Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Dear Stephen, On 18 May 2011, at 18:10, Stephen Paul King wrote: I am interested in more of your thinking on several ideas that you mention in this post. 1) The 8 hypostases as N-OM; N = 1 - 8 I suggest you to read the sane04 paper where they are explained in the part 2, or the Plotinus paper. They are the 8 variants of the provability logic G.: p truth Bp provability Bp p knowability Bp Dt 'or Bp Dp) observation Bp Dt p 'or Bp Dp p) feeling Three of them inherits the provability/truth splitting, like G and G*. The laws of physics are given by inversing Goldblatt transforms on the true observable (given by the true relation on the observation hypostases. That should give the quantum logic von Neumann was searchning, and which is such that it defines the whole quantum probability calculus. It makes testable comp+classical theory of knowledge. 2) Is this physical instantiation of a 3-OM is an infinite mathematical object phrasing equivalent to saying that the physical instantiation of a 3-OM a model (in Model theory terms) of an infinite mathematical object. What is the nature of this object. Remember that the whole physicalness is of the type first person plural. So, contrary to physicalism, a material object is not an objective object, but a sharable perceptible reality, like in a multi- user video game. There is still a difference with the video-games, which is that such material object are projection from infinities of computations, in fact from all computations going through the computational states of those who observe that object. It is not really a model in the sense of model theory. It would be more like an infinity of fungible models. Such material object, for example is not Turing emulable, nor generated anywhere by the universal dovetailer, it is entirely based on the first person plural indeterminacy. 3) About the the notion that OM overlap is what is managed by the modalities distinguishing the points of views? Please elaborate on this. The modalities, mathematically, add different types of structure on the way the computational states refer to each others, and those modalities emerges from the constraints of being self-referentially correct. The motivation and informal but rigorous reason why is given by the UDA, and the math is given by the AUDA. You might study the papers and aks question from there, because your last question is almost like asking to summarize the whole thing, which I do from times to times, but I can't do without boring the reader. Take the time to study the proofs and ask specific question. best, Bruno Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 10:58 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 18 May 2011, at 02:46, meekerdb wrote: On 5/17/2011 5:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip It is also difficult to see how the empirical experience of time can be accounted for in this theory. If you accept mechanism, many times emerges. Many 1-times (feeling of duration), and 3-times (clock). Their logic is provably given by the variant of self-reference, which each structured the numbers in different way. Actually 1-times is given by S4Grz1 and X1*, and 3- times is given by Z1*, or slight variant if you nuance the theory of knowledge (this is the toy theology of the ideally correct Löbian number). If you reject mechanism, tell me what is your theory of mind and your theory of matter. [Brent] You misunderstand. I'm objecting to the idea that a thought = a single state of a digital computation. It seems to me that observer moment, OM, is used equivocally to refer to both as though they were the same thing. [Bruno] Yes, I agree. That is a very usual confusion. That is why I suggest people to always distinguish clearly the 3-OMs (computational states belonging to 3-describable computations) and the 1-OMs (which are typically NOT describable, except by reference to a notion of truth, which is itself not describable). Eventually the 3-OMs are handled by the self-reference logic G (and G*), and the 1-OMs are described by the self-reference logic S4Grz1 and X1*. It is the difference between Bp, Bp p, and Bp Dt p. The additions of p, Dt and Dt p change the logical and topological structures bearing on the OMs. I use the notion of OM because people here use that vocabulary, but it is a bit misleading. Given that there is 8 hypostases, we should distinguish the 1-OM, 2-OM, 3-OM, ... 8-OM, and even more due to the others possible arithmetical nuances entailed by the incompleteness phenomenon. If my brain or some part thereof were replaced by digital computer I think its states would be a level far below those of my thoughts (1_OM?) - just as the computational state of my neurons is below the level of my consciousness. You are
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 18 May 2011, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No? Onward! Stephen I don't see how that follows. Me too. Consciousness requires logically the entire arithmetical reality, for example (with mechanism). Without 2+2=4, there is no consciousness, nor computation, nor matter. Require in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a blow to the head can interrupt consciousness We don't know that. With comp nothing interrupt consciousness. and erase memories. That can indeed happens locally and relatively. And that can give the feeling of having been unconscious. Bruno From: meekerdb Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 11:38 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self- consciousness. Brent -- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 18 May 2011, at 19:47, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Rex, A very good point! There must be a place for false memories in our modal logics. Indeed. and G* proves DBf. Lies and falsities abounds in the mind of the average Löbian machines. Could these be included in the Bp p where the p is not necessarily true in all worlds? It can, because p means in that context that p is arithmetically true, like Dt for a consistent machine, so we can have by incompleteness BDt Dt. Of course BDt - Bf (incompletness), and G* proves BDt - f. But this concerns the correct machine. All this work because we cannot know that we are consistent. Bruno Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Rex Allen Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 1:30 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On Wed, May 18, 2011 at 11:38 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self- consciousness. I tend to disagree. What is memory? Just representation in some material substrate? When you “recall” a memory into the present is it still a memory or part of the present? What about false memories? Isn’t the experience of reflecting on a memory just another kind of experience, no different really than day-dreaming about something that never happened? Rex -- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
