Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent 
>> universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite 
>> arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
>> And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in 
>> logic, as well as epistemic ones?
> Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material 
> primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. 

I don't believe either one - I just contemplate them. ;-)  

Since it is not at all clear to me that Peano arithmetic, or any mathematics, 
exists I'm uncertain as to whether there is greater explanatory power in your 
UDA as compared to Peter's "some things exist and others don't".

>It is just 
> up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. 
> This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense 
> of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both 
> materialism and computationalism. 

When you've written this before I've asked what contradiction you derive from 
the conjunction of materialism and computationalism.  IIRC you said there was 
not a contradiction.

But you are right, I should study your argument more carefully; I don't really 
see how you get QM, much less particle physics, out of it.

Brent Meeker

>The argument should make us more 
> modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.
> Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by 
> interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces 
> an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, 
> knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to 
> the (arithmetical hypostases):
> p  (truth)
> Bp (provable)
> Bp & p (knowable, correctly provabie)
> Bp & Dp (gamblings)
> Bp & Dp & p (correct gambling, feeling)
> And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the 
> hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and 
> what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have 
> explained some time ago, determines each a "geometrical" (Kripke) 
> multiverse.
> It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus 
> theology) experimentally testable.
> As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major 
> discovery:
> The universal machine (talks bits)
> The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks 
> qubits).
> The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits 
> to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of 
> both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).
> I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
> honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
> associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
> Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
> to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine.
> Bruno
> > 

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