Dear Bruno, Hear Hear! Dennett wants to be correct by making the Hard Problem "go away". that is the most lazy way of solving the problem: making a long winded wand-waving argument that consciousness is an illusion and then failing to explain the persistence of the stipulated illusion!
On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:05 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 16 Jan 2014, at 08:11, meekerdb wrote: > > On 1/15/2014 7:20 PM, LizR wrote: > > Ah, well, I would expect Dennett to say that! > > > On 16 January 2014 16:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales <cgha...@unimelb.edu.au>wrote: > >> >> >> http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289 >> > > I think Dennett is right. As soon as we're able to build robots that act > as intelligently as humans, all talk of "the hard problem" and "qualia" > will fade away and be seen as "asking the wrong question". > > > On the contrary. If intelligent machine appears, they will struggle like > us on the hard question. > > Even more so, in the paradoxical situation where they extract the comp > physics, and it is different from physics, then the 3-1 person associated > to such machine will ... correctly know that they are zombie! > > Dennett is just abandoning the problem, because he fail to solve it. but > with comp, we know that his error is in the physicalist, weakly > materialist, stance that he adopts. He is just denying the contardiction he > tend toward, between weak materialism and computationalism (that he adopts > too). > > I was hoping you could see that, a part (at least) of the comp mind-body > problem is well formulated (at the least). > > > We'll know that if we fit the robot with IR retinas it will see IR. If we > program it to do drastic and dangerous things when frustrated, we'll know > it's angry. > > > I am not sure we can program that. It is more like we can't avoid machine > to introspect and become like that, through long and deep histories. > > Bruno > > > > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
