On 27 Feb 2010, at 18:38, David Nyman wrote:

On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity
thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the
computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett
Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is that
they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind- body
or consciousness/reality problem.

Bruno, I'm just trying to catch up with some older posts whilst
continuing to think about your most recent comments, and I'd like to
enquire why you say above "and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum
Mechanics either".

UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has to emerge from a relative state measure on all computational histories. The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of the abandon of the identity thesis. You can still locally ascribe a "mind" to an apparent "body", but you cannot ascribe a body to a mind. You can only ascribe an infinity of "body", corresponding to the possible computations of your parts below your level of substitution. By the "invariance" delay of the first person experiences, in UD-time/step, the "average" first person "body" is a function depending on all possible universal machine/numbers. Negative interference, and indeed a quantum computer, should appear from the statistic or "measure" logic, with observability described by Bp & Dt, for probability or credibility one (true in all accessible worlds + there is a world, p Sigma_1). It corresponds plausibly to Plotinus "bastard calculus", an expression borrow to Plato, and used in their "matter" theory.

Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue his task and derive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from the collection of all computations (by UDA).



 I think I've asked before about the distinction
between "can be computed" and "is (in fact) being computed".

A can be computed if there is a UD-time-step t such that A is being computed.

"is being computed" is an arithetical proposition which is recursive (computable), Sigma_0.

"can be computed" is recursively enumerable (semi-computable), Sigma_1.



 It's
only in the latter case, AFAICS, that your comment would apply (i.e.
if we assume that we're participants in an Everett multiverse that is
in fact a computational artefact, as per the comp hypothesis).

It is just that with comp, we inherite (all lobian machines inherit) a "multiverse". To derive the Schroedinger (Dirac DeWitt-Wheeler etc.) equation of physics consists in showing that the sharable physical part of the lobian machines (the 3th, 4th, 5th hypostases, with p Sigma_1) is the same as the one described by the physicists.




But if
- as physicalists would - we take the view that what exists is
"primitively-physical", as opposed to computationally-generated,

Careful, "the primitively physical" apparent in comp is NOT (never) computed nor computable. It is really the 1-p-p view. In particular it is 1-p, and 1-p is unaware of the arithmetical delay of the UD. In a sense all UD* is processed in 0 seconds, at each of its "observer moments". A priori, the results of any observation for any observer moment depends on a statistic involving all universal machines and all their computations (emulated infinitely often by the UD). The mystery here is that the laws of physics seems (empirically) to be computable. No White Rabbits! But the difference of points of view (the hypostases) suggests clearly the mathematical reason why the non computable take refuge below our substitution level, giving rise to locally sharable universal structures (sharable by population of universal machines).


I'm
no longer sure of your reason for saying "thus".

It seems to me that the UD Argument explains why computationalism makes the notion 'primitively physical' meaningless, or without any explanation power for the "appearance of the primitively physical". On the contrary, the appearance of the 'primitively physical' are 'completely' (= completely except for a justified gap), explained in a theory of belief (knowledge, observable, sensible, etc.) by universal machines.

UDA is a reduction of the mind body problem to the body problem. Mind is whatever universal machine can experience. And eventually matter is what mind cannot determinate (in arithmetic).




Is it related to
what I've been saying about the non-computability of the mind from the
starting-point of purely 3-p processes (thus EQM): i.e. that mind - 1-
p qualitative experience - is simply inaccessible from a primitively-
physical 3-p pov?

I am not sure. The 1-p are inaccessible by any computation, and are even not definable in the language of a Löbian machine on which it applies. The 1-p are accessible, and even 'defined' on infinite sets "in some sense".

If you want a "primitively physical universe" to play any role with consciousness, not only should it be non Turing emulable, but it has also to be different from the 1-(infinite) result of the interference of all universal machines.

If tomorrow it happens that comp implies the probability is the power four of the amplitude, then the quantum empirical evidence for "power two", would be empirical evidence that comp is false, and that, may be, matter exists in some primitive sense. That would be the first serious evidences for it, beyond our animal instinct.

Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible, and we can test them. It is all what I say.

Well I add also that Mechanism leads to a cute Plotinian theology, when Materialism leads to the Aristotle theology which, I think, has a tendency to eliminate the persons.

Bruno



Actually we have already discussed this a lot, and the work I explain
here (uda, auda)  can be considered as an answer to Tegmark (or
Schmidhuber), except that it has been published many years before, and relies on "philosophy of mind/computer science" or machine's "theology".

The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity
thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the
computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett
Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is that
they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind- body
or consciousness/reality problem.

This is relevant for the (very hard) question "what is a (physical)
universe?". This is a notion more or less taken for granted by the
physicalists, but which can no more taken as such by the
computationalist cognitive scientist. Indeed machine dreams becomes
prevalent, and the question of "universe" becomes equivalent with the
question of how does the dreams glue together. It is the problem of
passing from first person to first person plural, and this needs a
notion of entanglement of computation.

If you define a universe by the coherent structure corresponding to
all what is observable, the question becomes: is there a unique
coherent structure accounting for all observations?  What is its
internal and external logic?

Today, if we accept (Everett) QM, we may say that such a coherent
structure exists, has Boolean (classical) logic as external logic, and some quantum logic as internal logic. Indeed, it is the major interest
of Everett QM that it reintroduces booleanity at the basic third
person description level. Such a logical completion of the quantum
observation leads to the multiverse, and it can be seen a unique
coherent (super) universe (nut multi-cosmos, multi-histories).

But Everett uses comp, and comp per se leads to an explosion of
realties (first person and first person plural), and it is just an
open problem to really count the number of complete boolean structures
capable of attributing values to anything observable.

This should be clear for the reader of the UD argument. I mean those
few who get the whole thing clearly in their mind (I am aware of some
subtleties not yet well understood: like what is a (mathematical)
computation.

  The fact that we have empirical data giving evidences that we share
the quantum indeterminacy suggests that we all share some computation:
this really means that we (human population) are multiplied by the
indeterminacy below our level of substitution. Such happenings makes
difficult to even define precisely what is a universe, and if that
"really" exists beyond its local appearances. This why I prefer to use
the expression many-dreams or many--histories instead of many worlds
or many-universes.   "Universe" becomes defined by the complete
boolean extension of sharable dreams/histories (computations as seen
from a first person perspective).

All this looks probably like utter nonsense for those who miss the
seven first steps of the universal dovetailer argument.

Bruno

On 07 Feb 2010, at 21:07, Brian Tenneson wrote:



Assuming a 4-level hierarchy of "universe" as posited by Tegmark
here...
http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283v1

Then the universe would be an aggregate of all mathematical
structures.

On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 6:07 AM, Mindey <min...@gmail.com> wrote:
Hello,

I was just wondering, we are talking so much about universes, but how
do we define "universe"? Sorry if that question was answered
somewhere, but after a quick search I didn't find it.

Inyuki
http://www.universians.org

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