Re: Evidence for the simulation argument
On 3/17/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). And while we're at it, why exclude non-mathematical structures? I guess that depends on what you mean by mathematical structures. I would take any non-contradictory set of axioms to define a mathematical structure. I'm not sure what it would mean to include self-contradictory structures. If you regard mathematics as a game of propositions it just means every wff is a theorem. But if you regard mathematics as existing (even in Platonia) I'm at a loss. What I meant was the naive interpretation of everything exists: cartoon characters in cartoon worlds *just there* rather than generated by some computer simulation or set of physical laws, as our universe seems to be. If you look at only computations in Platonia, you could argue that such structures (which as a matter of fact could be generated computationally, so perhaps non-mathematical was a poor choice of words) would be of low measure. However, what of the ones outside the computer? It seems to me they should have the same ontological status as the abstract computer, but it is then impossible to assign them a measure which makes the weirder ones less likely, as has been done with computation. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evidence for the simulation argument
Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). And how do things run in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in logic, as well as epistemic ones? Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind. Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to the (arithmetical hypostases): p (truth) Bp (provable) Bp p (knowable, correctly provabie) Bp Dp (gamblings) Bp Dp p (correct gambling, feeling) And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have explained some time ago, determines each a geometrical (Kripke) multiverse. It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus theology) experimentally testable. As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major discovery: The universal machine (talks bits) The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks qubits). The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication). I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus Matter (or our measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like to justify a quantum topology or deep enough universal machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: String theory and Cellular Automata
Hi, It was an interesting hypothesis, When we're talking black holes we should consider them as the sources of reduction of entropy; since when something gets into a black hole we have no more information about it and so the overall information of the world decreases and the same happens to entropy. In your the world is moving toward black holes so the entropy of the world should decrease! But that seems not to be the the case, it's somehow inconvenient. If we accept the idea of CA as the fundamental building blocks of the nature we should explain: why some patterns and not the others. Some that have lead to our physical laws and not the other possibilities? In this situation the idea of multiverse might help. On 3/15/07, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi, See previous posts here re EC - Entropy Calculus. This caught my eye, thought I'd throw in my $0.02 worth. I have been working on this idea for a long while now. Am writing it up as part of my PhD process. The EC is a lambda calculus formalism that depicts reality. It's actual instantation with one particular and unbelievable massive axiom set is the universe we are in. The instantation is literally the CA of the EC primitives. As cognitive agents within it, made of the EC-CA, describing it, we can use abstracted simplified EC on a computational substrate (also made of the CA...a computer!) to explore/describe the universe. But the abstractions (like string theory) are not the universe - they are merely depictions at a certain spatiotemporal observer-scales. Reality is a literal ongoing massively parallel theorem proving exercise in Entropy Calculus. The EC universe has literally computed you and me and my dogs. Coherence/Bifurcation points in the CA correspond to new descriptive 'levels of underlying reality' - emergence. Atoms, Molecules, Crystalsetc... One of the descriptive abstractions of the EC-CA is called 'Maxwells-Equations'. Another is the Navier-Stokes equations (different context), another is Quantum Mechanics, the standard particle model and so on. None of them are reality - merely depictions of a surface behaviour of it. In the model there is only one universe and only one justified or needed. Which is a bummer if you insist on talking about multiverses.they are not parsimonious or necessary to explain the universe. I can't help it if they are unnecessary! You know , it's funny what EC makes the universe look like. the boundary of the universe is the collective event horizon of all black holes. On the other side is nothing. The endlessly increasing size of black holes is what corresponds to the endlessly increasing entropy (disorder - which is the dispersal of the deep universe back to nothing at the event horizons). The measure of the surface area of the black holes is the entropy of the whole universe. The process of dispersal at the boundary makes it look like the universe is expanding - to us from the inside. The reality is actually the reverse - the spatiotemporal circumstances are of shrinkage - due to the loss of the redundant fabric of the very deepest layers of reality being eaten by the black holes, dragging it inwhilst the organisation of collections of it at the uppermost layers is maintained (like space, atoms etc). (Imagine a jumper knitted of wool with a huge number of threads in the yarn - remove the redundant threads from the inside and the jumper shrinks, but is still a jumper, just getting smaller(everything else around looks like it's getting bigger from the point of view of being the jumper.) our future?...we'll all blink out of existence as the event horizons of black holes that grow and grow and grow and do it faster and faster and faster until. merging and merging until they all merge and then PFT! NOTHING. and the whole process starts again with a new axiom setround and round and roundwe go... Weird huh? So I reckon you're on the right track. You don't have to believe me about any of it... but I can guarantee you'll get answers if you keep looking at it. The trick is to let go of the idea that 'fundamental building blocks' of nature are a meaningful concept (we are tricked into the belief be our perceptual/epistemological goals) ... cheers, colin hales Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote: I'm thinking there's some kind of similarity between string theory and depicting the world as a big CA. In String theory we have some vibrating strings which have some kind of influence on each other and can for different matters and fields. CA can play such role of changing patterns and of course the influence is evident. Different rules in CA might correspond to various basic shapes of vibration in strings... I don't know much about S.T. but the idea of such mapping seems very interesting. -- Mohsen Ravanbakhsh. -- Mohsen Ravanbakhsh, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran.
