Re: 7 steps etc.
Hello John, On 01 Sep 2009, at 23:49, John Mikes wrote: I am waiting for your explanatory post(s) and anxiously read some several thousand pages with related topics. I am very pleased to hear this. Unfortunately the technical examples and discussing their solutions are not much help. I cannot extract the now-and-then interlaced text-explanations, even if I find them, they relate to the technical discussions, not a simple understanding. To be honest, I have a similar problem. Is there a way to catch your theory in a concise, understandable, readable TEXT ? I will try to build a text from the conversation on the list. May be this will converge to a book. In the meantime, I will perhaps make some summary of what we have seen so far. Please intervene if things are unclear. Do you have a problem with the notion of bijection? I can go slowly, there is no rush. I was hoping to be slow down by more question from the non-mathematicians, but I think thy are a bit to shy. If you want to play the role of some candid questioner, you are welcome. Anyone? You work a lot on this topic, it is a shame if interested lurkers don't get it. Thank for saying this. Note that the next five days I have the september exams, so I will be a bit more busy than usual. I still hope I can make the antic math during that period. Please feel free to ask any question. Have a good day, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 1 Sep, 23:48, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 1 Sep, 17:46, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: time capsules are just what I am talking about. Why would you need anythign more for the specious present than a snapshop some of which is out of date? Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear to us as possessing internal temporal duration and differentiation. Easily explained if perceptual data are timestamped. This seems to appeal simultaneously to aspects of both flux and block models of time whilst being entirely consistent with neither. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: I think his exploration of the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves is pretty much on the money. So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I have read some of his articles and seen him debate and give interviews. So that sounds like Dennett alright - rearranging deck chairs, redefining words, whatever it takes. From the wikipedia article on Freedom Evolves: In his treatment of both free will and altruism, he starts by showing why we should not accept the traditional definitions of either term. So, as I said, you can't read quote of Dennett and accept it at face value, because Dennett doesn't restrict himself to traditional definitions of terms. You have to interpret Dennett's quotes within the context of his web of alternate, non-traditional compatibilist word definitions. Dennett's main goal is not to show that determinism is compatible with free will (which it isn't), actually it is, although I don't find it very convincing --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 02 Sep 2009, at 03:17, Brent Meeker wrote: But only by isolating a bit of computation from the rest of universe. And it doesn't show that a computation supervenes on zero physical activity. And even if it did show that, it would not follow that mental computation *does* supervene on computation realized in Platonia with zero physical activity. Maudlin's Olympia shows that a computation can be realized with zero *computational* physical activity, and this means that if we keep associating the consciousness to the computation, the physical activity has no role there. MGA shows that if we associate consciousness to the physical activity implementing a computation, then we have to associate that consciousness in real time to a description of that computation, which can be seen as absurd in different ways. We can come back on this, but I think it is better I explain what mathematician means by computations. MGA and MGA-like argument can be seen as an extension of what is done in UDA1-6. It shows that a universal machine cannot see the difference between real, virtual and then arithmetical. But like the notion of virtual emulation has to be grasped for the step 6, the notion of arithmetical computation has to be grasped before, and that is why I am explaining the mathematician definition of universal machine and its computations. This is an absurd conclusion, so the hypothesis that motivates it - i.e. CTM+PM - is thus shown to be contradictory and must be abandoned, not merely in this case, but in general: i.e. the exception has broken the rule. This is forced unless you can show where the logic goes wrong. No, even if the conclusion is wrong that only shows that *some* step in the argument is wrong NOT that the conjunction of the computationalist theory of mind and primary matter is self contradictory. You can say this for any proof by reduction ad absurdo. But if someone pretend having done a reduction of absurdo of A+B, that is, pretend to have provide a proof, or argument, that A+B - false, then if you disagree that this leads to ~(A+B), you have to *find* at which step the error is. That's the very idea of proving. Of course in a difficult applied subject, you can always find some loophole of the kind invisible horses driving cars, and it is a matter of pedagogy to explains things spirit, instead of big set of formalities capable of satisfying everyone in the first strike. In the present case, you can always develop a sufficiently ridiculous notion of matter and physical computation to block the proof, but it should be clear that a strong change of the meaning of the hypothesis is done. I don't even see where the argument uses PM to reach its conclusion. Note that PM is used in all UDA1-7, and at that stage, you can still argue that the supposedly existing physical universe is too little to run a big part of the UD, (but we have already the result that comp entails indeterminacy and non-locality). The step 8 just shows that the move toward a little physical universe does not really work, in the sense that the physical supervenience