Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy a écrit : Bruno, Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my computer. (The original at the Iridia web site http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) Thanks for telling. I know people a reconfiguring the main server at IRIDIA, I hope it is only that. In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the recording of an earlier physical process. It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that consciousness involves two partial processes each occupying two different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. I mainly agree. But assuming comp it seems to me this is just a question of acceptable implementation of consciousness. Once implemented in any correct ways, the reasoning shows, or is supposed to show, that the inner first person experience cannot be attributed to the physical activity. The physical keep an important role by giving the frame of the possible relative manifestations of the consciousness. But already at this stage, consciousness can no more been attached to it. On the contrary, keeping the comp hyp, the physical must emerge from the coherence of enough possible relative manifestations. I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness does not supervene the physical. The example is just an instance of consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of a physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these two time intervals. In this case, would you take this as an argument for the necessity of the physical, you would change the notion of physical supervenience a lot. You would be attaching consciousness to some history of physical activity. But if you keep comp, you will not been able to use genuinely that past physical activity. If you could, it would be like asking to the doctor an artificial brain with the guarantee that the hardware of that brain has been gone through some genuine physical stories, although no memory of those stories are needed in the computation made by the new (artificial) brain; or if such memory *are* needed, it would mean the doctor has not made the right level choice. Now, when you say the reasoning does not *prove* that consciousness does not supervene the physical, you are correct. But sup-phys says there is no consciousness without the physical, i.e. some physical primary ontology is needed for consciusness, and that is what the reasoning is supposed to be showing absurd: not only we don't need the physical (like thermodynamicians do not need invisible horses pulling cars), but MOVIE-GRAPH + UDA (*) makes obligatory the appearance of the physical emerging from *all* (relative) computations, making twice the concept of primitive matter useless. OK? ...I realize I could be clearer(**) (*) Caution: in Conscience et Mecanisme the movie-graph argument precedes the UD argument (the seven first step of the 8-steps-version of the current UDA). In my Lille thesis, the movie graph follows the UD argument for eliminating the use of the existence of a universe hypothesis; so there are some nuances between the different versions. (**) I am open to thoroughly discuss this, for example in november. Right now I am a bit over-busy (until the end of october). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally agreed-upon description of consciousness - applied in the lit as all variations of an unidentified thing anyone needs to his theory. I 'feel' Ccness is a process. It not only 'knows', but also 'decides' and directs activity accordingly. I identified it as acknowledgement of and response to information (1992) - info not in the information-theory term, but as a 'noted difference by anything/body'. It is not my recent position to hold on to that. On another list I read about the ID of Ccness: it is one's feeling of SELF (of I) (which makes sense). You wrote a less controversial variation in your post; ... I don't see how I am conscious in the first place. ... which (being conscious) is part of the picture, I miss the activity in it, just as in the 'feeling of I. (Tied to: 'being conscious OF..., i.e. awareness, what many identify with the entire chapter.) Unfortunately the word is so deeply anchored in the multimillennial usage that we cannot get rid of this noumenon. We could talk about the 'ingredients' by themselves and agree, the ominous Ccness term is a good platform for eternal debates. Also for grants. I join you in disproving of assigning total meaning to simplified tools allegedly active in the mental concept, like a QM abstraction. John M - Original Message - From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:25 PM Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the difference between consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently living through a virtual Sure, but I don't see how I am conscious in the first place. Yet the fact remains that I do. Until we have a better idea of the mechanisms behind consciousness, it is a little too early to rule out any specific conclusion. I think Penrose and Lockwood are dead wrong in their specific quantum mechanical connections with consciousness, but I retain a suspicion that quantum effects are important in some way. