exist and that that unexplained property (i.e. the capacity to manifest any configuration of differences) is THE nature of the substrate, then a computation can just be defined as a sequence of states selected from all of the potential difference-configurations inherent in the substrate. I don't even think that this notion of a computation requires energy to do the information processing. My main notion in the earlier post was that some selections of a sequence of the substrate's potential states will corresponds to order-producing computations (computations which produce emergent structure, systems, behaviour etc). Such an order-producing sequence of substrate potential-states might be considered to be the observable universe (because the order generation in that sequence was adequate to produce complex systems good enough to be sentient observers of the other parts of that state-sequence). If we number the states in that selected order-producing sequence of substrate states from the first-selected state to the last-selected state, we have a numbering which corresponds to the direction of the time arrow in that observable universe. My intuition is that the potential-states (i.e. potentially existing configurations of differences) of the substrate may correspond to quantum states and configurations of quantum entanglement, and that selection of meaningful or observable sequences of potential states corresponds to decoherence of quantum states into classical states. Eric Stephen Paul King wrote: It is the assumption that the 0's and 1's can exist without some substrate that bothers me. If we insist on making such an assuption, how can we even have a notion of distinguishability between a 0 and a 1?. To me, its analogous to claiming that Mody Dick exists but there does not exists any copies of it. If we are going to claim that all possible computations exists, then why is it problematic to imagine that all possible implementations of computations exists as well. Hardware is not an epiphenomena of software nor software an epiphenomena of hardware, they are very different and yet interdependent entities.
Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's?
It works because no observer can possibly see the whole of the Plenitude, only subsets. The subsets do contain information. Of course, people who believe in an omniscient God will have trouble with this :). Cheers Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Eric, I like your idea! But how do we reconsile your notion with the notion expressed by Russell: From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 18, 2002 5:12 PM Subject: Re: not-sets, not-gates, and the universe There is no problem is saying that all computations exist in platonia (or the plenitude). This is a zero information set, and requires no further explanation. One definition of information is a difference that makes a difference. If we take the substrate to be the capacity for there to be difference as you propose we obviously can not consider Platonia or the Plenitude do be it. If we take these two ideas seriously, is there any way that we can have both? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Eric Hawthorne [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 4:36 PM Subject: Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's? As I mentioned in an earlier post, titled quantum computational cosmology why don't we assume/guess that the substrate (the fundamental concept of the universe or multiverse) is simply a capacity for there to be difference, but also, a capacity for all possible differences (and thus necessarily all possible configurations of differences) to potentially exist. If we assume that all possible configurations of differences can potentially exist and that that unexplained property (i.e. the capacity to manifest any configuration of differences) is THE nature of the substrate, then a computation can just be defined as a sequence of states selected from all of the potential difference-configurations inherent in the substrate. I don't even think that this notion of a computation requires energy to do the information processing. My main notion in the earlier post was that some selections of a sequence of the substrate's potential states will corresponds to order-producing computations (computations which produce emergent structure, systems, behaviour etc). Such an order-producing sequence of substrate potential-states might be considered to be the observable universe (because the order generation in that sequence was adequate to produce complex systems good enough to be sentient observers of the other parts of that state-sequence). If we number the states in that selected order-producing sequence of substrate states from the first-selected state to the last-selected state, we have a numbering which corresponds to the direction of the time arrow in that observable universe. My intuition is that the potential-states (i.e. potentially existing configurations of differences) of the substrate may correspond to quantum states and configurations of quantum entanglement, and that selection of meaningful or observable sequences of potential states corresponds to decoherence of quantum states into classical states. Eric Stephen Paul King wrote: It is the assumption that the 0's and 1's can exist without some substrate that bothers me. If we insist on making such an assuption, how can we even have a notion of distinguishability between a 0 and a 1?. To me, its analogous to claiming that Mody Dick exists but there does not exists any copies of it. If we are going to claim that all possible computations exists, then why is it problematic to imagine that all possible implementations of computations exists as well. Hardware is not an epiphenomena of software nor software an epiphenomena of hardware, they are very different and yet interdependent entities. A/Prof Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's?
Dear Russell, Bingo! But can a method of definig the subsethood be defined? What distinguishes one subset from another? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Eric Hawthorne [EMAIL PROTECTED]; James N Rose [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 10:21 PM Subject: Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's? It works because no observer can possibly see the whole of the Plenitude, only subsets. The subsets do contain information. Of course, people who believe in an omniscient God will have trouble with this :). Cheers
Fw: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's?
