Re: R/ASSA query
On 28 February 2010 17:38, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: People believe and do all sorts of crazy things, as I'm sure you know. The psychological capacity for just about any possible behaviour is there, but the very maladaptive behaviours are rare. It's not that it's difficult to make an animal that does not feel hungry, it's just that these animals don't pass on their genes. Is that not a causal mechanism for evolution? Isn't there already a complete causal account at the level of quarks and electrons and the fundamental forces that govern their interactions, stretching back to the first instant of the universe, for the existence and demise of any specific animal that doesn't feel hunger? If this physics-based account is complete, then what does this extra causal mechanism of evolution that you are proposing actually do? Either evolution really does something - or it's just an imaginary device that we've made up...a descriptive metaphorical narrative that is broadly compatible with a Victorian conception of how the world is, but which in itself doesn't actually explain anything. I can say (a) I ate the sandwich because I was hungry; or (b) I ate the sandwich because signals from my hypothalamus acted on my motor cortex which then caused the muscles in my arms and jaws to contract in a certain coordinated way; or (c) I ate the sandwich because of the initial state of the universe plus the laws of physics. All these are valid explanations for why I ate the sandwich. The first two are explanations at a higher level of description than the last. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Definition of universe
On 27 Feb 2010, at 18:38, David Nyman wrote: On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is that they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind- body or consciousness/reality problem. Bruno, I'm just trying to catch up with some older posts whilst continuing to think about your most recent comments, and I'd like to enquire why you say above and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum Mechanics either. UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has to emerge from a relative state measure on all computational histories. The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of the abandon of the identity thesis. You can still locally ascribe a mind to an apparent body, but you cannot ascribe a body to a mind. You can only ascribe an infinity of body, corresponding to the possible computations of your parts below your level of substitution. By the invariance delay of the first person experiences, in UD-time/step, the average first person body is a function depending on all possible universal machine/numbers. Negative interference, and indeed a quantum computer, should appear from the statistic or measure logic, with observability described by Bp Dt, for probability or credibility one (true in all accessible worlds + there is a world, p Sigma_1). It corresponds plausibly to Plotinus bastard calculus, an expression borrow to Plato, and used in their matter theory. Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue his task and derive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from the collection of all computations (by UDA). I think I've asked before about the distinction between can be computed and is (in fact) being computed. A can be computed if there is a UD-time-step t such that A is being computed. is being computed is an arithetical proposition which is recursive (computable), Sigma_0. can be computed is recursively enumerable (semi-computable), Sigma_1. It's only in the latter case, AFAICS, that your comment would apply (i.e. if we assume that we're participants in an Everett multiverse that is in fact a computational artefact, as per the comp hypothesis). It is just that with comp, we inherite (all lobian machines inherit) a multiverse. To derive the Schroedinger (Dirac DeWitt-Wheeler etc.) equation of physics consists in showing that the sharable physical part of the lobian machines (the 3th, 4th, 5th hypostases, with p Sigma_1) is the same as the one described by the physicists. But if - as physicalists would - we take the view that what exists is primitively-physical, as opposed to computationally-generated, Careful, the primitively physical apparent in comp is NOT (never) computed nor computable. It is really the 1-p-p view. In particular it is 1-p, and 1-p is unaware of the arithmetical delay of the UD. In a sense all UD* is processed in 0 seconds, at each of its observer moments. A priori, the results of any observation for any observer moment depends on a statistic involving all universal machines and all their computations (emulated infinitely often by the UD). The mystery here is that the laws of physics seems (empirically) to be computable. No White Rabbits! But the difference of points of view (the hypostases) suggests clearly the mathematical reason why the non computable take refuge below our substitution level, giving rise to locally sharable universal structures (sharable by population of universal machines). I'm no longer sure of your reason for saying thus. It seems to me that the UD Argument explains why computationalism makes the notion 'primitively physical' meaningless, or without any explanation power for the appearance of the primitively physical. On