Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent 
> universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite 
> arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
> And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in 
> logic, as well as epistemic ones?

Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material 
primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just 
up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. 
This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense 
of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both 
materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more 
modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.

Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by 
interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces 
an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, 
knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to 
the (arithmetical hypostases):

p  (truth)
Bp (provable)
Bp & p (knowable, correctly provabie)

Bp & Dp (gamblings)
Bp & Dp & p (correct gambling, feeling)

And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the 
hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and 
what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have 
explained some time ago, determines each a "geometrical" (Kripke) 

It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus 
theology) experimentally testable.

As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major 

The universal machine (talks bits)
The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks 

The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits 
to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of 
both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).

I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine.



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