thesis, in the comp frame, entails that we can show the physical activity non relevant with respect to the computation. You have to believe that consciousness in real time is related to static description of such computation, which is perhaps not contradictory, but is non sensical. You can no more say yes to the doctor 'qua computatio'. Maybe CTM+UD is a simpler explanation of the world, a return to Platonic idealism, but I don't see that its contrary is contrdictory. It is contradictory with the idea that consciousness is related to both the computation and the physical activity, in the PM sense of physical activity. A movie of a brain become conscious qua computation and without computation. It is not a mathematical contradiction, but a conceptual difficulty preventing saying yes to the doctor by appealing to the notion of computation. Like invisible horses pulling cars could throw doubt to the thermodynamical explanation of car motor. As I have always said, MGA does not eliminate completely some use of Occam; it minimizes it, but, like always in applied math, you can imagine a sufficiently bizarre notion of physical computation to stuck the logic of the applied proof, a bit like your own move of associating your consciousness to a non computable physical object outside your brain. But with the generalized brain, this is taking into account. If your consciousness, to exist, needs that uncomputable object, you are no more in the comp frame. It is like the collapse of the wave packet. It shows that the many- worlds does not follow logically from the SWE, and the collapse is so badly defined, that you can hardy evacuate it (like the God-of-the-gap in physics), yet, I do think that the many-words follows directly from
Re: Against Physics
2009/9/2 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: I think his exploration of the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves is pretty much on the money. So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I have read some of his articles and seen him debate and give interviews. So that sounds like Dennett alright - rearranging deck chairs, redefining words, whatever it takes. From the wikipedia article on Freedom Evolves: In his treatment of both free will and altruism, he starts by showing why we should not accept the traditional definitions of either term. So, as I said, you can't read quote of Dennett and accept it at face value, because Dennett doesn't restrict himself to traditional definitions of terms. You have to interpret Dennett's quotes within the context of his web of alternate, non-traditional compatibilist word definitions. Dennett's main goal is not to show that determinism is compatible with free will (which it isn't), BUT to show that determinism is compatible with continued social order and cohesion (which it is...probably). Dennett didn't invent compatibilism. It has a long history and extensive literature. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The seven step series
Bruno Marchal wrote: Ouh la la ... Mirek, You may be right, but I am not sure. You may verify if this was not in a intuitionist context. Without the excluded middle principle, you may have to use countable choice in some situation where classical logic does not, but I am not sure. Please see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countable_set the sketch of proof that the union of countably many countable sets is countable is in the second half of the article. I don't think it has anything to do with the law of excluded middle. Similar reasoning is described here http://at.yorku.ca/cgi-bin/bbqa?forum=ask_a_topologist_2008;task=show_msg;msg=1545.0001 My opinion on choice axioms is that there are obviously true, and this despite I am not a set realist. OK, thanks. I am glad, nevertheless that ZF and ZFC have exactly the same arithmetical provability power, so all proof in ZFC of an arithmetical theorem can be done without C, in ZF. This can be seen through the use of Gödel's constructible models. I am sorry, but I have no idea what might an arithmetical provability power refer to. Just give me a hint ... I use set theory informally at the metalevel, and I will not address such questions. As I said, I use Cantor theorem for minimal purpose, and as a simple example of diagonalization. OK. Fair enough. I am far more puzzled by indeterminacy axioms, and even a bit frightened by infinite game theory I have no intuitive clues in such fields. Do you have some links please? Just to check it and write down few new key words. Cheers, Mirek On 01 Sep 2009, at 14:30, Mirek Dobsicek wrote: The reason why I am puzzled is that I was recently told that in order to prove that * the union of countably many countable sets is countable one needs to use at least the Axiom of Countable Choice (+ ZF, of course). The same is true in order to show that * a set A is infinite if and only if there is a bijection between A and a proper subset of A (or in another words, * if the set A is infinite, then there exists an injection from the natural numbers N to A) Reading the proofs, I find it rather subtle that some (weaker) axioms of choices are needed. The subtlety comes from the fact that many textbook do not mention it. In order to understand a little bit more to the axiom of choice, I am thinkig if it has already been used in the material you covered or whether it was not really needed at all. Not being able to answer it, I had to ask :-) Please note that I don't have any strong opinion about the Axiom of Choice. Just trying to understand it. May I ask about your opinion? Mirek Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Mirek, On 01 Sep 2009, at 12:25, Mirek Dobsicek wrote: I am puzzled by one thing. Is the Axiom of dependent choice (DC) assumed implicitly somewhere here or is it obvious that there is no need for it (so far)? I don't see where I would have use it, and I don't think I will use it. Cantor's theorem can be done in ZF without any form of choice axioms. I think. Well, I may use the (full) axiom of choice by assuming that all cardinals are comparable, but I don't think I will use this above some illustrations. If you suspect I am using it, don't hesitate to tell me. But so far I don't think I have use it. Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear to us as possessing internal temporal duration and differentiation. Easily explained if perceptual data are timestamped. Yes, that would appear to be the specification, more or less. What's the implementation? David On 1 Sep, 23:48, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 1 Sep, 17:46, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: time capsules are just what I am talking about. Why would you need anythign more for the specious present than a snapshop some of which is out of date? Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear to us as possessing internal temporal duration and differentiation. Easily explained if perceptual data are timestamped. This seems to appeal simultaneously to aspects of both flux and block models of time whilst being entirely consistent with neither. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different at some lower level can be said to implement the same computation at a higher level. I see nothing incoherent is saying that two physically different computers perform the same computation. So if mental states are certain kinds of computations (either physically realized or in Platonia) they can be realized on different, i.e. non-invariant physical processes. What's incoherent about that? I wonder what you mean by either physically realized or in Platonia? ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is indeed nothing problematic in saying that two physically different computers perform the same computation. We can understand what is meant without ambiguity; 'different' is indeed different, and any identity is thus non-physical (i.e. relational). But 'realisation' of such relational identity in Platonia in the form of an invariant experiential state is surely something else entirely: i.e. if it is a supplementary hypothesis to PM it is dualism. The point of Bruno's argument is to force a choice between the attachment of experience to physical process or computation; but not both at the same time. And that's where my idea that the context/environment is essential. It defines the level at which functions must be the same; in other words when we say yes to the doctor we are assuming that he will replace our brain so that it has the same input/ouput at the level of our afferent and efferent nerves and hormones (roughly speaking). Then we would continue to exist in and experience this world. This is why we would hesitate to say yes to the doctor if he proposed to also simulate the rest of world with which we interact, e.g. in a rock, because it would mean our consciousness would be in a different world - not this one, which due to it's much greater complexity would not be emulable. Yes, this could make sense. But what you're saying is that if we knew the correct substitution level, be it at the level of our afferent and efferent nerves and hormones, or some different or finer analysis, we would in effect have reproduced whatever is 'physically' relevant to consciousness. Whether this is indeed possible at any functional level above the atomic may in the end be resolvable empirically, it can't simply be assumed a priori on the basis of computational theory. In point of fact you haven't actually appealed to software here, but rather to highly specific details of physical implementation, and this is a hardware issue, as we computer programmers are wont to say. But I guess the 'yes doctor' is really about where the distinction between hardware and software merges experientially. And then the import of MGA is that if the gap closes at any level above atom-for-atom substitution, any attachment of experience to 'PM' below that level becomes spurious for CMT. David David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive, but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain, and hence in principle implementable by any physical process capable of instantiating the equivalent computation. Bruno's 'version' starts with this postulate and then shows that the first part of the hypothesis - i.e. that the mind is computational - is incompatible with the second part - i.e. that it is implemented by some specifically distinguishable non-computational process. That's the step I don't grasp. I see that the MGA makes it plausible that the mind could be a computation divorced from all physical processes - but not that it must be. Maybe you can explain it. Well, I'll recapitulate what insight I possess. As I see it, both MGA and Olympia are intended to show how postulating, on the basis of PM, that invariant mental states supervene qua computatio, as Bruno would say, on non-invariant physical causes is flatly incoherent - i.e. it leads to absurd consequences. But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different at some lower level can be said to implement the same computation at a higher level. I see nothing incoherent is saying that two physically different computers perform the same computation. So if mental states are certain kinds of computations (either physically realized or in Platonia) they can be realized on different, i.e. non-invariant physical processes. What's incoherent about that? And that's where my idea that the context/environment is essential. It defines the level at which functions must be the same; in
Re: Dreaming On
