On 28 February 2010 15:45, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has to emerge from
> a relative state measure on all computational histories.
> The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of the abandon of the
> identity thesis.

Bruno, I'm sorry but I think I failed to make clear what I was
actually asking you.  I assumed, when you made you comment about
Everett Quantum Mechanics, that you didn't simply mean EQM in the
context of *already assuming* the computationalist hypothesis to be
true, but even in the contrary case of assuming some notion of the
"primitively physical" to be the case.  When you mention UDA as you do
above, I can only assume that you intend the reader to understand your
comment in the context of the comp hypothesis.  Of course, I
understand that in this case, EQM and physics in general would be
derived from comp, and not vice versa, and hence your comment about
EQM would necessarily follow.  But my question was whether you were
intending to say something stronger - i.e. that EQM, or the SWE itself
under any interpretation, reveal the implausibility of the mind/body
(or minds-bodies) identity thesis, as when you say:

> Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue his task and
> derive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from the collection of all
> computations (by UDA).

What do you mean by " Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening)"?
Do you mean that he was explicitly assuming the comp hypothesis, or
that his approach implicitly presupposes it?  I'm confused.

David

>
> On 27 Feb 2010, at 18:38, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>> The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity
>>> thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the
>>> computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett
>>> Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is that
>>> they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind-body
>>> or consciousness/reality problem.
>>
>> Bruno, I'm just trying to catch up with some older posts whilst
>> continuing to think about your most recent comments, and I'd like to
>> enquire why you say above "and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum
>> Mechanics either".
>
> UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has to emerge from
> a relative state measure on all computational histories.
> The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of the abandon of the
> identity thesis. You can still locally ascribe a "mind" to an apparent
>  "body", but you cannot ascribe a body to a mind. You can only ascribe an
> infinity of "body", corresponding to the possible computations of your parts
> below your level of substitution. By the "invariance" delay of the first
> person experiences, in UD-time/step, the "average" first person "body" is a
> function depending on all possible universal machine/numbers. Negative
> interference, and indeed a quantum computer, should appear from the
> statistic or "measure" logic, with observability described by Bp & Dt, for
> probability or credibility one (true in all accessible worlds + there is a
> world, p Sigma_1). It corresponds plausibly to Plotinus "bastard calculus",
> an expression borrow to Plato, and used in their "matter" theory.
>
> Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue his task and
> derive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from the collection of all
> computations (by UDA).
>
>
>
>>  I think I've asked before about the distinction
>> between "can be computed" and "is (in fact) being computed".
>
> A can be computed if there is a UD-time-step t such that A is being
> computed.
>
> "is being computed" is an arithetical proposition which is recursive
> (computable), Sigma_0.
>
> "can be computed" is recursively enumerable (semi-computable), Sigma_1.
>
>
>
>>  It's
>> only in the latter case, AFAICS, that your comment would apply (i.e.
>> if we assume that we're participants in an Everett multiverse that is
>> in fact a computational artefact, as per the comp hypothesis).
>
> It is just that with comp, we inherite (all lobian machines inherit) a
> "multiverse". To derive the Schroedinger (Dirac DeWitt-Wheeler etc.)
> equation of physics consists in showing that the sharable physical part of
> the lobian machines (the 3th, 4th, 5th hypostases, with p Sigma_1) is the
> same as the one described by the physicists.
>
>
>
>
>> But if
>> - as physicalists would - we take the view that what exists is
>> "primitively-physical", as opposed to computationally-generated,
>
> Careful, "the primitively physical" apparent in comp is NOT (never) computed
> nor computable. It is really the 1-p-p view. In particular it is 1-p, and
> 1-p is unaware of the arithmetical delay of the UD. In a sense all UD* is
> processed in 0 seconds, at each of its "observer moments". A priori, the
> results of any observation for any observer moment depends on a statistic
> involving all universal machines and all their computations (emulated
> infinitely often by the UD). The mystery here is that the laws of physics
> seems (empirically) to be computable. No White Rabbits! But the difference
> of points of view (the hypostases) suggests clearly the mathematical reason
> why the non computable take refuge below our substitution level, giving rise
> to locally sharable universal structures (sharable by population of
> universal machines).
>
>
>> I'm
>> no longer sure of your reason for saying "thus".
>
> It seems to me that the UD Argument explains why computationalism makes the
> notion 'primitively physical' meaningless, or without any explanation power
> for the "appearance of the primitively physical". On the contrary, the
> appearance of the 'primitively physical' are 'completely' (= completely
> except for a justified gap), explained in a theory of belief (knowledge,
> observable, sensible, etc.) by universal machines.
>
> UDA is a reduction of the mind body problem to the body problem. Mind is
