Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruce Kellett]

On 1/07/2016 3:05 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:


It is not a coincidence that those who have a difficulty with 
computationalism, have a difficulty with Everett, and hallucinate 
spooky action at a distance.


Everett, despite your repeated claims, did not eliminate non-locality 
from quantum mechanics. It is pure rhetoric to continually refer to 
non-locality as "spooky action at a distance". You should get up to 
speed with contemporary thinking about non-locality in physics.


(And before you start shouting "ad hominem", reflect on your oft 
repeated assertions that some of us should get up to speed on 
contemporary logic/computer science.)


Bruce

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[John Clark]

On Thu, Jun 30, 2016 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​> ​
> A universal Turing machine can compute all Turing computable functions.
> And also all Lambda computable function, and actually,
>

​An​

​abstract ​
universal Turing machine can compute
​ ​exactly
diddly squat
​. A physical ​
universal Turing machine
​on the other hand ​
can compute
​anything capable of being computed.​

​> ​
> Once you accept Yes-doctor,
>

​But I don't accept it unless the Turing Machine simulating me is ​PHYSICAL.


​> ​
> If computationalism is true, there is no way for us to distinguish
> *introspectively* which universal computations supports us,
>

​
So what? We are not limited to introspection, we can
​observe the outside world and even perform experiments on it and we can​
easily see
​ ​that
computations
 are ALWAYS physical, and we can see that the physical brain makes
calculations and these calculations are what makes us who we are; change
the physical stuff in the brain and the computations change, change the
computations and your conscious experience changes.

​> ​
> human physicalness is an indexical.
>


​H​
uman physicalness is an indexical
​ what?​

​>>​
>> ​Perhaps your "big picture" is just a bit too big. If the fundamental
>> meaning of the word "nothing" is infinite unbounded homogeneity in every
>> dimension, and I can't think of a better one that conforms with our normal
>> use of the word, then your "big picture" is nothing.
>
>
> ​> ​
> You seem to be negative for the purpose of being negative.
>

No, I'm being negative for a good cause.
​ ​
One should be negative against illogical ill formed metaphysical ideas
masquerading as mathematics.



​
>> ​>> ​
>> John Clark is not stuck at step 3, ​
>> ​Bruno Marchal is. ​
>> Bruno Marchal assumes
>> ​the very thing Bruno Marchal is trying to prove, ​Bruno assumes
>> that because
>> ​when ​
>> looking into the past there is
>> ​always ​
>> a unique meaning to the word ​"you" there will
>> ​be ​
>> a unique meaning to that personal pronoun
>> ​when ​
>> looking into the future too
>> ​;​
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Not at all. Quite the contrary. All what is used is the talk of each
> duplicated people.
>

If the person is duplicated then the question "what will *YOU* see next?"
is not well formed and it is equivalent to "what will flobkneequicks see
next?"; neither question has an answer. The question "what will John Clark
see next?" has an answer but Bruno absolutely insists on using the personal
pronoun, hasn't anyone wondered why Bruno is so adamant about doing so?
It's because personal pronouns are a convenient place to hide the gaping
holes in Bruno's argument.


> ​> ​
> You are the one using bad religion to invalidate a demonstration,
>
Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

​ John K Clark​

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Jun 2016, at 19:30, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​​>> ​A definition will tell you absolutely positively 100%  
NOTHING about the underlying nature of mathematics or physics, it  
will just tell you things about human mathematical notation and  
language. ​You learn about nature from examples not from  
definitions, even the writers of dictionaries know that.



​> ​You are just delirious or what?

​I'm not delirious so I must be what.​

​> ​I just meant that if you consult the literature,

The literature is physical.​



Oh!





​> ​the notion of partial computable function, or Turing  
computable function, or Church lambda calculus, and the relative  
computations, etc. does not involve any physical assumption.


​And that is precisely why despite their misleading names partial  
computable function​s​ or Turing computable function​s​​ ​ 
or​ ​Church lambda calculus​ can't actually compute or  
calculate one damn thing.