On 2 Sep, 16:58, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear to us as possessing internal temporal duration and differentiation. Easily explained if perceptual data are timestamped. Yes, that would appear to be the specification, more or less. What's the implementation? Is that a philosophical question? On 1 Sep, 23:48, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 1 Sep, 17:46, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: time capsules are just what I am talking about. Why would you need anythign more for the specious present than a snapshop some of which is out of date? Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear to us as possessing internal temporal duration and differentiation. Easily explained if perceptual data are timestamped. This seems to appeal simultaneously to aspects of both flux and block models of time whilst being entirely consistent with neither. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Flammarion wrote: On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: I think his exploration of the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves is pretty much on the money. So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I have read some of his articles and seen him debate and give interviews. So that sounds like Dennett alright - rearranging deck chairs, redefining words, whatever it takes. From the wikipedia article on Freedom Evolves: In his treatment of both free will and altruism, he starts by showing why we should not accept the traditional definitions of either term. So, as I said, you can't read quote of Dennett and accept it at face value, because Dennett doesn't restrict himself to traditional definitions of terms. You have to interpret Dennett's quotes within the context of his web of alternate, non-traditional compatibilist word definitions. Dennett's main goal is not to show that determinism is compatible with free will (which it isn't), actually it is, although I don't find it very convincing I think Dennett's point is that compatibilist free-will has all the chracteristics of free-will that people usually think are important - it's all the free-will worth having. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The seven step series
On 02 Sep 2009, at 17:16, Mirek Dobsicek wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Ouh la la ... Mirek, You may be right, but I am not sure. You may verify if this was not in a intuitionist context. Without the excluded middle principle, you may have to use countable choice in some situation where classical logic does not, but I am not sure. Please see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countable_set the sketch of proof that the union of countably many countable sets is countable is in the second half of the article. I don't think it has anything to do with the law of excluded middle. I was thinking about the equivalence of the definitions of infinite set (self-injection, versus injection of omega), which, I think are inequivalent without excluded middle, but perhaps non equivalent with absence of choice, I don't know) Similar reasoning is described here http://at.yorku.ca/cgi-bin/bbqa?forum=ask_a_topologist_2008;task=show_msg;msg=1545.0001 I am not sure ... I may think about this later ... My opinion on choice axioms is that there are obviously true, and this despite I am not a set realist. OK, thanks. I am glad, nevertheless that ZF and ZFC have exactly the same arithmetical provability power, so all proof in ZFC of an arithmetical theorem can be done without C, in ZF. This can be seen through the use of Gödel's constructible models. I am sorry, but I have no idea what might an arithmetical provability power refer to. Just give me a hint ... By arithmetical provability power, I mean the set of first order arithmetical sentences provable in the theory, or by a machine. I will say, for example, that the power of Robinson Arithmetic is smaller than the power of Peano Aritmetic, *because* the set of arithmetical theorems of Robinson Ar. is included in the set of theorems of Peano Ar. Let us write this by RA PA. OK? Typically, RA PA ZF = ZFC ZF + k (k = there exists a inaccessible cardinal). The amazing thing is ZF = ZFC (in this sense!). Any proof of a theorem of arithmetic using the axiom of choice, can be done without it. I use set theory informally at the metalevel, and I will not address such questions. As I said, I use Cantor theorem for minimal purpose, and as a simple example of diagonalization. OK. Fair enough. I am far more puzzled by indeterminacy axioms, and even a bit frightened by infinite game theory I have no intuitive clues in such fields. Do you have some links please? Just to check it and write down few new key words. This is not too bad, imo, (I should have use determinacy, it is a better key word): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinacy Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 2 Sep, 16:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different at some lower level can be said to implement the same computation at a higher level. I see nothing incoherent is saying that two physically different computers perform the same computation. So if mental states are certain kinds of computations (either physically realized or in Platonia) they can be realized on different, i.e. non-invariant physical processes. What's incoherent about that? I wonder what you mean by either physically realized or in Platonia? ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is indeed nothing problematic in saying that two physically different computers perform the same computation. We can understand what is meant without ambiguity; 'different' is indeed different, and any identity is thus non-physical (i.e. relational). But 'realisation' of such relational identity in Platonia in the form of an invariant experiential state is surely something else entirely: i.e. if it is a supplementary hypothesis to PM it is dualism. Why would a believer in CTM need to make that additional step? (You seem to be talkign about the abstract computaitonal state having exitence independent from its concrete physcial isntantiations). The point of Bruno's argument is to force a choice between the attachment of experience to physical process or computation; but not both at the same time. I see no problem with mental states attaching to phsycial processes via the computaitons instantiated by them. AFAICS that is still CTM. Since every instance of a computation *is* an instance of a phsycial process as well, there is no either/or. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 2 Sep, 17:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I wonder what you mean by either physically realized or in Platonia? ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is indeed nothing problematic in saying that two physically different computers perform the same computation. We can understand what is meant without ambiguity; 'different' is indeed different, and any identity is thus non-physical (i.e. relational). But 'realisation' of such relational identity in Platonia in the form of an invariant experiential state is surely something else entirely: i.e. if it is a supplementary hypothesis to PM it is dualism. Why would a believer in CTM need to make that additional step? (You seem to be talkign about the abstract computaitonal state having exitence independent from its concrete physcial isntantiations). No, I was querying whether Brent was implying this by his reference to mental states realised in Platonia but nonetheless deemed to supervene on physical process. But without such dual supervention, where does that leave CTM+PM? Either we're appealing to experience=computation=invariant, or we're appealing to experience=physical process=variant. Well, I've asked before, but what does (in) variant mean here? If we seek refuge in both, then in what sense can we maintain an identity? Does invariant=variant? But if what is meant by this is that physical process is only relevant to experience *inasmuch as it functionally instantiates a computation* - i.e. only the non-physical aspects make any difference - then precisely what remains of experience that is physical? The term Bruno sometimes uses for any such sense of 'physical' is 'spurious', and I think that about sums it up. David i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to the question --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I wonder what you mean by either physically realized or in Platonia? ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is indeed nothing problematic in saying that two physically different computers perform the same computation. We can understand what is meant without ambiguity; 'different' is indeed different, and any identity is thus non-physical (i.e. relational). But 'realisation' of such relational identity in Platonia in the form of an invariant experiential state is surely something else entirely: i.e. if it is a supplementary hypothesis to PM it is dualism. Why would a believer in CTM need to make that additional step? (You seem to be talkign about the abstract computaitonal state having exitence independent from its concrete physcial isntantiations). No, I was querying whether Brent was implying this by his reference to mental states realised in Platonia but nonetheless deemed to supervene on physical process. But without such dual supervention, where does that leave CTM+PM? Either we're appealing to experience=computation=invariant, or we're appealing to experience=physical process=variant. If we seek refuge in both, then in what sense can we maintain an identity? Does invariant=variant? But if what is meant by this is that physical process is only relevant to experience *inasmuch as it functionally instantiates a computation* - i.e. only the non-physical aspects make any difference - then precisely what remains of experience that is physical? The term Bruno sometimes uses for any such sense of 'physical' is 'spurious', and I think that about sums it up. David On 2 Sep, 16:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different at some lower level can be said to implement the same computation at a higher level. I see nothing incoherent is saying that two physically different computers perform the same computation. So if mental states are certain kinds of computations (either physically realized or in Platonia) they can be realized on different, i.e. non-invariant physical processes. What's incoherent about that? I wonder what you mean by either physically realized or in Platonia? ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is indeed nothing problematic in saying that two physically different computers perform the same computation. We can understand what is meant without ambiguity; 'different' is indeed different, and any identity is thus non-physical (i.e. relational). But 'realisation' of such relational identity in Platonia in the form of an invariant experiential state is surely something else entirely: i.e. if it is a supplementary hypothesis to PM it is dualism. Why would a believer in CTM need to make that additional step? (You seem to be talkign about the abstract computaitonal state having exitence independent from its concrete physcial isntantiations). The point of Bruno's argument is to force a choice between the attachment of experience to physical process or computation; but not both at the same time. I see no problem with mental states attaching to phsycial processes via the computaitons instantiated by them. AFAICS that is still CTM. Since every instance of a computation *is* an instance of a phsycial process as well, there is no either/or. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 2 Sep, 18:03, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Flammarion wrote: On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: I think his exploration of the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves is pretty much on the money. So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I have read some of his articles and seen him debate and give interviews. So that sounds like Dennett alright - rearranging deck chairs, redefining words, whatever it takes. From the wikipedia article on Freedom Evolves: In his treatment of both free will and altruism, he starts by showing why we should not accept the traditional definitions of either term. So, as I said, you can't read quote of Dennett and accept it at face value, because Dennett doesn't restrict himself to traditional definitions of terms. You have to interpret Dennett's quotes within the context of his web of alternate, non-traditional compatibilist word definitions. Dennett's main goal is not to show that determinism is compatible with free will (which it isn't), actually it is, although I don't find it very convincing I think Dennett's point is that compatibilist free-will has all the chracteristics of free-will that people usually think are important - it's all the free-will worth having. I'm not convinced by that either --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