- Original Message - From: James N Rose [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Eric Hawthorne [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; echo-CI [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 8:56 PM Subject: Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's? Stephen, Eric is taking the quest to its logical conclusion. Even Steve Wolfram hints that pure space is the source of all instantiation. So the only question that needs resolution is specifying the natural of the architecture of that space - and - identifying how it brings entities forces, particles into being. And that requires identifying the characteristics of that realm of 'could be' .. the one I've labeled in discussions as Potentia. Jamie Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Eric, I like your idea! But how do we reconsile your notion with the notion expressed by Russell: From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 18, 2002 5:12 PM Subject: Re: not-sets, not-gates, and the universe There is no problem is saying that all computations exist in platonia (or the plenitude). This is a zero information set, and requires no further explanation. One definition of information is a difference that makes a difference. If we take the substrate to be the capacity for there to be difference as you propose we obviously can not consider Platonia or the Plenitude do be it. If we take these two ideas seriously, is there any way that we can have both? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Eric Hawthorne [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 4:36 PM Subject: Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's? As I mentioned in an earlier post, titled quantum computational cosmology why don't we assume/guess that the substrate (the fundamental concept of the universe or multiverse) is simply a capacity for there to be difference, but also, a capacity for all possible differences (and thus necessarily all possible configurations of differences) to potentially exist. If we assume that all possible configurations of differences can potentially exist and that that unexplained property (i.e. the capacity to manifest any configuration of differences) is THE nature of the substrate, then a computation can just be defined as a sequence of states selected from all of the potential difference-configurations inherent in the substrate. I don't even think that this notion of a computation requires energy to do the information processing. My main notion in the earlier post was that some selections of a sequence of the substrate's potential states will corresponds to order-producing computations (computations which produce emergent structure, systems, behaviour etc). Such an order-producing sequence of substrate potential-states might be considered to be the observable universe (because the order generation in that sequence was adequate to produce complex systems good enough to be sentient observers of the other parts of that state-sequence). If we number the states in that selected order-producing sequence of substrate states from the first-selected state to the last-selected state, we have a numbering which corresponds to the direction of the time arrow in that observable universe. My intuition is that the potential-states (i.e. potentially existing configurations of differences) of the substrate may correspond to quantum states and configurations of quantum entanglement, and that selection of meaningful or observable sequences of potential states corresponds to decoherence of quantum states into classical states. Eric Stephen Paul King wrote: It is the assumption that the 0's and 1's can exist without some substrate that bothers me. If we insist on making such an assuption, how can we even have a notion of distinguishability between a 0 and a 1?. To me, its analogous to claiming that Mody Dick exists but there does not exists any copies of it. If we are going to claim that all possible computations exists, then why is it problematic to imagine that all possible implementations of computations exists as well. Hardware is not an epiphenomena of software nor software an epiphenomena of hardware, they are very different and yet interdependent entities.
Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's?
In my paper Why Occam's Razor, I identify a postulate called the projection postulate, which in words is something like An observer necessarily projects out an actual from the space of possibilities Mathematically, this corresponds to choosing a subset from the set of all descriptions. My paper shows in essence P+T+K = QM (projection postulate + time postulate + Kolmogorov probability axioms implies quantum mechanics). Apparently (not that I'm any expert on these matters) Kant tried to derive Classical dynamics by introducing this as a necessary prior, so its quite possible that this idea is not at all new. Cheers Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Russell, Bingo! But can a method of definig the subsethood be defined? What distinguishes one subset from another? Kindest regards, Stephen A/Prof Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's?
Stephen, Eric is taking the quest to its logical conclusion. Even Steve Wolfram hints that pure space is the source of all instantiation. So the only question that needs resolution is specifying the natural of the architecture of that space - and - identifying how it brings entities forces, particles into being. And that requires identifying the characteristics of that realm of 'could be' .. the one I've labeled in discussions as Potentia. Jamie Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Eric, I like your idea! But how do we reconsile your notion with the notion expressed by Russell:
Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's?