Re: The Meaning of Life
Brent: ...No parent expects to receive anything but satisfaction from raising their children - as perfectly well explained by Darwin. And how dare you assert that money I sent to Katrina victims was simply calculated to get something back. There are many possible Darwinian explanations for feelings of altruism; but apparently you haven't bothered to find them... What is this? a mental blockage? How could you forget (disregard) your 1st sentence in the 2nd? Are you a formalistical materialist to expect ONLY monetary rewards for money (or anything else) spent? S a t i s f a c t i o n is not a reward? Feeling good about something? Besides such feelings - indeed - might have developed from 'real' return: raising young means having a community-protection when getting old (as the most primitive idea). As complexity grew such ideas get also more complex. Luv is a composition. Not a primitive John M - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2007 12:03 AM Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life Tom Caylor wrote: On Mar 6, 5:19 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: A source that has given us the crusades and 9/11 as well as the sister's of mercy. No a very sufficient source if nobody can agree on what it provides. I don't like simply saying That isn't so, but nobody can agree on what it provides, referring to the source of ultimate meaning, I was referring to the sufficient source of *morality*. Such a source should be able to provide an unambiguous standard that is so clear everyone agrees - if it existed. is not true. In fact it's very remarkable the consistency, across all kinds of cultures, the basic beliefs of truly normative morality, evidence for their being a source which cannot be explained through closed science alone. Why not? Why isn't Darwin's or Scott Atran's or Richard Dawkin's a *possible* explanation. And how is God did it an explanation of anything? It's just a form of words so ambiguous as to be virtually empty. God meant different things to the crusaders and the 9/11 jihadists, to the Aztecs and the Conquistadores, to the Nazi's and the Jews. So just because they use the same word doesn't mean they are referring to the same thing. We've talked about this before. Darwin cannot explain giving without expecting to receive. Where do you get this nonsense?? Do you just make it up as you need it? No parent expects to receive anything but satisfaction from raising their children - as perfectly well explained by Darwin. And how dare you assert that money I sent to Katrina victims was simply calculated to get something back. There are many possible Darwinian explanations for feelings of altruism; but apparently you haven't bothered to find them. ...skipped the rest... Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: JOINING post
Dear Mindaugas. you wrote: Analogically, if we find that our world is some cellular automata ... I PRESUME THIS IS your STARTING POINT: if... if not, if we find that our world is more(?) than a cellular automaton - which is in my word-use 'reductionist' - then the world is NOT governed by some simple rules. We don't set rules, we select models, count/identify in them the occurrences and deduct what happened most which then is called law. And the world is not GOVERNED. it is a process of them all. Nothing can be excluded from the interefficiency, because that would lead to separate worlds - which may well be, but we do not know about them. So your 'origination point' is causally connected (your word) to the rest of the totality and its process. A 'next step' segmentually observed. Initial state? I don't believe the narrative of the physical cosmology, because it has logical flaws even in human logic. I made another narrative, which may not be more 'true', but eliminates SOME flaws. You can make another one. We know nothing about that 'origin', it was before the 'time' of Loebian machines (even before my time). We can speculate, it is cheap. John - Original Message - From: 明迪 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2007 2:45 AM Subject: Re: JOINING post Dear John, I feel I understand your view and distinction of origination point and origination. Origination is entailment of origination point. Origination point is part of our world (the item to be originated). Is that correct? Now, my opinion is that there is no origination of the origination point, because whatever it may be, it is connected to the item to be originated through causality. What I mean is, if we were to find some relatively simple rule generating our world, then we could actually try to reduce it to some even simpler rule. It is now thought of that some rules governing cellular automata are irreducible, since there seem to be no simpler rule to produce the patterns they some cellular automata produce, however, suppose that our world is governed by some relatively simple rule. In this case, there is a rule to reduce most if not all of the cellular automata rules, since it actually produces all the cellular automata that we know :-).with the initial state that we do not know, we could try to find the world produced by an even simpler rule, that eventually produces the initial state of our world. Mindaugas Indriunas On 3/8/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I feel a misunderstanding here: origination point IMO is part of the item to be originated, the pertinent 'point' (within and for) the evolving total to grow out from. As I used 'origination refers to the entailment producing such point - if we use a 'point' to start with. Such 