Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, Nov 10, 2019 at 11:22 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 7 Nov 2019, at 22:58, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 8:53 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the
>> probabilities becomes actualized.  MWI tries to avoid this by supposing
>> that all probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of becoming orthogonal
>> subspaces.  There are some problems with this too, but I see the attraction.
>>
>
> You can always find problems with any approach. What I particularly
> dislike about MW advocates (like Sean Carroll) is that they are dishonest
> about the number of assumptions they have to make to get the SWE to "fly".
> Particularly over the preferred basis problem and Born rule. Zurek comes
> closer, and he effectively dismisses the "other branches" as a convenient
> fiction. If these other branches play no effective role in explaining our
> experience, then why have them there?
>
>
> How could some terms in a wave expansion disappear without assuming some
> non unitary collapse of some sort?
>

I did not say that they disappeared: merely that they do not play any role
in explaining our experience. If you can point to any such role, then fine.
But I doubt that you can do this.


> There is no preferred basis, only personal basis to be able to interact
> locally in between us.
>

Again you appear to ignore the primary role of science is in explaining our
experience. In our experience, there most certainly is a preferred basis --
the world around us has not dissolved into the "mush" that Schroedinger
feared so much. If there is only a "personal basis", explain to me why your
personal basis does not include superpositions of live and dead cats.

Bruce

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Re: Infinitesimals

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, November 10, 2019 at 1:09:41 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Sunday, November 10, 2019 at 6:17:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9 Nov 2019, at 02:22, Lawrence Crowell  
>> wrote:
>>
>> We can think of infinitesimals as a manifestation of Gödel's theorem with 
>> Peano number theory. There is nothing odd that is going to happen with this 
>> number theory, but no matter how much we count we never reach "infinity." 
>> We have then an issue of ω-consistency, and to completeness. To make this 
>> complete we must then say there exists an element that has no successor. We 
>> can now take this "supernatural number" and take the reciprocal of it 
>> within the field of rationals or reals. This is in a way what 
>> infinitesimals are. These are a way that Robinson numbers are constructed. 
>> These are as "real" in a sense, just as imaginary numbers are. They are 
>> only pure fictions if one stays strictly within the Peano number theory. 
>> They also have incredible utility in that the whole topological set theory 
>> foundation for algebraic geometry and topology is based on this.
>>
>>
>> Roughly thinking, I agree. It corroborates my feeling that first order 
>> logic is science, and second-order logic is philosophy. Useful philosophy, 
>> note, but useful fiction also.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
> The key word is useful. Infinitesimals are immensely useful in calculus 
> and point-set topology. It provide a proof of the mean value theorem in 
> calculus, which in higher dimension is Stokes' rule that in the language of 
> forms lends itself to algebraic topology. Something that useful as I see it 
> has some sort of ontology to it, even if it is in the abstract sense of 
> mathematics.
>
> LC
>  
>

 
It is interesting that infinitesimal calculus [ 
https://www.math.wisc.edu/~keisler/foundations.pdf ] is still a "backbench" 
calculus - not mattering so much in science, at least in terms of 
education. Maybe that's a problem with science.

@philipthrift

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Re: Infinitesimals

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Sunday, November 10, 2019 at 6:17:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Nov 2019, at 02:22, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> We can think of infinitesimals as a manifestation of Gödel's theorem with 
> Peano number theory. There is nothing odd that is going to happen with this 
> number theory, but no matter how much we count we never reach "infinity." 
> We have then an issue of ω-consistency, and to completeness. To make this 
> complete we must then say there exists an element that has no successor. We 
> can now take this "supernatural number" and take the reciprocal of it 
> within the field of rationals or reals. This is in a way what 
> infinitesimals are. These are a way that Robinson numbers are constructed. 
> These are as "real" in a sense, just as imaginary numbers are. They are 
> only pure fictions if one stays strictly within the Peano number theory. 
> They also have incredible utility in that the whole topological set theory 
> foundation for algebraic geometry and topology is based on this.
>
>
> Roughly thinking, I agree. It corroborates my feeling that first order 
> logic is science, and second-order logic is philosophy. Useful philosophy, 
> note, but useful fiction also.
>
> Bruno
>
>
The key word is useful. Infinitesimals are immensely useful in calculus and 
point-set topology. It provide a proof of the mean value theorem in 
calculus, which in higher dimension is Stokes' rule that in the language of 
forms lends itself to algebraic topology. Something that useful as I see it 
has some sort of ontology to it, even if it is in the abstract sense of 
mathematics.