> whatever universal machine can experience. And eventually matter is what
> mind cannot determinate (in arithmetic).
>
>
>
>
>> Is it related to
>> what I've been saying about the non-computability of the mind from the
>> starting-point of purely 3-p processes (thus EQM): i.e. that mind - 1-
>> p qualitative experience - is simply inaccessible from a primitively-
>> physical 3-p pov?
>
> I am not sure. The 1-p are inaccessible by any computation, and are even not
> definable in the language of a Löbian machine on which it applies. The 1-p
> are accessible, and even 'defined' on infinite sets "in some sense".
>
> If you want a "primitively physical universe" to play any role with
> consciousness, not only should it be non Turing emulable, but it has also to
> be different from the 1-(infinite) result of the interference of all
> universal machines.
>
> If tomorrow it happens that comp implies the probability is the power four
> of the amplitude, then the quantum empirical evidence for "power two", would
> be empirical evidence that comp is false, and that, may be, matter exists in
> some primitive sense. That would be the first serious evidences for it,
> beyond our animal instinct.
>
> Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible, and we can test them. It is all
> what I say.
>
> Well I add also that Mechanism leads to a cute Plotinian theology, when
> Materialism leads to the Aristotle theology which, I think,  has a tendency
> to eliminate the persons.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>>> Actually we have already discussed this a lot, and the work I explain
>>> here (uda, auda)  can be considered as an answer to Tegmark (or
>>> Schmidhuber), except that it has been published many years before, and
>>> relies on "philosophy of mind/computer science" or machine's "theology".
>>>
>>> The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity
>>> thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the
>>> computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett
>>> Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is that
>>> they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind-body
>>> or consciousness/reality problem.
>>>
>>> This is relevant for the (very hard) question "what is a (physical)
>>> universe?". This is a notion more or less taken for granted by the
>>> physicalists, but which can no more taken as such by the
>>> computationalist cognitive scientist. Indeed machine dreams becomes
>>> prevalent, and the question of "universe" becomes equivalent with the
>>> question of how does the dreams glue together. It is the problem of
>>> passing from first person to first person plural, and this needs a
>>> notion of entanglement of computation.
>>>
>>> If you define a universe by the coherent structure corresponding to
>>> all what is observable, the question becomes: is there a unique
>>> coherent structure accounting for all observations?  What is its
>>> internal and external logic?
>>>
>>> Today, if we accept (Everett) QM, we may say that such a coherent
>>> structure exists, has Boolean (classical) logic as external logic, and
>>> some quantum logic as internal logic. Indeed, it is the major interest
>>> of Everett QM that it reintroduces booleanity at the basic third
>>> person description level. Such a logical completion of the quantum
>>> observation leads to the multiverse, and it can be seen a unique
>>> coherent (super) universe (nut multi-cosmos, multi-histories).
>>>
>>> But Everett uses comp, and comp per se leads to an explosion of
>>> realties (first person and first person plural), and it is just an
>>> open problem to really count the number of complete boolean structures
>>> capable of attributing values to anything observable.
>>>
>>> This should be clear for the reader of the UD argument. I mean those
>>> few who get the whole thing clearly in their mind (I am aware of some
>>> subtleties not yet well understood: like what is a (mathematical)
>>> computation.
>>>
>>>  The fact that we have empirical data giving evidences that we share
>>> the quantum indeterminacy suggests that we all share some computation:
>>> this really means that we (human population) are multiplied by the
>>> indeterminacy below our level of substitution. Such happenings makes
>>> difficult to even define precisely what is a universe, and if that
>>> "really" exists beyond its local appearances. This why I prefer to use
>>> the expression many-dreams or many--histories instead of many worlds
>>> or many-universes.   "Universe" becomes defined by the complete
>>> boolean extension of sharable dreams/histories (computations as seen
>>> from a first person perspective).
>>>
>>> All this looks probably like utter nonsense for those who miss the
>>> seven first steps of the universal dovetailer argument.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> On 07 Feb 2010, at 21:07, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Assuming a 4-level hierarchy of "universe" as posited by Tegmark
>>>> here...
>>>> http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283v1
>>>
>>>> Then the universe would be an aggregate of all mathematical
>>>> structures.
>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 6:07 AM, Mindey <min...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> Hello,
>>>
>>>> I was just wondering, we are talking so much about universes, but how
>>>> do we define "universe"? Sorry if that question was answered
>>>> somewhere, but after a quick search I didn't find it.
>>>
>>>> Inyuki
>>>> http://www.universians.org
>>>
>>>> --
>>>
>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
>>>> .
>>>> For more options, visit this group
>>>> athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
>>>> .
>>>
>>>> --
>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
>>>> .
>>>> For more options, visit this group
>>>> athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
>>>> .
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to