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. -- -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 -- -- -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.407 / Virus Database: 268.13.1/466 - Release Date: 10/07/06 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows - isn't this more interesting? He claims that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS) I think the 'modesty' part is meant more to relate to provability vs.believability, per Goedel/Lob - that we must live with doubt (i.e. empiricism is ineliminable). As to computationalism, there seems to be some confusion on the list (and elsewhere) between (at least) two varieties. At least four! The first might I suppose be characterised as minimalist comp, dealing with programs as instantiated in (as one might say) real - i.e. material - computers. Clearly it would make no sense to say that this kind of computationalism is incompatible with materialism - i.e that physical processes can 'compute'. So how does he get computationalism is incompatible with materialism out of such interviews? From the 8th step of the UDA argument. This attempts to show that if one (but not you, I think?) starts with the much stronger assumption that *consciousness supervenes on computation itself*, What is a computation itself? A process? And algorithm? then it can't also supervene on the physical. Using supplementary assumptions -- such as only activity counts. AFAICS, this stems fundamentally from the inability to stabilise the instantiation of a computation, given the lack of constraint on the material substrates that can be construed as implementing equivalent computations. Given materialism, in other words, 'computation' is just a metaphor - it's the physics that does the work. Yes, but it is still quite possible that a class of phsyical systems picked out by some computational(but ultimately physical) set of properties are conscious/cognitive in veirtue of those proeprties -- ie computationalism is a sort of convenient shorthand or shortcut to the physically relevant properties. I have to say that I think this may really point to a fatal flaw in any assumption - within materialism - that consciousness can supervene on the physical *per computation* in the standard AI sense. However, consciousness may of course still be shown to supervene on some physically stabilisable material process (e.g. at the neurological or some other consistently materially-reducible level of explanation). Bruon's empirical prediction require a UD to exist. That is an assumption beyond computationalism. But not beyond 'comp', which is a horse of a different colour. A Trojan horse with Plato in its belly... The UDA argument attempts to establish, and show the consequences of, a 'comp' constrained to CT, AR, and the 'modest empiricism' of 'yes doctor'. It *assumes* that putative stable conscious experiences are associated with certain types of machine thus defined. From this stems the claim that the consciousness of such machines can't simultaneously supervene on an unstabilisable externally-defined 'material' substrate - in fact, the 'material' also has to be an emergent from the computational in this view. You are presenting the conclusions, not the argument. Comp and materialism start from radically different assumptions, and have diametrically opposed explanatory directions. The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. If comp is not standard computationalism, the fact that it is incompatible with materalism may be a lot less impactive. comp might simply beg the question. However, I don't think they treat the *observables* in any essential way as less 'real', but differ radically as to the source - and here its does get difficult, because one can no longer simply appeal directly to those observables - as Johnson failed to note in stubbing his toe on the stone. The Johnsonian argument can be used as a wayof establishing the meaning of exist. It answers the question what definition of existence is there other than the mathematical one. How can he come to conclusions about the uneality of matter without assuming the reality of something to take its place? Well, in the end we can only believe that whatever it is must be 'real in the sense that I am real', or where are we? The point is that computationalists can continue to believe in matter so long as they don't believe in numbers. No, it's really easy. I am real, or I would not be writing this. What you mean is to establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult. Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim. Well, as you know, I've also had some discomfort with aspects of platonic or other possibly implicit assumptions in this approach, but I think now that it's interesting and fruitful enough to suspend judgement on this pending further (preferably empirically refutable) results, without fully
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 9, 6:35 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What is a computation itself? A process? And algorithm? Bruno covers what he means by 'comp' pretty comprehensively in his various posts and papers. Using supplementary assumptions -- such as only activity counts. Not sure what you're getting at - do you mean that, under materialism, the mere existence (not specific activity) of physical properties suffices to generate conscious experience? If so, I don't follow. I assume (see below) that, under materialism, experience - psychological activity - physical activity. Yes, but it is still quite possible that a class of phsyical systems picked out by some computational(but ultimately physical) set of properties are conscious/cognitive in veirtue of those proeprties -- ie computationalism is a sort of convenient shorthand or shortcut to the