LC
 

>
> LC
>
> On Sunday, November 3, 2019 at 6:39:53 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> *Leibniz's Infinitesimals: Their Fictionality, Their Modern 
>> Implementations, And Their Foes From Berkeley To Russell And Beyond*
>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.0174
>>
>> *Infinitesimals, Imaginaries, Ideals, and Fictions*
>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1304.2137
>>
>> *Leibniz vs Ishiguro: Closing a quarter-century of syncategoremania*
>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1603.07209
>>
>> Leibniz frequently writes that his infinitesimals are useful fictions, 
>> and we agree; but we shall show that it is best not to understand them as 
>> logical fictions; instead, they are better understood as pure fictions.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
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> 
> .
>
>
>

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Re: C60 Interference

[Alan Grayson]

On Sunday, November 10, 2019 at 5:42:50 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 8 Nov 2019, at 01:13, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
>
> On Thursday, November 7, 2019 at 12:50:21 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11/7/2019 6:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 6 Nov 2019, at 10:34, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 6, 2019 at 3:19:58 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5 Nov 2019, at 02:53, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>> IIUC, as the temperature rises, interference in the double slit C60 
>>> experiment declines, and eventually disappears. I don't think this is 
>>> really a which-way experiment because the interference disappears whether 
>>> or not which-way is observed. How does this effect the collapse issue? 
>>> Usually, IIUC, when interference ceases to exist, it implies collapse of 
>>> the wf. So, is the C60 double slit experiment evidence for collapse of the 
>>> wf? TIA, AG
>>>
>>>
>>> My two pre views posts explained exactly this, in the non-collapse 
>>> frame. It works for particles, Molecules and even macroscopic cats. The 
>>> advantage of the non-collapse quantum theory is that any interaction can be 
>>> counted as a measurement. So heat cannot not decrease interference, for the 
>>> technical factorisation reason already explained.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> They've sent 2000-atom sized molecules through double slits.
>>
>> What about sending cats?
>>
>>
>> You will loss the ability to get the interference, because it is hugely 
>> more complex to isolate a cat from the environment, so its alive or dead 
>> state will be pass on you unavoidably very quickly.  See my explanation to 
>> Grayson why any (unknown) interaction of an object in a superposition state 
>> makes it logically impossible to remain in a superposition relatively to 
>> you. It uses only very elementary algebra. The quantum effect, to be 
>> exploited, require perfect isolation, which is impossible for most 
>> macroscopic object. But some “macro-superposition” have been obtained with 
>> superconducting device. In fact, superconductor is a quantum macroscopic 
>> effect.
>>
>>
>> Aside from the isolation problems the de Broglie wavelength of a cat is 
>> extremely small so to get an interference pattern the slit and slit spacing 
>> must be correspondingly small.  The C60 experiment was only made possible 
>> by the development of the Tablot-Lau interferometer.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> I've made this point before; the decoherence time for a cat is very very 
> short, but how does this effect the point Schroedinger wanted to make, 
> since the cat is in that paradoxical superposition for some short but 
> finite duration? AG 
>
>
> Once the cat is alive + dead, he remains in that state for ever.
>

*Then how come we NEVER observe that state? AG*
 

> I don’t see any mean to avoid this without introducing non unitary 
> phenomena. [T]he accessibility to interference is very short, because we 
> can’t isolate the cat, 
>

*Then without interference, the superposition ceases to exist! AG*
 

> and the wave length is very tiny (making perhaps no sense in a GR 
> accommodation of QM), but in pure elementary QM, superposition are forever.
>
> Bruno
>

