Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent > universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite > arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything"). > > And how do things "run" in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in > logic, as well as epistemic ones? Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind. Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to the (arithmetical hypostases): p (truth) Bp (provable) Bp & p (knowable, correctly provabie) Bp & Dp (gamblings) Bp & Dp & p (correct gambling, feeling) And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have explained some time ago, determines each a "geometrical" (Kripke) multiverse. It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus theology) experimentally testable. As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major discovery: The universal machine (talks bits) The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks qubits). The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication). I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---