Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Bruno,

Hear Hear! Dennett wants to be correct by making the Hard Problem "go
away". that is the most lazy way of solving the problem: making a long
winded wand-waving argument that consciousness is an illusion and then
failing to explain the persistence of the stipulated illusion!


On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:05 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 16 Jan 2014, at 08:11, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 1/15/2014 7:20 PM, LizR wrote:
>
> Ah, well, I would expect Dennett to say that!
>
>
> On 16 January 2014 16:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289
>>
>
> I think Dennett is right.  As soon as we're able to build robots that act
> as intelligently as humans, all talk of "the hard problem" and "qualia"
> will fade away and be seen as "asking the wrong question".
>
>
> On the contrary. If intelligent machine appears, they will struggle like
> us on the hard question.
>
> Even more so, in the paradoxical situation where they extract the comp
> physics, and it is different from physics, then the 3-1 person associated
> to such machine will ... correctly know that they are zombie!
>
> Dennett is just abandoning the problem, because he fail to solve it. but
> with comp, we know that his error is in the physicalist, weakly
> materialist, stance that he adopts. He is just denying the contardiction he
> tend toward, between weak materialism and computationalism (that he adopts
> too).
>
> I was hoping you could see that, a part (at least) of the comp mind-body
> problem is well formulated (at the least).
>
>
> We'll know that if we fit the robot with IR retinas it will see IR.  If we
> program it to do drastic and dangerous things when frustrated, we'll know
> it's angry.
>
>
> I am not sure we can program that. It is more like we can't avoid machine
> to introspect and become like that, through long and deep histories.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Brent
>
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Kindest Regards,

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:



http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289

Daniel C. Dennett
Philosopher; Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Co- 
Director, Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University; Author,  
Intuition Pumps



And again

Cheers

Niloc





Dennet wrote (there):

 <<
Is the Hard Problem an idea that demonstrates the need for a major  
revolution in science if consciousness is ever to be explained, or an  
idea that demonstrates the frailties of human imagination? That  
question is not settled at this time, so scientists should consider  
adopting the cautious course that postpones all accommodation with it.  
That's how most neuroscientists handle ESP and psychokinesis—assuming,  
defeasibly, that they are figments of imagination.

>>


The question has been settled, it seems to me, or at least reduce to  
another more precise question.
And the answer is that if computationalism is true, as dennett  
advocates, then consciousness is not a figment of imagination (which  
makes no sense), but physicalism is refuted, and the new problem is to  
compare the comp physics (the physics extracted from arithmetic, by  
comp) and the facts.


Bruno






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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Jan 2014, at 08:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/15/2014 7:20 PM, LizR wrote:

Ah, well, I would expect Dennett to say that!


On 16 January 2014 16:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales > wrote:


http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289


I think Dennett is right.  As soon as we're able to build robots  
that act as intelligently as humans, all talk of "the hard problem"  
and "qualia" will fade away and be seen as "asking the wrong  
question".


On the contrary. If intelligent machine appears, they will struggle  
like us on the hard question.


Even more so, in the paradoxical situation where they extract the comp  
physics, and it is different from physics, then the 3-1 person  
associated to such machine will ... correctly know that they are zombie!


Dennett is just abandoning the problem, because he fail to solve it.  
but with comp, we know that his error is in the physicalist, weakly  
materialist, stance that he adopts. He is just denying the  
contardiction he tend toward, between weak materialism and  
computationalism (that he adopts too).


I was hoping you could see that, a part (at least) of the comp mind- 
body problem is well formulated (at the least).



We'll know that if we fit the robot with IR retinas it will see IR.   
If we program it to do drastic and dangerous things when frustrated,  
we'll know it's angry.


I am not sure we can program that. It is more like we can't avoid  
machine to introspect and become like that, through long and deep  
histories.


Bruno





Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

[LizR]

On 16 January 2014 18:29, Jason Resch  wrote:

> Colin, Liz,
>
> What do you find wrong with what Dennett said?
>

I didn't actually say I found anything wrong with it, just that I would
expect him to want to drop the hard problem. I said that because he's
wanted to for decades now, and indeed believes he has. And perhaps he's
right. If we can explain what it means for consciousness to supervene on
matter then I think it could be game over for the HP. Until then I remain
agnostic, as I find myself doing on many things.

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

[meekerdb]

On 1/15/2014 7:20 PM, LizR wrote:

Ah, well, I would expect Dennett to say that!


On 16 January 2014 16:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales > wrote:


http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289



I think Dennett is right.  As soon as we're able to build robots that act as intelligently 
as humans, all talk of "the hard problem" and "qualia" will fade away and be seen as 
"asking the wrong question".  We'll know that if we fit the robot with IR retinas it will 
see IR.  If we program it to do drastic and dangerous things when frustrated, we'll know 
it's angry.


Brent

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

[Jason Resch]

Colin, Liz,

What do you find wrong with what Dennett said?

Jason


On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 9:21 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales <
cgha...@unimelb.edu.au> wrote:

>  J yeah... he does that he’s so wrong and yet I like him a lot.
>
>
>
> *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:
> everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *LizR
> *Sent:* Thursday, 16 January 2014 2:21 PM
> *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
> *Subject:* Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR
> RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem
>
>
>
> Ah, well, I would expect Dennett to say that!
>
>
>
> On 16 January 2014 16:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289
>
>
>
> *Daniel C. Dennett* <http://www.edge.org/memberbio/daniel_c_dennett>
>
> *Philosopher; Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Co-Director,
> Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University; Author, Intuition Pumps*
>
>
>
>
>
> And again
>
>
>
> Cheers
>
>
>
> Niloc
>
> 
>
>
>
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RE: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

[Colin Geoffrey Hales]

:) yeah... he does that he's so wrong and yet I like him a lot.

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR
Sent: Thursday, 16 January 2014 2:21 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The 
Hard Problem

Ah, well, I would expect Dennett to say that!

On 16 January 2014 16:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales 
mailto:cgha...@unimelb.edu.au>> wrote:

http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289

Daniel C. Dennett<http://www.edge.org/memberbio/daniel_c_dennett>
Philosopher; Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Co-Director, Center 
for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University; Author, Intuition Pumps


And again

Cheers

Niloc


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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

[LizR]

Ah, well, I would expect Dennett to say that!


On 16 January 2014 16:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

>
>
> http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289
>
>
>
> *Daniel C. Dennett* 
>
> *Philosopher; Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Co-Director,
> Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University; Author, Intuition Pumps*
>
>
>
>
>
> And again
>
>
>
> Cheers
>
>
>
> Niloc
>
> 
>
>
>
> --
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RE: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

[Colin Geoffrey Hales]

http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289

Daniel C. Dennett
Philosopher; Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Co-Director, Center 
for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University; Author, Intuition Pumps


And again

Cheers

Niloc


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