physically relevant properties. But this is the very nub. And it may be dead wrong, so would you address this directly? What is being claimed (in this form, a general appeal to the class of arguments referred to by the UDA 8th step) is that under materialism, 'computationalism' (i.e. the 1st variety in my taxonomy) precisely *can't* 'pick out' a set of 'physically relevant properties' in any stable way, because the physical instantiation of any given 'computation' is essentially arbitrary, and can extend to any number of diverse physical properties, to choice. Under materialism, specific conscious experiences should presumably map, or reduce, to the activity of an equivalently stable set of physical properties (in an analogous sense to, say, specific neurological processes reducing stably downwards through the physical substrate). And this can't be the case if I can change the physical properties of the computational substrate at will, from step to step of the program if necessary. So the claim is that, under materialism, some other schema than computationalism must ultimately be deployed to explain any stable *general* mapping from consciousness to physics. I agree that this is a bold claim, but it does appear to stem from a basic dislocation in the supervention scheme consciousness - computation - physicalism. Its consequence is that if we wish to claim that consciousness does in fact supervene stably on computation, as opposed to the physical itself, then such computation must itself be defined in a manner unconstrained to specific *physical* properties. This is a reductio devised to show the consequences of the starting assumptions. You pays your money. The point is that computationalists can continue to believe in matter so long as they don't believe in numbers. But if I'm right, they can't also believe that 'computation' - which is only arbitrarily constrained physically - is an adequate explanatory schema for consciousness. It's just a metaphor, and metaphors per se (as opposed to their instantiations) aren't 'real in the sense that I am real'. David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows - isn't this more interesting? He claims that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS) I think the 'modesty' part is meant more to relate to provability vs.believability, per Goedel/Lob - that we must live with doubt (i.e. empiricism is ineliminable). As to computationalism, there seems to be some confusion on the list (and elsewhere) between (at least) two varieties.At least four! The first might I suppose be characterised as minimalist comp, dealing with programs as instantiated in (as one might say) real - i.e. material - computers. Clearly it would make no sense to say that this kind of computationalism is incompatible with materialism - i.e that physical processes can 'compute'. So how does he get computationalism is incompatible with materialism out of such interviews? From the 8th step of the UDA argument. This attempts to show that if one (but not you, I think?) starts with the much stronger assumption that *consciousness supervenes on computation itself*,What is a computation itself? A process? And algorithm? then it can't also supervene on the physical.Using supplementary assumptions -- such as only activity counts. AFAICS, this stems fundamentally from the inability to stabilise the instantiation of a computation, given the lack of constraint on the material substrates that can be construed as implementing equivalent computations. Given materialism, in other words, 'computation' is just a metaphor - it's the physics that does the work.Yes, but it is still quite possible that a class of phsyical systems picked out by some computational(but ultimately physical) set of properties are conscious/cognitive in veirtue of those proeprties -- ie computationalism is a sort of
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 08-oct.-06, 08:00, George Levy a crit : Bruno, Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my computer. (The original at the Iridia web site http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) Thanks for telling. I know people a reconfiguring the main server at IRIDIA, I hope it is only that. In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the recording of an earlier physical process. It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that consciousness involves two partial processes each occupying two different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. I mainly agree. But assuming comp it seems to me this is just a question of "acceptable" implementation of consciousness. Once implemented in any "correct" ways, the reasoning shows, or is supposed to show, that the inner first person experience cannot be attributed to the physical activity. The "physical" keep an important role by giving the frame of the possible relative manifestations of the consciousness. But already at this stage, consciousness can no more been attached to it. On the contrary, keeping the comp hyp, the physical must emerge from the coherence of "enough" possible relative manifestations. I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness does not supervene the physical. The example is just an instance of consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of a physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these two time intervals. In this case, would you take this as an argument for the necessity of the physical, you would change the notion of physical supervenience