'point' is the limit we can go back to, not further to 'its' entailing circumstgances we have no access to. I tried to adjust to a vocabulary I responded to, not my own and preferred one. Hence the misunderstandability. Sorry. John Mikes - Original Message - From: 明迪 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2007 10:45 AM Subject: Re: JOINING post Dear John Mikes, I thought your words 'Origin of (our) universe' are the same as the word 'origination-point'. You said: (1) 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. And you also said: (2) we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). From (2) claim it logically follows a statement we can reach to items later or equal to origination-point. I agree (2) statement, but slightly disagree with (1) statement. Mindaugas Indriunas On 3/5/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear Mindaugas Indriunas, what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use in our speculations only our present cognitive inventory of our existing mind. No information from super(extra)natural sources included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). Nor can a 'valid' ALGORITHM reach back further. Itg cannot 'generate' information about ' no information' topics. All we can speak about are intra-existence items, the rest is fantasy, sci-fi, religion. What I may use in a narrative, but by no means in the conventionally outlined scientific method. John M --- 明迪 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear John Mikes. I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only to 1 part of your letter: 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. If we do come up with an
Re: Evidence for the simulation argument
I was so glad to have some 'text' on UD(A), comp, the P-words (Platonia, Paeano, Plotinus), the hypostases, in your post. Alas! Still all techy, only for the adepts. Not in Mark's required plain language. (English or what?) (I still stumble among them). My question now: How do we distinguish Everything from Almost Everything? We are still 'walled in' by our (or: OK, let's call it: the Loeb machine's) knowledge base. How can we know that we include things we do not know ABOUT? (Part of the real total Everything, of course) and build our 'world' on a partial model - called (our?) Everything? Then, by some event unforeseeable some 'left-out' effect may show up and we happily and self-justifiedly refuse it, as nonsense (happened many times in the conventional reductionist sciences). How are we better? We have no idea if we know but a negligible bit or almost all. We may be the laughing stock for an alien with wider knowledgebase (and: 'smarter'). Ad vocem 'smarter': I am sorry for the greatgrandkids who - in your remark of yesterday may not be smarter than we are, just have a wider source of information (epistemy). Does that mean that you do not believe we are 'smarter' than humans of 2-3 millennia ago? (Could be, because you base much knowledge on Plato etc., - the old Greeks). I still hold to the Leninian wisdom that quantity turns into quality and increasing the info-basis MAY(?) result in also smarter understganding - i.e. better wisdom. So I put on hold my regret for the greatgrandkids for now. Regards John M - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2007 11:02 AM Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). And how do things run in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in logic, as well as epistemic ones? Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind. Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to the (arithmetical hypostases): p (truth) Bp (provable) Bp p (knowable, correctly provabie) Bp Dp (gamblings) Bp Dp p (correct gambling, feeling) And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have explained some time ago, determines each a geometrical (Kripke) multiverse. It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus theology) experimentally testable. As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major discovery: The universal machine (talks bits) The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks qubits). The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication). I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus Matter (or our measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like to justify a quantum topology or deep enough universal machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.5.446 / Virus Database: 268.18.12/724 - Release Date: 3/16/2007 12:12 PM --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: String theory and Cellular Automata
Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote: Hi, It was an interesting hypothesis, When we're talking black holes we should consider them as the sources of reduction of entropy; since when something gets into a black hole we have no more information about it and so the overall information of the world decreases and the same happens to entropy. In your the world is moving toward black holes so the entropy of the world should decrease! But that seems not to be the the case, it's somehow inconvenient. It's also wrong, according to our best theory of BHs, the entropy of a BH is proportional to it's surface area and the maximum entropy configuration of a given mass is for it to form a BH. The information interpretation of this is that the information that seems to be lost by something falling into a black hole is encoded in correlations between what falls in and the black-body Hawking radiation from the surface. So the entropy increases in that