the contrary, the appearance of the 'primitively physical' are 'completely' (= completely except for a justified gap), explained in a theory of belief (knowledge, observable, sensible, etc.) by universal machines. UDA is a reduction of the mind body problem to the body problem. Mind is whatever universal machine can experience. And eventually matter is what mind cannot determinate (in arithmetic). Is it related to what I've been saying about the non-computability of the mind from the starting-point of purely 3-p processes (thus EQM): i.e. that mind - 1- p qualitative experience - is simply inaccessible from a primitively- physical 3-p pov? I am not sure. The 1-p are inaccessible by any computation, and are even not definable in the language of a Löbian machine on which it applies. The 1-p are accessible, and even 'defined' on infinite sets in some sense. If you want a primitively
Re: R/ASSA query
On 28 Feb 2010, at 07:33, Rex Allen wrote: What would the causal mechanism for natural selection be? A selection field? Selection particles? Spooky selection at a distance??? No, it is (mainly) Sex. Selection by individual seduction. On some level. Chatting universal chromosomes. On some other level. The quantum wave or matrix. On some yet different level. Consciousness selection on universal machine histories. On a yet deeper level. (Frankly, you should appreciate!) Elementary arithmetic. At the deepest level with the comp. hyp.). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Definition of universe
On 28 February 2010 15:45, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has to emerge from a relative state measure on all computational histories. The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of the abandon of the identity thesis. Bruno, I'm sorry but I think I failed to make clear what I was actually asking you. I assumed, when you made you comment about Everett Quantum Mechanics, that you didn't simply mean EQM in the context of *already assuming* the computationalist hypothesis to be true, but even in the contrary case of assuming some notion of the primitively physical to be the case. When you mention UDA as you do above, I can only assume that you intend the reader to understand your comment in the context of the comp hypothesis. Of course, I understand that in this case, EQM and physics in general would be derived from comp, and not vice versa, and hence your comment about EQM would necessarily follow. But my question was whether you were intending to say something stronger - i.e. that EQM, or the SWE itself under any interpretation, reveal the implausibility of the mind/body (or minds-bodies) identity thesis, as when you say: Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue his task and derive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from the collection of all computations (by UDA). What do you mean by Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening)? Do you mean that he was explicitly assuming the comp hypothesis, or that his approach implicitly presupposes it? I'm confused. David On 27 Feb 2010, at 18:38, David Nyman wrote: On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is that they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind-body or consciousness/reality problem. Bruno, I'm just trying to catch up with some older posts whilst continuing to think about your most recent comments, and I'd like to enquire why you say above and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum Mechanics either. UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has to emerge from a relative state measure on all computational histories. The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of the abandon of the identity thesis. You can still locally ascribe a mind to an apparent body, but you cannot ascribe a body to a mind. You can only ascribe an infinity of body, corresponding to the possible computations of your parts below your level of substitution. By the invariance delay of the first person experiences, in UD-time/step, the average first person body is a function depending on all possible universal machine/numbers. Negative interference, and indeed a quantum computer, should appear from the statistic or measure logic, with observability described by Bp Dt, for probability or credibility one (true in all accessible worlds + there is a world, p Sigma_1). It corresponds plausibly to Plotinus bastard calculus, an expression borrow to Plato, and used in their matter theory. Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue his task and derive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from the collection of all computations (by UDA). I think I've asked before about the distinction between can be computed and is (in fact) being computed. A can be computed if there is a UD-time-step t such that A is being computed. is being computed is an arithetical proposition which is recursive (computable), Sigma_0. can be computed is recursively enumerable (semi-computable), Sigma_1. It's only in the latter case, AFAICS, that your comment would apply (i.e. if we assume that we're participants in an Everett multiverse that is in fact a computational artefact, as per the comp hypothesis). It is just that with comp, we inherite (all lobian machines inherit) a multiverse. To derive the Schroedinger (Dirac DeWitt-Wheeler etc.) equation of physics consists in showing that the sharable physical part of the lobian machines (the 3th, 4th, 5th hypostases, with p Sigma_1) is the same as the one described by the physicists. But if - as physicalists would - we take the view that what exists is primitively-physical, as opposed to computationally-generated, Careful, the primitively physical apparent in comp is NOT (never) computed nor computable. It is really the 1-p-p view. In particular it is 1-p, and 1-p is unaware of the arithmetical delay of the UD. In a sense all UD* is processed in 0 seconds, at each of its observer moments. A priori, the results of any observation for any observer moment depends on a statistic involving all universal machines and all their computations (emulated