Yablo and Gallois's paper Is ontology based on a mistake is quite relevant to the question of Platonism, specificall whether true matehmatical assertions of existence have to be taken literally. http://tinyurl.com/ldekg7 What is it? A paper criticising the Quinean view of ontology. Yablo does so by introduces a metaphorical/literal distinction as to when it is reasonable to posit the existence of entities. Thus in order to determine our ontological commitments we need to be able to extract all cases in which such entities are posited in a metaphorical way rather than a literal one. If there is no way to do this, then it is not possible to develop a Quinean ontology. Where does it fit in for me? For the thesis: if correct, it implies that Quine's fundamental approach to ontology is flawed and this may have negative implications for the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. For the metaphysics paper: possibly details a way in which existence cannot be held to occur (which would be interesting to look at in terms of the relations proposed). At the very least it gives an example of particular existence claims which can then be analysed in a relational way. Reference Yablo, S., Does ontology rest on a mistake?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. LXXII (1998), 229-261. The Argument Carnap on existence Carnap argued that the realist existence question/assertion was meaningless. He did this by means of his concept of linguistic framework. A linguistic framework lays down rules for the use and meaning of some object term X in a linguistic sense. Thus there are two ways in which one can question/assert the existence of X: internal or external to the linguistic framework. If one questions the existence of X internal to the framework, one is almost certainly guaranteed a yes answer (thus the statement there is an X can pretty much be viewed as tautological when assessed internally to a framework involving X). Hence the realist must be making an external existence assertion. However, in this case the term X has no meaning, as the framework within which it gains such is not present. Thus the realist existence question/assertion is either tautological or impossible to answer/assess. Quine on Carnap Quine objected to Carnap's position in three ways: firstly, he held that his internal/external distinction was reliant on an analytic/ synthetic distinction (because the concept of a linguistic framework involves the rules inherent in that framework being viewed as indefeasible (i.e. analytic) within that particular linguistic practice). As Quine believed that the analytic/synthetic distinction could not be made, he held that Carnap's internal/external distinction breaks down: internal assessments are thus not just a matter of following inviolable linguistic rules, it is indeed possible for these rules to change in response to experience and thus for internal practice to change too. Secondly, Quine argues that the external choice between linguistic frameworks is much more influenced by observation than Carnap would have us believe. For Quine, the decision to adopt a rule governing the appropriate observational conditions under which one may assert the existence of X is itself in part an assertion that X exists (if such conditions obtain). He does not believe in making a distinction between the linguistic truth and the factual truth of a statement. Finally, Quine objects to the claim that the choice of linguistic framework existence rule is based on merely practical considerations to do with efficiency, simplicity, etc with no metaphysical implications. He does so on the basis that these are exactly the sorts of things that scientists use to favour one theory (and hence in Quine's opinion, a view of the world, complete with ontology) over another. Yablo on Quine Yablo argues that each aspect of Quine's critique is flawed. Firstly, one does not need to hold that rules making up a linguistic framework are analytic in order to be able to understand the need for a framework in order to understand the meaning of terms. Not really sure how this fits in and is related to Quine's second objection stage: One does not need to render external talk of the objects within a particular framework meaningless in order to save the internal, rule- bound meaning. One can just make clear how such external statements cannot be applied internally.;finally, Yablo points out that Quine himself accepts the fact that a statement can be asserted purely for practical advantage without the asserter actually holding that what it entails metaphysically is actually the case. Saving the Framework Yablo goes on to propose a linguistic framework modified in light of Quine's criticisms in which a framework is adopted as a kind of game where the players assess the truth and falsity of statements within the framework
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to the question Well, a computation is a type, and is thus not any particular physical object. A specific physical implementation is a token of that computational type, and is indeed a physical object, albeit one whose physical details can be of any variety so long as they continue to instantiate the relevant computational invariance. Hence it is hard to see how a specific (invariant) example of an experiential state could be justified as being token-identical with all the different physical implementations of a computation. It might appear that a defence against the foregoing is to say that only the appropriate functionally-distinguished subsets of the entire implementing substrate need be deemed tokens of the relevant computational type, and that actual occasions of experience can be considered to be token-identical with these subsets. But even on this basis it still doesn't seem possible to establish any consistent identity between the physical variety of the tokens thus distinguished and a putatively unique experiential state. On the contrary, any unbiased a priori prediction would be of experiential variance on the basis of physical variance. Hence continuing to insist on physically-based token-identity seems entirely ad hoc. The unique challenge facing us, on the assumption of