a lot. You would be attaching consciousness to some history of physical activity. I agree with all this. I would be changing the notion of physical supervenience such that the physical substrate can be split into time intervals connected by recordings. . But why stop here. We could create an example in which the substrate is maximally split, across time, space, substrate and level. On the other hand, widening the domain of supervenience (time, space, substrate and level) does not seem to eliminate the need for the physical. Here I am arguing against myself... We may solve the problem if we make supervenience recursive, i.e.. software supervening on itself without needing a physical substrate just like photons do not need Ether. In addition, if we are going to split consciousness maximally in this fashion, the concept of observer becomes important, something you do not include in your example. To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also split, in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space, substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). In your example, for an observer to see consciousness in the machine, he must be willing to exist at the earlier interval, skip over the time delay carrying the recording and resume his existence at the later interval. If he observes only a part of the whole thing, say the recording, he may conclude that the machine is not conscious. But if you keep comp, you will not been able to use genuinely that past physical activity. If you could, it would be like asking to the doctor an artificial brain with the guarantee that the hardware of that brain has been gone through some genuine physical stories, although no memory of those stories are needed in the computation made by the new (artificial) brain; or if such memory *are* needed, it would mean the doctor has not made the right level choice. Now, when you say the reasoning does not *prove* that consciousness does not supervene the physical, you are correct. But sup-phys says there is no consciousness without the physical, i.e. some physical primary ontology is needed for consciusness, and that is what the reasoning is supposed to be showing absurd: not only we don't need the physical (like thermodynamicians do not need "invisible horses pulling cars"), but MOVIE-GRAPH + UDA (*) makes obligatory the appearance of the physical emerging from *all* (relative) computations, making twice the concept of primitive matter useless. OK? ...I realize I could be clearer(**) (*) Caution: in "Conscience et Mecanisme" the movie-graph argument precedes the UD argument (the seven first step of the 8-steps-version of the current UDA). In my Lille thesis, the movie graph follows the UD argument for eliminating the use of the "existence of a universe hypothesis"; so there are
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
On Oct 9, 8:54 pm, George Levy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also split, in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space, substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). In your example, for an observer to see consciousness in the machine, he must be willing to exist at the earlier interval, skip over the time delay carrying the recording and resume his existence at the later interval. If he observes only a part of the whole thing, say the recording, he may conclude that the machine is not conscious. Careful, George. Remember the observer *is* the machine. Consequently he's never in a position to 'conclude that the machine is not conscious', because in that case, it is precisely *he* that is not conscious. But you're right IMO that the the concatenation of these observer moments represents the observer's conscious 'existence in time' . The 1-person narrative of this concatenation is what comprises IMO, the A-series (i.e. the conscious discriminability of observer moments arising from the consistent 1-person compresence of global and local aspects of the observer), whereas any 3-person account of this is necessarily stripped back to a B-series that reduces, ultimately, to Planck-length 'snapshots' devoid of temporality. David Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy a écrit : Bruno, Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my computer. (The original at the Iridia web site http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) Thanks for telling. I know people a reconfiguring the main server at IRIDIA, I hope it is only that. In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the recording of an earlier physical process. It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that consciousness involves two partial processes each occupying two different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. I mainly agree. But assuming comp it seems to me this is just a question of acceptable implementation of consciousness. Once implemented in any correct ways, the reasoning shows, or is supposed to show, that the inner first person experience cannot be attributed to the physical activity. The physical keep an important role by giving the frame of the possible relative manifestations of the consciousness. But already at this stage, consciousness can no more been attached to it. On the contrary, keeping the comp hyp, the physical must emerge from the coherence of enough possible relative manifestations. I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness does not supervene the physical. The example is just an instance of consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of a physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these two time intervals. In this case, would you take this as an argument for the necessity of the physical, you would change the notion of physical supervenience a lot. You would be attaching consciousness to some history of physical activity.I agree with all this. I would be changing the notion of physical supervenience such that the physical substrate can be split into time intervals connected by recordings. . But why stop here. We could create an example in which the substrate is maximally split, across time, space, substrate and level. On the other hand, widening the domain of supervenience (time, space, substrate and level) does not seem to eliminate the need for the physical. Here I am arguing against myself... We may solve the problem if we make supervenience recursive, i.e.. software supervening on itself without needing a physical substrate just like photons do not need Ether. In addition, if we are going to split consciousness maximally in this fashion, the concept of observer becomes important, something you do not include in your example. To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also split, in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space, substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). In your example, for an observer to see consciousness in the machine, he must be willing to exist at the earlier interval, skip over the time delay carrying the recording and resume his existence at the later interval. If he observes only a part of the whole thing, say the recording, he may conclude that the machine is not conscious. But if you keep comp, you will not been able to use genuinely that past physical activity. If you could, it would
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
LZ: Colin Hales wrote: I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking? I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is. This deficit of mine includes having trouble with ALL numbers. :-) For the life of me I cannot imagine what an 'object' is that has quintessential property of 'five' about it. Sitting in platonia somewhere is this object. Somewhere else in platonia sit the objects 'red' and 'sad' and 'big'. Here on the list we talk of integers and given them a label I and then speak of operations on I. We tend to think of I as 'being' an an integer.. ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label I and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the value in the storage (call it [I]) is not an integer, but a symbolic representation of property of five_ness as mapped from platonia to reality. What we are doing is (very very metaphorically) shining a light (of an infinity of possible numbers) on the object 5 in platonia and letting the reflected light inhabit [I]. We behave as if 5 was in there, but it's not. All the rules of integers act as-if 5 was there. At that moment the storage pointed to by I contains a symbolic rearrangment of matter such as binary 1001 implemented as the temporary state (an arrangement of charge in space) of logic gates. We logically interpret this artrangement of charge in space as having the effect of five_ness, which is property of we assign at the moment we use it (such as one more than 4). To me the actual numbers (things) don't exist at all. All I can really see here in reality is logical relations that behave as-if the platonic entities existed. This all may seem obvious to the rest of you. That's my problem! But to me here watching the industrial scale manipulations of symbols going on, I wonder why it is we think we are saying anything at all about reality - the computation that literally _is_ reality - which, again, I see as a pile of logical relations that sometimes lets the platonic light shine on them in useful ways - say in ways that enable a mathematical generalisation called an empirical law. As to what the non-ideal numbers are Well there aren't any. Not really. At least I can't conceive them. However the logical operations I see around us have the structure of numbers correponding to a rather odd plethora of bases. Quantity is implicit in any natural aggregation resulting from logical operations. One number might be: human.cell.molecule.atom.nucleus.proton.quark.fuzzy1.fuzzy2...fuzzyN (fred.dandruffskincell.omega3.carbon.nucleus.3rd_proton.UP_quark1_string.loop_2.etc1.etc2.) If you work in base atom arithmetic you have and arithmetic where atoms associate with a remainder, say a unit in another base called .photon This is called chemistry. The human (and all the space that expresses it) is one single number consisting of 'digits' that are all the cells(and interstitial molecules) collected together according to affinities of fuzzyN, which acts in the above 'number' like the integer I does to the set of integers expressed in binary I mentioned above. There's no nice neat rows. No neat remainderless arithmetic. But it's all created with logical operators on an assumed elemental 'fuzzyN' (see above) primitive. '.fuzzyN' can be treated as an underlying structural primitive 'pseudo-object' as a fundamental 'thing'. But .fuzzyN can be just another logical relation between deeper primitives. There is no depth limit to it. As to computation - I have already described what we do here in maths and computation - all the same, really - all manipulating 'as-if' labeled entities. At the instant we lose sight of the logical/relational nature of