Re: R/ASSA query
On 2/27/2010 10:33 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 4:27 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: Note that I am not arguing that this particular belief is an impossible belief. What I'm arguing is that evolution doesn't help you one way or the other in deciding...because evolution is just a mental tool, a way of thinking by analogy. Lacking any sort of causal mechanism, it doesn't explain the way things are. It's just a story that helps us think about the way things are. Right? Why do you say evolution lacks a causal mechanism? Natural selection causes somethings not to occur - like animals that eat their children. What would the causal mechanism for natural selection be? A selection field? Selection particles? Spooky selection at a distance??? Even if you could find some way to frame it in terms of one of those, would you then say that the selection field was something that actually existed, or would you believe it more likely to just be a calculational device? Though, some animals do eat their children under some circumstances. Why? Well, according to physicialism, because of the initial conditions of the universe plus the causal laws that govern it's state changes over time. Evolution would seem to be more of a metaphorical framework for thinking about possibilities, rather than an actual scientific explanation for anything. I think you have to narrow a concept of explanation; you seem to confine it to causal physical chain at the most fundamental level. If someone asked you whether you expected a newly discovered animal species to be one that ate it's offspring, would you try to find the initial conditions of the quark fields at that the time of the Big Bang that led to this creature - or would you make an inference from the theory of evolution? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: R/ASSA query
On 2/27/2010 10:38 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 10:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 February 2010 05:33, Rex Allenrexallen...@gmail.com wrote: I'm not sure what you're saying here. Is it that peoples' beliefs could not be other than what they actually are given initial conditions and physical laws? I suppose that is true, but even in a deterministic single universe we generally use the term physically possible to mean that something could have been the case if initial conditions had been different, while in a multiverse physically possible means that it occurs in at least one universe. In either of these two senses, it is physically possible that a person believes that he lives for only a day. How do you know? Perhaps the physical brain state that this belief WOULD supervene on is not actually possible in our universe due to the fact that assuming that state would violate the Pauli exclusion principle? Or perhaps it wouldn't violate the violate any physical law, BUT all paths by which you could reach that state WOULD violate some physical law. So the only universe that could contain a person holding that belief would have to have this person appear as part of the initial conditions of that universe. Note that I am not arguing that this particular belief is an impossible belief. What I'm arguing is that evolution doesn't help you one way or the other in deciding...because evolution is just a mental tool, a way of thinking by analogy. Lacking any sort of causal mechanism, it doesn't explain the way things are. It's just a story that helps us think about the way things are. Right? People believe and do all sorts of crazy things, as I'm sure you know. The psychological capacity for just about any possible behaviour is there, but the very maladaptive behaviours are rare. It's not that it's difficult to make an animal that does not feel hungry, it's just that these animals don't pass on their genes. Is that not a causal mechanism for evolution? Isn't there already a complete causal account at the level of quarks and electrons and the fundamental forces that govern their interactions, stretching back to the first instant of the universe, for the existence and demise of any specific animal that doesn't feel hunger? No. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: R/ASSA query
