I was so glad to have some 'text' on UD(A), comp, the P-words (Platonia,
Paeano, Plotinus), the hypostases, in your post. Alas! Still all techy, only
for the adepts. Not in Mark's required "plain language". (English or what?)
(I still stumble among them).
My question now:
How do we distinguish "Everything" from "Almost Everything"? We are still
'walled in' by our (or: OK, let's call it: the Loeb machine's) knowledge base.
How can we know that we include things we do not know ABOUT? (Part of the real
total Everything, of course) and build our 'world' on a partial model - called
(our?) "Everything"? Then, by some event unforeseeable some 'left-out' effect
may show up and we happily and self-justifiedly refuse it, as nonsense
(happened many times in the conventional reductionist sciences).
How are we better?
We have no idea if we know but a negligible bit or almost all. We may be the
laughing stock for an alien with wider knowledgebase (and: 'smarter').
Ad vocem 'smarter':
I am sorry for the greatgrandkids who - in your remark of yesterday may not be
smarter than we are, just have a wider source of information (epistemy). Does
that mean that you do not believe we are 'smarter' than humans of 2-3 millennia
ago? (Could be, because you base much knowledge on Plato etc., - the old
Greeks). I still hold to the Leninian wisdom that quantity turns into quality
and increasing the info-basis MAY(?) result in also smarter understganding -
i.e. better wisdom.
So I put on hold my regret for the greatgrandkids for now.
----- Original Message -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2007 11:02 AM
Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument
Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent
> universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite
> arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
> And how do things "run" in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in
> logic, as well as epistemic ones?
Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material
primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just
up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument.
This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense
of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both
materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more
modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.
Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by
interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces
an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving,
knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to
the (arithmetical hypostases):
Bp & p (knowable, correctly provabie)
Bp & Dp (gamblings)
Bp & Dp & p (correct gambling, feeling)
And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the
hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and
what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have
explained some time ago, determines each a "geometrical" (Kripke)
It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus
theology) experimentally testable.
As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major
The universal machine (talks bits)
The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks
The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits
to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of
both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).
I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be
honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one)
associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus
Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like
to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine.
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