what we are doing then we can delude ourselves that the symbols denote real 'objects' such as those in platonia and - especially - if you happen to 'be' a collection of these logical operations the rest of the logical operations going on around you look very lumpy and thingy indeed! It looks even more compellingly so when you it appears to obey empirical laws like quantum mechanics and the Nernst equation when perception - made of the same logical operations - presents you with a representation of it all using that special logical aggregate called a brain. In terms of the thread subject line, then, a chair is literally mathematics going on. There's an infinity of other mathematics that can symbolically fiddle with entities in an arithmetical base linguistic_token_for_chair or perhaps linguistic_token_la_chaise, but in coming into existence in the minds of humans we instantly lose the native maths of which the chair is an expression - a computation - an unfolding neverending proof - a theorem pushed along by the drive of the master mathematician - the 2nd law of thermodynamics (= natural propensities for
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: LZ: Colin Hales wrote: I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking? I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is. This deficit of mine includes having trouble with ALL numbers. :-) For the life of me I cannot imagine what an 'object' is that has quintessential property of 'five' about it. Sitting in platonia somewhere is this object. Somewhere else in platonia sit the objects 'red' and 'sad' and 'big'. Here on the list we talk of integers and given them a label I and then speak of operations on I. We tend to think of I as 'being' an an integer.. ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label I and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the value in the storage (call it [I]) is not an integer, but a symbolic representation of property of five_ness as mapped from platonia to reality. What we are doing is (very very metaphorically) shining a light (of an infinity of possible numbers) on the object 5 in platonia and letting the reflected light inhabit [I]. We behave as if 5 was in there, but it's not. All the rules of integers act as-if 5 was there. None of them change if it isn't. At that moment the storage pointed to by I contains a symbolic rearrangment of matter such as binary 1001 implemented as the temporary state (an arrangement of charge in space) of logic gates. We logically interpret this artrangement of charge in space as having the effect of five_ness, which is property of we assign at the moment we use it (such as one more than 4). To me the actual numbers (things) don't exist at all. All I can really see here in reality is logical relations that behave as-if the platonic entities existed. This all may seem obvious to the rest of you. That's my problem! But to me here watching the industrial scale manipulations of symbols going on, I wonder why it is we think we are saying anything at all about reality - the computation that literally _is_ reality - which, again, I see as a pile of logical relations that sometimes lets the platonic light shine on them in useful ways - say in ways that enable a mathematical generalisation called an empirical law. If empirical reality isn't necessarily mathematical, how can it be necessarily computational. As to what the non-ideal numbers are Well there aren't any. But you said there were. That's why I asked. Not really. At least I can't conceive them. However the logical operations I see around us have the structure of numbers correponding to a rather odd plethora of bases. Quantity is implicit in any natural aggregation resulting from logical operations. One number might be: human.cell.molecule.atom.nucleus.proton.quark.fuzzy1.fuzzy2...fuzzyN (fred.dandruffskincell.omega3.carbon.nucleus.3rd_proton.UP_quark1_string.loop_2.etc1.etc2.) If you work in base atom arithmetic you have and arithmetic where atoms associate with a remainder, say a unit in another base called .photon This is called chemistry. Hmm. Well, we have a way of mathematising the world. It is called physics, and it bases don't have much to do with it. Real numbers symmetry, and smooth funciton do. The human (and all the space that expresses it) is one single number Didn't you just say numbers odn't exist? Do you mean representation of a number, or something like that? consisting of 'digits' that are all the cells(and interstitial molecules) collected together according to affinities of fuzzyN, which acts in the above 'number' like the integer I does to the set of integers expressed in binary I mentioned above. There's no nice neat rows. No neat remainderless arithmetic. How do you know? But it's all created with logical operators on an assumed elemental 'fuzzyN' (see above) primitive. '.fuzzyN' can be treated as an underlying structural primitive 'pseudo-object' as a fundamental 'thing'. But .fuzzyN can be just another logical relation between deeper primitives. There is no depth limit to it. How do you know? As to computation - I have already described what we do here in maths and computation - all the same, really - all manipulating 'as-if' labeled entities. At the instant we lose sight of the logical/relational nature of what we are doing then we can delude ourselves that the symbols denote real 'objects' such as those in platonia and - especially - if you happen to 'be' a collection of these logical operations the rest of the logical operations going on around you look very lumpy and thingy indeed! It looks even more compellingly so when you it appears to obey empirical laws like quantum mechanics and the Nernst equation when perception - made of the same logical operations - presents you with a representation of it all using that special logical