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Re: C60 Interference

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Nov 2019, at 05:06, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, November 7, 2019 at 8:47:15 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 11/7/2019 6:39 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, November 7, 2019 at 6:25:37 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 11/7/2019 5:01 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>> There is no paradox.  It's just some hang up you have that a cat can't be 
>>> dead and alive at the same time.  It's as though your physics was stuck in 
>>> the time of Aristotle and words were magic so that "Alive implies 
>>> not-dead." was a law of physics instead of an axiom of logic.
>>> 
>>> In fact a moments thought will tell you that quite aside from quantum 
>>> mechanics there would be no way to identify the moment of death of the cat 
>>> to less than a several seconds.  It would be simply meaningless to say the 
>>> cat was alive at 0913:20 and dead at 0913:21.
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> You can imagine a different experiment, without cats, with the same 
>>> paradoxical result. The point of Schroedinger's thought 
>>> experiment was to demonstate tHE title of this thread; that there's 
>>> something wrong with the prevailing interpretation of superposition. In 
>>> your view I am hung up with Aristotle? In my view, you're seduced by some 
>>> quantum nonsense. AG 
>> 
>> Prevailing when?  1927?  There is no problem in the prevailing 2019 
>> interpretation, except in your mind because you assume that a cat cannot be 
>> in a superposition of alive/dead even for a fraction of a 
>> nano-second...because...WHY?   The radioactive atom can be in a 
>> superposition of decayed and not-decayed for a nanosecond.  Why doesn't that 
>> violate your Aristotelean logic?
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> What's wrong with the interpretation that the radioactive atom is either 
>> decayed OR undecayed with probabilities calculated by Born's Rule? AG 
> 
> Being in the quasi-classical state of either decayed or undecayed assumes the 
> superposition of decayed and undecayed has decohered by interaction with the 
> environment.  The interactions that produce decoherence all proceed at less 
> than the speed of light, so it is not instantaneous.  So the atom and the cat 
> are no different...except the time for which one can keep them isolated from 
> the environment.
> 
> Brent
> 
> Maybe isolation is an idealization which never exists in nature. That would 
> put this issue to bed. AG 


Then a photon will go only through one slit, and we are back to classical 
mechanics, or QM + hidden variable (and FTL), etc. We need the superposition to 
explain the interference patterns.

Bruno



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Re: C60 Interference

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Nov 2019, at 01:13, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, November 7, 2019 at 12:50:21 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 11/7/2019 6:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Nov 2019, at 10:34, Philip Thrift > 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, November 6, 2019 at 3:19:58 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 5 Nov 2019, at 02:53, Alan Grayson > wrote:
 
 IIUC, as the temperature rises, interference in the double slit C60 
 experiment declines, and eventually disappears. I don't think this is 
 really a which-way experiment because the interference 
   disappears whether or not which-way is observed. How does this 
 effect the collapse issue? Usually, IIUC, when interference ceases to 
 exist, it implies collapse of the wf. So, is the C60 double slit 
 experiment evidence for collapse of the wf? TIA, AG
>>> 
>>> My two pre views posts explained exactly this, in the non-collapse frame. 
>>> It works for particles, Molecules and even macroscopic cats. The advantage 
>>> of the non-collapse quantum theory is that any interaction can be counted 
>>> as a measurement. So heat cannot not decrease interference, for the 
>>> technical factorisation reason already explained.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> They've sent 2000-atom sized molecules through double slits.
>>> 
>>> What about sending cats?
>> 
>> You will loss the ability to get the interference, because it is hugely more 
>> complex to isolate a cat from the environment, so its alive or dead state 
>> will be pass on you unavoidably very quickly.  See my explanation to Grayson 
>> why any (unknown) interaction of an object in a superposition state makes it 
>> logically impossible to remain in a superposition relatively to you. It uses 
>> only very elementary algebra. The quantum effect, to be exploited, require 
>> perfect isolation, which is impossible for most macroscopic object. But some 
>> “macro-superposition” have been obtained with superconducting device. In 
>> fact, superconductor is a quantum macroscopic effect.
> 
> Aside from the isolation problems the de Broglie wavelength of a cat is 
> extremely small so to get an interference pattern the slit and slit spacing 
> must be correspondingly small.  The C60 experiment was only made possible by 
> the development of the Tablot-Lau interferometer.
> 
> Brent
> 
> I've made this point before; the decoherence time for a cat is very very 
> short, but how does this effect the point Schroedinger wanted to make, since 
> the cat is in that paradoxical superposition for some short but finite 
> duration? AG 

Once the cat is alive + dead, he remains in that state for ever. I don’t see 
any mean to avoid this without introducing non unitary phenomena. He 
accessibility to interference is very short, because we can’t isolate the cat, 
and the wave length is very tiny (making perhaps no sense in a GR accommodation 
of QM), but in pure elementary QM, superposition are forever.

