I was so glad to have some 'text' on UD(A),  comp,  the P-words (Platonia, 
Paeano, Plotinus), the hypostases, in your post. Alas! Still all techy, only 
for the adepts. Not in Mark's required "plain language". (English or what?) 
(I still stumble among them).  
My question now:
How do we distinguish "Everything" from "Almost Everything"? We are still 
'walled in' by our (or: OK, let's call it:  the Loeb machine's) knowledge base. 
How can we know that we include things we do not know ABOUT? (Part of the real 
total Everything, of course) and build our 'world' on a partial model - called 
(our?) "Everything"? Then, by some event unforeseeable some 'left-out' effect 
may show up and we happily and self-justifiedly refuse it, as nonsense 
(happened many times in the conventional reductionist sciences). 
How are we better? 
We have no idea if we know but a negligible bit or almost all. We may be the 
laughing stock for an alien with wider knowledgebase (and: 'smarter'). 
Ad vocem 'smarter': 
I am sorry for the greatgrandkids who - in your remark of yesterday may not be 
smarter than we are, just have a wider source of information (epistemy). Does 
that mean that you do not believe we are 'smarter' than humans of 2-3 millennia 
ago? (Could be, because you base much knowledge on Plato etc., - the old 
Greeks). I still hold to the Leninian wisdom that quantity turns into quality 
and increasing the info-basis MAY(?) result in also smarter understganding - 
i.e. better wisdom. 
So I put on hold my regret for the greatgrandkids for now.


John M 

  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2007 11:02 AM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

  Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :

  > But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent 
  > universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite 
  > arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
  > And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in 
  > logic, as well as epistemic ones?

  Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material 
  primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just 
  up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. 
  This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense 
  of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both 
  materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more 
  modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.

  Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by 
  interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces 
  an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, 
  knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to 
  the (arithmetical hypostases):

  p  (truth)
  Bp (provable)
  Bp & p (knowable, correctly provabie)

  Bp & Dp (gamblings)
  Bp & Dp & p (correct gambling, feeling)

  And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the 
  hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and 
  what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have 
  explained some time ago, determines each a "geometrical" (Kripke) 

  It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus 
  theology) experimentally testable.

  As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major 

  The universal machine (talks bits)
  The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks 

  The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits 
  to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of 
  both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).

  I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
  honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
  associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
  Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
  to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine.




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12:12 PM

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