A universal Turing machine can compute all Turing computable  
functions. And also all Lambda computable function, and actually,  
accepting the Church-Turing-Kleene-Post thesis, a universal (Turing)  
machine can compute all computable functions.


Of course, for non universal machine, some computable function are not  
computable.


And the extensional Church-Turing thesis admits an intentional  
version, so that not only all universal machine can compute all  
computable functions, but they can compute them in the same manner as  
each other, that is they can all emulate all digital processes.


Just inform yourself as you seem to persist in the confusion between  
the mathematical notion of computation and the notion of a physical  
implementation of a universal machine, which makes possible to  
exploits nature to do physical computations.


In a physical computer, a register can be build physically, for  
example with a sequence of flip-flop, done with physical electrical  
line and the nand gate. In arithmetic, you can build a register, that  
is fine a number which will encode the sequence of numbers, like using  
Gödel"s exploitation of the fundamental theorem of arithmetic: the  
uniqueness of the factorization of numbers into product of prime factor.


In the first case, you will get physical boxes containing the numbers  
you want to encode: say 4, 5, 4, 6.
In the second case, you will get an arithmetic register coding the  
sequence, for example with gn = Gödel number, that is representation  
of symbol by numbers.


2^ng(0)*3^ng(s0)*5^ng(0)*7^ng(ss0)

Arithmetical retrieval will be easy to define, writing p-i for the ith  
prime, like


R(a, i) = the number n such that p_i^n divides a, but p_i^n+1 does  
not, with a > 0.


A computation is given by what universal machine does, and "being a  
computation" is primitive recursive, and easily definable in arithmetic.


Once you accept Yes-doctor, it is a simple consequence of the laws of  
addition and multiplication that the exact computation made physically  
right now to make you conscious of reading this paragraph right now is  
emulated exactly, at the (existing by hypothesis) substitution level  
in infinitely many different computational histories.


The point: If you tell me that none are real except our own physical  
one, well, if you tell me this in virtue of a brain doing a   
computation, all the John Clark in arithmetic will tell exactly this  
to my doppelgangers, pointing ostensively on their apparent, and  
indeed real for them, physical reality.


If computationalism is true, there is no way for us to distinguish  
*introspectively* which universal computations supports us, and below  
our substitution level, we must expected a sort of infinite sum of  
computations, which QM does illustrate in some way.






​​>> ​Don't tell me show me, don't give me another definition  
give me an example, calculate 2+2 without using anything  
physical,  ​or if that's too hard try 1+1. Do that and I'll concede  
the argument​,​​ and immediately after that I'll get on the  
phone to Silicon Valley.   ​


​> ​Silicon valley exists thanks to those mathematicians having  
discovered the universal numbers.


​That is true,  Silicon ​V​alley ​wouldn't exist without  
mathematicians like Turing, but​ Silicon Valley wouldn't exist  
without Silicon either.


​> ​The numbers, as studied today, by mathematicians, does not  
use physical assumption.


Mathematicians​ are free to make or not to make any assumption they  
like, but it won't change the fact that mathematicians are  
physical.​



Human mathematicians are physical. But if computationalism, even the  
human physicalness is an indexical. The mind of the universal machine  
obeys a lot of laws which do not assume primitive physicalness. The  
closure of the partial recursive functions for diagonalization and  
higher orders makes numberland quite explanatively close, and with 

Re: The search of truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Jun 2016, at 00:04, John Clark wrote:

Forget the "primary" crap. Matter is needed for the existence of  
computations period.


No, matter is needed locally to make a calculation relative to you in  
the physical reality.
But the relative computations exist,  provably so in any sigma_1  
complete theory.
Good, as the existence and explanation of the physical reality  
appearances relies on those computations existing in arithmetic.


You begin again to just repeat nonsensical slogan. I will (try) to not  
answer them, as they have all already been answered.
You say you are not religious, but you systematically argue like a  
dogmatic priest from an institutionalized religion.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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