Bruno


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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Nov 2019, at 05:06, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 11/7/2019 2:37 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 9:26 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> On 11/7/2019 1:58 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 8:53 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> On 11/7/2019 1:40 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>  
>>> On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 6:35 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
 On 11/7/2019 12:21 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
> On Wednesday, November 6, 2019 at 7:27:32 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
> On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 at 11:15, Bruce Kellett > wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 7, 2019 at 11:00 AM Stathis Papaioannou  <>> wrote:
> 
> The universe as a whole is determined in every detail, and random choice 
> of the observer in measuring a particle is not really a random choice.
> 
> If you believe that, you believe in magic sauce.
> 
> It is a consequence of Many Worlds that there is no true randomness, but 
> only apparent randomness. If Many Worlds is wrong, then this may also be 
> wrong. Randomness in choice of measurement is required for the apparent 
> nonlocal effect when considering entangled particles.
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> 
> That's what Many Worlds implies.
> 
> The mystery is: Why do (according to the science press in the wake of 
> Sean Carroll's book) so many people think Many Worlds is a good 
> scientific idea (or the best idea, according to the author).
 
 Because it treats measurement as just another physical interaction of 
 quantum systems obeying the same evolution equations as other interactions.
 
 But you can do that (viz. accept that people, and measuring instruments, 
 and everything else are basically quantum mechanical) without adopting the 
 "many worlds" philosophy.
>>> 
>>> ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the 
>>> probabilities becomes actualized.  MWI tries to avoid this by supposing 
>>> that all probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of becoming orthogonal 
>>> subspaces.  There are some problems with this too, but I see the attraction.
>>> 
>>> You can always find problems with any approach. What I particularly dislike 
>>> about MW advocates (like Sean Carroll) is that they are dishonest about the 
>>> number of assumptions they have to make to get the SWE to "fly". 
>>> Particularly over the preferred basis problem and Born rule. Zurek comes 
>>> closer, and he effectively dismisses the "other branches" as a convenient 
>>> fiction.
>> 
>> Yeah, I like Omnes' dictum, "It's a probabilistic theory, so it predicts 
>> probabilities.  What more do you want?"  
>> 
>> But it still leaves that gap between the density matrix becoming diagonal 
>> FAPP and one subspace becoming actual FR (for real), not just FAPP.  If you 
>> take a purely epistemic view the gap is just in your belief changing.  But 
>> if you keep an ontological view the matrix is only diagonal in some 
>> preferred basis and it's not necessarily even approximately diagonal in some 
>> other basis.  It seems the other bases are an inconvenient fiction. :-)  It 
>> seems to come down to explaining that Zurek's quantum Darwinism necessarily 
>> picks out the basis in which our brains will form beliefs and they will 
>> agree on that belief as to what "really happened".
>> 
>> Maybe our brains see it in this way because "that is really what happened". 
>> It is stochastic, but so what?  We are used to updating probabilities on the 
>> basis of new evidence. Quantum Darwinism is a way of explaining that the 
>> world itself determines what is real.
> 
> Zurek uses quantum Darwinism and envariance to show there's a preferred basis 
> and the Born rule is the way to assign probabilities to them once decoherence 
> has acted.  But he doesn't seem to say that one result or another is realized 
> via the quantum Darwinism.  Rather he's satisfied like Omnes' to say "It's a 
> probabilistic theory so you get predictions of probabilities."  Then 
> observing one, you discard the others as failed predictions.  He doesn't 
> think of the quantum Dawinism as competition between different preferred 
> basis outcomes to select one as realized.  At least that's what I think he 
> says.

It is more a selection by consciousness than a competition in some precise 
Darwinian sense I would say, like in the sigma_1 (partial computable) frame.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Panpsychism, materialism, and zombies

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, November 10, 2019 at 6:13:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > On 7 Nov 2019, at 19:13, Eva > wrote: 
> > 
> > Galen Strawson say that consciousness is matter. I don't think so. When 
> I am unconscious my brain does not dissapear. 
>
> I agree. To equate consciousness (which we know to exist) with Matter (an 
> unconscious construct of the mind in the mechanist theory of mind) does not 
> make much sense. It is a category error consisting in identifying what we 
> do not understand. 
> It is easier to explain the illusion of matter to someone conscious than 
> the illusion of consciousness (and what could that be?) to a piece of 
> matter. 
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
>
People will likely keep saying *X is not matter* - or the same thing: *X is 
not material* - where X = mind, consciousness - but it is the worst 
philosophical error in human history (as Rorty said).

I say ignore all books/writing that say the "not matter" thing, and throw 
away any such books you have in your library.