primitive materiality, is the personally manifest existence of an experiential state associated with a physical system. The first person gives us a unique insight in this instance which is unavailable for other type-token analyses. Ordinarily, picking out functional invariance in physical systems is unproblematic, because the invariance is one of type, not of token. The token may vary but the type-token association is unharmed. But, uniquely, this doesn't hold for a theory of mind based on primitive materiality, because now we have a unique token-identity - mind-body - and thus it is inconsistent to expect to substitute an entirely different type of body and expect no substantive change on the other side of the identical doublet. The resort of desperation is of course to disregard this unique distinction, or worse to relegate experience to mere typehood; but in that case we eliminate it from concrete existence. David No, I was querying whether Brent was implying this by his reference to mental states realised in Platonia but nonetheless deemed to supervene on physical process. But without such dual supervention, where does that leave CTM+PM? Either we're appealing to experience=computation=invariant, or we're appealing to experience=physical process=variant. Well, I've asked before, but what does (in) variant mean here? David On 2 Sep, 17:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I wonder what you mean by either physically realized or in Platonia? ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is indeed nothing problematic in saying that two physically different computers perform the same computation. We can understand what is meant without ambiguity; 'different' is indeed different, and any identity is thus non-physical (i.e. relational). But 'realisation' of such relational identity in Platonia in the form of an invariant experiential state is surely something else entirely: i.e. if it is a supplementary hypothesis to PM it is dualism. Why would a believer in CTM need to make that additional step? (You seem to be talkign about the abstract computaitonal state having exitence independent from its concrete physcial isntantiations). No, I was querying whether Brent was implying this by his reference to mental states realised in Platonia but nonetheless deemed to supervene on physical process. But without such dual supervention, where does that leave CTM+PM? Either we're appealing to experience=computation=invariant, or we're appealing to experience=physical process=variant. Well, I've asked before, but what does (in) variant mean here? If we seek refuge in both, then in what sense can we maintain an identity? Does invariant=variant? But if what is meant by this is that physical process is only relevant to experience *inasmuch as it functionally instantiates a computation* - i.e. only the non-physical aspects make any difference - then precisely what remains of experience that is physical? The term Bruno sometimes uses for any such sense of 'physical' is 'spurious', and I think that about sums it up. David i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to the question --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Dreaming On
On 2 Sep, 21:20, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to the question Well, a computation is a type, A type of computation is a type. A token of a type of computation is a token. and is thus not any particular physical object. A specific physical implementation is a token of that computational type, and is indeed a physical object, albeit one whose physical details can be of any variety so long as they continue to instantiate the relevant computational invariance. Hence it is hard to see how a specific (invariant) example of an experiential state could be justified as being token-identical with all the different physical implementations of a computation. I was right. A mental type can be associated with a computational type. Any token of a mental type can be associated with a token of the corresponding computational type. The difficulty comes from mixing types and tokens. It might appear that a defence against the foregoing is to say that only the appropriate functionally-distinguished subsets of the entire implementing substrate need be deemed tokens of the relevant computational type, and that actual occasions of experience can be considered to be token-identical with these subsets. But even on this basis it still doesn't seem possible to establish any consistent identity between the physical variety of the tokens thus distinguished and a putatively unique experiential state. The variety of the physical implementations is reduced by grouping them as equivalent computational types. Computation is abstract. Abstraction is ignoring irrelevant details. Ignoring irrelevant details establishes a many-to-one relationship : many possible implementations of one mental state. On the contrary, any unbiased a priori prediction would be of experiential variance on the basis of physical variance. Yes. The substance of the CTM claim is that physical differences do not make a mental difference unless they make a computational difference. That is to say, switching from one token of a type of computation to another cannot make a difference in mentation. That is not to be expected on an unbiased basis, just because it is a substantive claim. Hence continuing to insist on physically-based token-identity seems entirely ad hoc. Identity of what with what? The unique challenge facing us, on the assumption of primitive materiality, is the personally manifest existence of an experiential state associated with a physical system. The first person gives us a unique insight in this instance which is unavailable for other type-token analyses. Ordinarily, picking out functional invariance in physical systems is unproblematic, because the invariance is one of type, not of token. Uhhhexactly how does the first person insight break the invariance-of-type-with-variance-of-token thing? The token may vary but the type-token association is unharmed. So long as it is a token of the same type, yes. But, uniquely, this doesn't hold for a theory of mind based on primitive