microscopically encoded information becomes unavailable to use macroscopic beings. This is where all entropy comes from anyway - the dynamical evolution of QM is deterministic (at least in the MWI) and so information is never lost or gained. Brent Meeker If we accept the idea of CA as the fundamental building blocks of the nature we should explain: why some patterns and not the others. Some that have lead to our physical laws and not the other possibilities? In this situation the idea of multiverse might help. On 3/15/07, *Colin Hales* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi, See previous posts here re EC - Entropy Calculus. This caught my eye, thought I'd throw in my $0.02 worth. I have been working on this idea for a long while now. Am writing it up as part of my PhD process. The EC is a lambda calculus formalism that depicts reality. It's actual instantation with one particular and unbelievable massive axiom set is the universe we are in. The instantation is literally the CA of the EC primitives. As cognitive agents within it, made of the EC-CA, describing it, we can use abstracted simplified EC on a computational substrate (also made of the CA...a computer!) to explore/describe the universe. But the abstractions (like string theory) are not the universe - they are merely depictions at a certain spatiotemporal observer-scales. Reality is a literal ongoing massively parallel theorem proving exercise in Entropy Calculus. The EC universe has literally computed you and me and my dogs. Coherence/Bifurcation points in the CA correspond to new descriptive 'levels of underlying reality' - emergence. Atoms, Molecules, Crystalsetc... One of the descriptive abstractions of the EC-CA is called 'Maxwells-Equations'. Another is the Navier-Stokes equations (different context), another is Quantum Mechanics, the standard particle model and so on. None of them are reality - merely depictions of a surface behaviour of it. In the model there is only one universe and only one justified or needed. Which is a bummer if you insist on talking about multiverses.they are not parsimonious or necessary to explain the universe. I can't help it if they are unnecessary! You know , it's funny what EC makes the universe look like. the boundary of the universe is the collective event horizon of all black holes. On the other side is nothing. The endlessly increasing size of black holes is what corresponds to the endlessly increasing entropy (disorder - which is the dispersal of the deep universe back to nothing at the event horizons). The measure of the surface area of the black holes is the entropy of the whole universe. The process of dispersal at the boundary makes it look like the universe is expanding - to us from the inside. The reality is actually the reverse - the spatiotemporal circumstances are of shrinkage - due to the loss of the redundant fabric of the very deepest layers of reality being eaten by the black holes, dragging it inwhilst the organisation of collections of it at the uppermost layers is maintained (like space, atoms etc). (Imagine a jumper knitted of wool with a huge number of threads in the yarn - remove the redundant threads from the inside and the jumper shrinks, but is still a jumper, just getting smaller(everything else around looks like it's getting bigger from the point of view of being the jumper.) our future?...we'll all blink out of existence as the event horizons of black holes that grow and grow and grow and do it faster and faster and faster until. merging and merging until they all merge and then PFT! NOTHING. and the whole process starts again with a new
Re: Evidence for the simulation argument
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). And how do things run in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in logic, as well as epistemic ones? Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. I don't believe either one - I just contemplate them. ;-) Since it is not at all clear to me that Peano arithmetic, or any mathematics, exists I'm uncertain as to whether there is greater explanatory power in your UDA as compared to Peter's some things exist and others don't. It is just up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both materialism and computationalism. When you've written this before I've asked what contradiction you derive from the conjunction of materialism and computationalism. IIRC you said there was not a contradiction. But you are right, I should study your argument more carefully; I don't really see how you get QM, much less particle physics, out of it. Brent Meeker The argument should make us more modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind. Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to the (arithmetical hypostases): p (truth) Bp (provable) Bp p (knowable, correctly provabie) Bp Dp (gamblings) Bp Dp p (correct gambling, feeling) And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have explained some time ago, determines each a geometrical (Kripke) multiverse. It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus theology) experimentally testable. As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major discovery: The universal machine (talks bits) The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks qubits). The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication). I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus Matter (or our measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like to justify a quantum topology or deep enough universal machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