Okay, I think maybe we're getting somewhere! On Sun, Feb 28, 2010 at 3:37 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 February 2010 17:38, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: People believe and do all sorts of crazy things, as I'm sure you know. The psychological capacity for just about any possible behaviour is there, but the very maladaptive behaviours are rare. It's not that it's difficult to make an animal that does not feel hungry, it's just that these animals don't pass on their genes. Is that not a causal mechanism for evolution? Isn't there already a complete causal account at the level of quarks and electrons and the fundamental forces that govern their interactions, stretching back to the first instant of the universe, for the existence and demise of any specific animal that doesn't feel hunger? If this physics-based account is complete, then what does this extra causal mechanism of evolution that you are proposing actually do? Either evolution really does something - or it's just an imaginary device that we've made up...a descriptive metaphorical narrative that is broadly compatible with a Victorian conception of how the world is, but which in itself doesn't actually explain anything. I can say (a) I ate the sandwich because I was hungry; or (b) I ate the sandwich because signals from my hypothalamus acted on my motor cortex which then caused the muscles in my arms and jaws to contract in a certain coordinated way; or (c) I ate the sandwich because of the initial state of the universe plus the laws of physics. All these are valid explanations for why I ate the sandwich. The first two are explanations at a higher level of description than the last. Well, your words mean whatever you want them to mean. So if you intend for your statements about hunger and eating sandwiches to exactly reduce to more detailed explanations involving initial states and fundamental laws, then good enough! But this would seem to support my assertion that evolution doesn't explain anything. Higher level descriptions don't add information - in fact they leave out details, sacrificing definitiveness for increased comprehensibility via the use of abstraction and analogy. SO, what got this particular subthread going was this: On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 10:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: There is no real distinction between the different possibilities you mention, but evolution has programmed me to think that I am a single individual travelling in the forward direction through time. So you proposed evolution as the reason that you think of yourself as a single individual who persists through time. But taking the equivalent of option (c) from your example above, what you are *actually* saying is: The initial state of the universe plus the causal laws of physics have programmed me to think that I am a single individual travelling in the forward direction through time. Correct? If so, I agree with you that this translation is the equivalent of your original statement - but it doesn't sound quite as good, does it? It sounds less like an explanation and more like the statement of a brute fact. But it's just a matter of wording, not because of a change in content. To make it even more clear: I think of myself as a single individual travelling forward in time because that's the way things are. To say that you could have been otherwise is to say that the initial conditions of the universe and/or the laws of physics and/or random quantum events along the way could have been otherwise. But if they *could* have been otherwise, why weren't they? Ultimately I think you have to say that there is no reason that you think of yourself as a single individual travelling forward in time. You (or rather your OMs!) just do. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: R/ASSA query
On Sun, Feb 28, 2010 at 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Feb 2010, at 07:33, Rex Allen wrote: What would the causal mechanism for natural selection be? A selection field? Selection particles? Spooky selection at a distance??? No, it is (mainly) Sex. Selection by individual seduction. On some level. Chatting universal chromosomes. On some other level. The quantum wave or matrix. On some yet different level. Consciousness selection on universal machine histories. On a yet deeper level. (Frankly, you should appreciate!) Elementary arithmetic. At the deepest level with the comp. hyp.). But if causal laws are real then I would think that they could only really operate at one level. At most (!) one of those levels is what really exists - the other levels are just ways that we think about what really exists or ways that things *seem* to us. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: R/ASSA query
On Sun, Feb 28, 2010 at 2:15 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: I think you have to narrow a concept of explanation; you seem to confine it to causal physical chain at the most fundamental level. If someone asked you whether you expected a newly discovered animal species to be one that ate it's offspring, would you try to find the initial conditions of the quark fields at that the time of the Big Bang that led to this creature - or would you make an inference from the theory of evolution? I'd think about the question in the context of the theory of evolution, but any answers that I formulated on that basis would be very tentative. Evolutionary theory doesn't provide for unambiguous predictions, or even retrodictions (why do lions have manes?), since it has no causal mechanism. Again, it's more of a metaphorical framework for thinking about possibilities. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