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
1Z wrote: Whatever properties are picked out by a computation will be relevant to it as a computation. Yes, of course. But how are these properties supposed to simultaneously produce a state of consciousness stably linked to the 'computation' when this self-same computation could have been instantiated in arbitrarily many physically distinct ways? The computations would be equivalent, but you appear to be claiming that however they are implemented, arbitrarily many distinct physical properties somehow become equally 'relevant' to generating the same state of consciousness. There is no requirement that the same connscious state is implemented by the same physical state, so the multiple reliasability of computations is not a problem So you say, but just *what* physical properties are supposed to be relevant and *how* do they contrive always to manifest equivalently within totally different implementations of a computation? Is this just supposed to be a mystery? My point is that under materialism, 'computation' is just a metaphor and what is directly relevant is the activity of the physical substrate in producing the results that we interpret in this way. What's critical to computational equivalence is not the internal states of the physical substrate, but the consistency of the externalised results thus produced. But with consciousness, it's precisely the internal states that are relevant. And here your reasoning appears to become circular - a particular set of physical properties can be construed as 'externalising' a particular set of computational results at a given point in time (fair enough) so, whatever these properties happen to be, they're must also be 'relevant' in generating a specific internal conscious state - and so must any arbitrary alternative set of properties that externalise the same computational results. Only because you say so, AFAICS. By making the rationale for supervention of consciousness on physical activity completely arbitrary in this way (it just *somehow* tracks a 'computation' however instantiated), you've effectively abandoned it as a materialist explanation. Didn't Hofstadter use this sleight of intuition to conjure consciousness from anthills and books - or was he perhaps just joking? David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 9, 6:35 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What is a computation itself? A process? And algorithm? Bruno covers what he means by 'comp' pretty comprehensively in his various posts and papers. Almost all my discussions with him are attempts to clarify it. Using supplementary assumptions -- such as only activity counts. Not sure what you're getting at - do you mean that, under materialism, the mere existence (not specific activity) of physical properties suffices to generate conscious experience? I mean the Activity Thesis http://tigger.uic.edu/~cvklein/papers/maudlin%20on%20comp.pdf If so, I don't follow. I assume (see below) that, under materialism, experience - psychological activity - physical activity. Yes, but it is still quite possible that a class of phsyical systems picked out by some computational(but ultimately physical) set of properties are conscious/cognitive in veirtue of those proeprties -- ie computationalism is a sort of convenient shorthand or shortcut to the physically relevant properties. But this is the very nub. And it may be dead wrong, so would you address this directly? What is the alternative? Computaitonalism is just dead wrong, as a thesis about consciousness ? That is possible. Computation is an extra factor, a ghost in the machine? I don't think that is woth entertaining. What is being claimed (in this form, a general appeal to the class of arguments referred to by the UDA 8th step) is that under materialism, 'computationalism' (i.e. the 1st variety in my taxonomy) precisely *can't* 'pick out' a set of 'physically relevant properties' in any stable way, because the physical instantiation of any given 'computation' is essentially arbitrary, and can extend to any number of diverse physical properties, to choice. Whatever properties are picked out by a computation will be relevant to it as a computation. Under materialism, specific conscious experiences should presumably map, or reduce, to the activity of an equivalently stable set of physical properties (in an analogous sense to, say, specific neurological processes reducing stably downwards through the physical substrate). And this can't be the case if I can change the physical properties of the computational substrate at will, from step to step of the program if necessary. It can't be done if you can change the relevant properties. But then it would not be the same computation. You can do what you like with the irrelevant ones. So the claim is that, under materialism, some other schema than computationalism must ultimately be deployed to explain any stable
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote: The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP is incompatible with is eliminative materialism, also sometimes known as physicalism. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