@phillipthrift   

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Nov 2019, at 22:58, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 8:53 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> On 11/7/2019 1:40 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>  
> On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 6:35 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
>> On 11/7/2019 12:21 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, November 6, 2019 at 7:27:32 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>>> On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 at 11:15, Bruce Kellett > wrote:
>>> On Thu, Nov 7, 2019 at 11:00 AM Stathis Papaioannou > 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> The universe as a whole is determined in every detail, and random choice of 
>>> the observer in measuring a particle is not really a random choice.
>>> 
>>> If you believe that, you believe in magic sauce.
>>> 
>>> It is a consequence of Many Worlds that there is no true randomness, but 
>>> only apparent randomness. If Many Worlds is wrong, then this may also be 
>>> wrong. Randomness in choice of measurement is required for the apparent 
>>> nonlocal effect when considering entangled particles.
>>> -- 
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>> 
>>> 
>>> That's what Many Worlds implies.
>>> 
>>> The mystery is: Why do (according to the science press in the wake of Sean 
>>> Carroll's book) so many people think Many Worlds is a good scientific idea 
>>> (or the best idea, according to the author).
>> 
>> Because it treats measurement as just another physical interaction of 
>> quantum systems obeying the same evolution equations as other interactions.
>> 
>> But you can do that (viz. accept that people, and measuring instruments, and 
>> everything else are basically quantum mechanical) without adopting the "many 
>> worlds" philosophy.
> 
> ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the probabilities 
> becomes actualized.  MWI tries to avoid this by supposing that all 
> probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of becoming orthogonal subspaces. 
>  There are some problems with this too, but I see the attraction.
> 
> You can always find problems with any approach. What I particularly dislike 
> about MW advocates (like Sean Carroll) is that they are dishonest about the 
> number of assumptions they have to make to get the SWE to "fly". Particularly 
> over the preferred basis problem and Born rule. Zurek comes closer, and he 
> effectively dismisses the "other branches" as a convenient fiction. If these 
> other branches play no effective role in explaining our experience, then why 
> have them there?

How could some terms in a wave expansion disappear without assuming some non 
unitary collapse of some sort? There is no preferred basis, only personal basis 
to be able to interact locally in between us.

Bruno




> 
> Bruce
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Re: Infinitesimals

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Nov 2019, at 02:22, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> We can think of infinitesimals as a manifestation of Gödel's theorem with 
> Peano number theory. There is nothing odd that is going to happen with this 
> number theory, but no matter how much we count we never reach "infinity." We 
> have then an issue of ω-consistency, and to completeness. To make this 
> complete we must then say there exists an element that has no successor. We 
> can now take this "supernatural number" and take the reciprocal of it within 
> the field of rationals or reals. This is in a way what infinitesimals are. 
> These are a way that Robinson numbers are constructed. These are as "real" in 
> a sense, just as imaginary numbers are. They are only pure fictions if one 
> stays strictly within the Peano number theory. They also have incredible 
> utility in that the whole topological set theory foundation for algebraic 
> geometry and topology is based on this.

Roughly thinking, I agree. It corroborates my feeling that first order logic is 
science, and second-order logic is philosophy. Useful philosophy, note, but 
useful fiction also.

Bruno




> 
> LC
> 
> On Sunday, November 3, 2019 at 6:39:53 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> Leibniz's Infinitesimals: Their Fictionality, Their Modern Implementations, 
> And Their Foes From Berkeley To Russell And Beyond
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.0174 
> 
> Infinitesimals, Imaginaries, Ideals, and Fictions
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1304.2137 
> 
> Leibniz vs Ishiguro: Closing a quarter-century of syncategoremania
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1603.07209 
> 
> Leibniz frequently writes that his infinitesimals are useful fictions, and we 
> agree; but we shall show that it is best not to understand them as logical 
> fictions; instead, they are better understood as pure fictions.
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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Re: Panpsychism, materialism, and zombies

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Nov 2019, at 19:13, Eva  wrote:
> 
> Galen Strawson say that consciousness is matter. I don't think so. When I am 
> unconscious my brain does not dissapear.

I agree. To equate consciousness (which we know to exist) with Matter (an 
unconscious construct of the mind in the mechanist theory of mind) does not 
make much sense. It is a category error consisting in identifying what we do 
not understand.
It is easier to explain the illusion of matter to someone conscious than the 
illusion of consciousness (and what could that be?) to a piece of matter.

Bruno



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Re: BH question

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, November 9, 2019 at 6:29:02 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> Look at Greg Egan's page on this: 
> https://www.gregegan.net/SCIENCE/FiniteFall/FiniteFall.html#HOR
>
> Brent
>


very strange


[image: Photo of Greg Egan, science fiction writer]
SF writer Greg Egan


@philipthrift 

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