QM and MWI
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1105/1105.3796v1.pdf. I am curious what people think of this, not just from the DM Point of view. Ronald -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: QM and MWI
Raphael Bousso and Leonard Susskind appear to mix the concepts of the multiverse with the idea of wave collapse, e.g., For example, we might choose S to be an electron and E to be the inanimate laboratory. The system's wave function collapses when the electron becomes entangled with some detector. But we may also include in S everything out to the edge of the solar system. The environment is whatever is out beyond the orbit of Pluto. In that case the collapse of the system wavefunction cannot take place until a photon from the detector has passed Pluto's orbit. This would take about a ve hours during which the system wavefunction is coherent. On Fri, May 20, 2011 at 7:36 AM, ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com wrote: http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1105/1105.3796v1.pdf. I am curious what people think of this, not just from the DM Point of view. Ronald -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/20/2011 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 May 2011, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No? Onward! Stephen I don't see how that follows. Me too. Consciousness requires logically the entire arithmetical reality, for example (with mechanism). Without 2+2=4, there is no consciousness, nor computation, nor matter. Require in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a blow to the head can interrupt consciousness We don't know that. With comp nothing interrupt consciousness. I have experienced it, a gap in my consciousness. Of course you may say it is only a gap in my memory of consciousness, but a loss of memory can be induced in by drugs that do not cause one to be unresponsive at the time which is not remembered. This tells me that being unconscious is more that just not remembering. and erase memories. That can indeed happens locally and relatively. And that can give the feeling of having been unconscious. Bruno But consciousness is a matter of having feelings. Why credit feelings of being conscious but not those of having been uncouscious. This goes back to the question of the role of memories and whether memory is essential to consciousness. You may hypothesize that nothing interrupts consciousness, or make it true by a definition that denies physical (3rd person) time. But this strikes me as trying to save a theory by redefining words. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Hi Brent and Bruno, From: meekerdb Sent: Friday, May 20, 2011 1:44 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 5/20/2011 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 May 2011, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No? Onward! Stephen I don't see how that follows. Me too. Consciousness requires logically the entire arithmetical reality, for example (with mechanism). Without 2+2=4, there is no consciousness, nor computation, nor matter. Require in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a blow to the head can interrupt consciousness We don't know that. With comp nothing interrupt consciousness. I have experienced it, a gap in my consciousness. Of course you may say it is only a gap in my memory of consciousness, but a loss of memory can be induced in by drugs that do not cause one to be unresponsive at the time which is not remembered. This tells me that being unconscious is more that just not remembering. and erase memories. That can indeed happens locally and relatively. And that can give the feeling of having been unconscious. Bruno But consciousness is a matter of having feelings. Why credit feelings of being conscious but not those of having been uncouscious. This goes back to the question of the role of memories and whether memory is essential to consciousness. You may hypothesize that nothing interrupts consciousness, or make it true by a definition that denies physical (3rd person) time. But this strikes me as trying to save a theory by redefining words. Brent -- [SPK] Let me be clear, if we say that X supervenes on Y then the existence of X is dependent on the existence of Y, right? Consciousness, stripped of the notions of self-awareness, is what I was considering. This corresponds, crudely stated, the idea of some kind of correlation between the content of any given individual 1p and that which is the same for many 1p or even invariant over transformations from one 1p to any other in the equivalence class of 1p. In that sense, if consciousness does not necessitate memory – any form of correlation with representations of prior events – then why does consciousness require any persistent structure at all to exist? What motivation does persistence of structure have in any discussion? This disallows for Last Thursdaysm, I realize, and that is kind of the point that I was trying to make. It seems to me that self-awareness requires memory but bare consciousness does not. This seems consistent with the notion of an OM as have been considered by Russell and Bruno, but it makes my confusion about how OMs are sequenced even more profound! We may posit that 2+2=4 is what undergirds reality, but what the heck does “feelings” have to do with 2+2=4? There is no alternative to 2+2=4 except for falsehood; but “feelings” seems to be a nonsense term without the notion of some form of comparison between, for example, “I experience a qualia that is incompatible with nothing other than having been unconscious yesterday.” How is the truth of this statement evaluated? To put such statements in the same domain as 2+2=4 seems to be a massive error. Feeling something requires a comparative process and a process that requires persistence in time (or over many separate and irreducible computations) so that the content of consciousness is not identical to some stochastic variable (giving rise to the White Rabbit problem). To bring propositions like 2+2=4, which are universal true statements and even tautologies, as support for the idea that consciousness supervenes from Arithmetic Realism (implicit in the 2+2=4) then is to reduce consciousness to a trivial mapping, like the identity 0 – 0 = 0. I have tried to ask Bruno if the logical propositions that he is considering include 1p statements such as this one and, more generally, statements about the local state of affairs as seen from some place and time so that I can better understand if there is a place for an OM in his result, but I get the feeling that there is no answer yet to this question. I am trying to advance the discussion. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