materiality, because now we have a unique token-identity - mind-body - and thus it is inconsistent to expect to substitute an entirely different type of body and expect no substantive change on the other side of the identical doublet. Why? I see nothing there except blunt dogmatic insistence. In general, randomly selecting another body will lead to another mind. But that is not different from saying that randomly selecting differently configured hardware will lead to a different computation. The point of CTM is that making a non-random substitution -- that is, picking another token of the same type of computation -- will also automatically amount to picking another token of the same type of mentation. I have no idea why you think introducing a first person would make a difference. The resort of desperation is of course to disregard this unique distinction, or worse to relegate experience to mere typehood; but in that case we eliminate it from concrete existence. David No, I was querying whether Brent was implying this by his reference to mental states realised in Platonia but nonetheless deemed to supervene on physical process. But without such dual supervention, where does that leave CTM+PM? Either we're appealing to experience=computation=invariant, or we're appealing to experience=physical process=variant. Well, I've asked before, but what does (in) variant mean here? And i still haven't found out. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: and is thus not any particular physical object. A specific physical implementation is a token of that computational type, and is indeed a physical object, albeit one whose physical details can be of any variety so long as they continue to instantiate the relevant computational invariance. Hence it is hard to see how a specific (invariant) example of an experiential state could be justified as being token-identical with all the different physical implementations of a computation. I was right. A mental type can be associated with a computational type. Any token of a mental type can be associated with a token of the corresponding computational type. But what difference is that supposed to make? The type association is implicit in what I was saying. All you've said above is that it makes no difference whether one talks in terms of the mental type or the associated computational type because their equivalence is a posit of CTM. And whether it is plausible that the physical tokens so picked out possess the causal efficacy presupposed by CTM is precisely what I was questioning. But even on this basis it still doesn't seem possible to establish any consistent identity between the physical variety of the tokens thus distinguished and a putatively unique experiential state. The variety of the physical implementations is reduced by grouping them as equivalent computational types. Computation is abstract. Abstraction is ignoring irrelevant details. Ignoring irrelevant details establishes a many-to-one relationship : many possible implementations of one mental state. Again, that's not an argument - you're just reciting the *assumptions* of CTM, not arguing for their plausibility. The justification of the supposed irrelevance of particular physical details is that they are required to be ignored for the supposed efficacy of the type-token relation to be plausible. That doesn't make it so. On the contrary, any unbiased a priori prediction would be of experiential variance on the basis of physical variance. Yes. The substance of the CTM claim is that physical differences do not make a mental difference unless they make a computational difference. That is to say, switching from one token of a type of computation to another cannot make a difference in mentation. That is not to be expected on an unbiased basis, just because it is a substantive claim. Yes it's precisely the claim whose plausibility I've been questioning. The variety of the physical implementations is reduced by grouping them as equivalent computational types. Computation is abstract. Abstraction is ignoring irrelevant details. Ignoring irrelevant details establishes a many-to-one relationship : many possible implementations of one mental state. Yes thanks, this is indeed the hypothesis. But simply recapitulating the assumptions isn't exactly an uncommitted assessment of their plausibility is it? That can only immunise it from criticism. There is no whiff in CTM of why it should be considered plausible on physical grounds alone. Hence counter arguments can legitimately question the consistency of its claims as a physical theory in the absence of its type-token presuppositions. Look, let me turn this round. You've said before that you're not a diehard partisan of CTM. What in your view would be persuasive grounds for doubting it? David On 2 Sep, 21:20, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to the question Well, a computation is a type, A type of computation is a type. A token of a type of computation is a token. and is thus not any particular physical object. A specific physical implementation is a token of that computational type, and is indeed a physical object, albeit one whose physical details can be of any variety so long as they continue to instantiate the relevant computational invariance. Hence it is hard to see how a specific (invariant) example of an experiential state could be justified as being token-identical with all the different physical implementations of a computation. I was right. A mental type can be associated with a computational type. Any token of a mental type can be associated with a token of the corresponding computational type. The difficulty comes from mixing types and tokens. It might appear that a defence against the foregoing is to say that only the appropriate functionally-distinguished subsets of the entire implementing substrate need be deemed tokens of the relevant computational type, and that actual occasions of experience can be considered to be token-identical with these subsets. But even on this basis it still doesn't seem possible to establish any consistent identity between the physical variety of the tokens thus distinguished and a putatively