Dear Russell, Neat! I have been thinking of this idea in terms of a very weak anthropic principle and a communication principle. Roughtly these are: All observations by an observer are only those that do not contradict the existence of the observer and any communication is only that which mutually consistent with the existence of the communicators. I will read you paper again. ;-) Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Eric Hawthorne [EMAIL PROTECTED]; James N Rose [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 10:53 PM Subject: Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's? In my paper Why Occam's Razor, I identify a postulate called the projection postulate, which in words is something like An observer necessarily projects out an actual from the space of possibilities Mathematically, this corresponds to choosing a subset from the set of all descriptions. My paper shows in essence P+T+K = QM (projection postulate + time postulate + Kolmogorov probability axioms implies quantum mechanics). Apparently (not that I'm any expert on these matters) Kant tried to derive Classical dynamics by introducing this as a necessary prior, so its quite possible that this idea is not at all new. Cheers Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Russell, Bingo! But can a method of definig the subsethood be defined? What distinguishes one subset from another? Kindest regards, Stephen -- -- A/Prof Russell StandishDirector High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 -- --
Re: emergence (or is that re-emergence)
Let me first apologize for not yet reading the mentioned references on the subject, John Mikes wrote: As long as we cannot qualify the steps in a 'process' leading to the emerged new, we call it emergence, later we call it process. Just look back into the cultural past, how many emergence-mystiques (miracles included) changed into regular quotidien processes, simply by developing more information about them. I did not say: the information. Some. I don't think this is correct. A fundamental concept when talking about emergence ought to be the pattern, or more precisely, the interesting, coherent, or perhaps useful pattern; useful perhaps in the sense of being a good building block for some other pattern. Process is a subset of pattern, in the sense in which I'm using pattern. Also, system is a subset of pattern. Q: How do you know when you have completely described a pattern? Two examples, or analogies, for what I mean by this question: e.g. 1 I used to wonder whether I had completely proved something in math, and would go into circles trying to figure out how to know when something was sufficiently proved or needed more reductionism i.e. The old Wait a minute: How do we know that 1 + 1 = 2? problem. The gifted mathematicians teaching me seemed to have no trouble knowing when they were finished proving something. It was intuitively obvious -- load of cods wallop of course. And I still wonder to this day if they were simply way smarter than me or prisoners of an incredibly limited, rote-learned math worldview. The point is, every theory; every description of states-of-affairs and processes or systems (patterns) using concepts and relationships, has a limited domain-of-discourse, and mixing descriptions of patterns in different domains is unnecessary and obfuscates the essentials of the pattern under analysis. e.g. 2 Is the essence of human life in the domain of DNA chemistry, or in the domain of sociobiology, psychology, cultural anthropology? Are we likely to have a future DNA based theory of psychology or culture? Definitely not. Cellular processes and psychology and culture are related, but not in any essential manner. A: Let's define a complete description of a pattern as a description which describes the essential properties of the pattern. The essential properties of the pattern are those which, taken together, are sufficient to yield the defining interestingness, coherence, or usefulness of the pattern. Note that any other properties (of the medium in which the pattern lives) are accidental properties of the incarnation of the pattern. Note also that the more detailed mechanisms or sub-patterns which may have generated each particular essential property of the main pattern are irrelevant to the creation of a minimal complete description of the main pattern being described. As long as the property of the main pattern has whatever nature it has to have as far as the pattern is concerned, it simply doesn't matter how the property got that way, or what other humps on its back the property also has in the particular incarnation. And that level-independence or spurious-detail independence or simply abstractness of useful patterns is one of the reasons why it makes sense to talk about emergence. e.g.of level-independence of a pattern. 1. Game of Pong 2a. Visual Basic 2b. Pascal program 2c. Ping-pong table, program on PCon a Mac ball, bats, players 3a. x86 ML program 3b. PowerPC ML program3c. Newtonian physics of everyday objects 4a. voltage patterns in 4b. voltage patterns in silicon NAND gates Gallium Arsenide NOR gates (you get the idea) Key: - 1. The main pattern being described 2, 3, 4. Lower-level i.e. implementation-level or building-block-level patterns whose own internal details are irrelevant to the emergence of the main pattern, which emerges essentially identical from all three of very different lower level building-block patterns. So in summary, an emergent pattern is described as emergent because it emerges, somehow, anyhow, doesn't matter how, as an abstract, useful, independently describable pattern (process, system, state-of-affairs). A theory of the pattern's essential form or behaviour need make no mention of the properties of the substrate in which the pattern formed, except to confirm that, in some way, some collection of the substrate properties could have generated or accidentally manifested each pattern-essential property. A theory of form and function of the pattern can be perfectly adequate, complete, and predictive (in the pattern-level-appropriate domain of discourse), without making any reference to the substrate properties. This is not to say that any substrate can generate any pattern. There are constraints, but they are of many-to-many
