On 16 Jan 2014, at 08:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/15/2014 7:20 PM, LizR wrote:
Ah, well, I would expect Dennett to say that!
On 16 January 2014 16:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales <[email protected]
> wrote:
http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289
I think Dennett is right. As soon as we're able to build robots
that act as intelligently as humans, all talk of "the hard problem"
and "qualia" will fade away and be seen as "asking the wrong
question".
On the contrary. If intelligent machine appears, they will struggle
like us on the hard question.
Even more so, in the paradoxical situation where they extract the comp
physics, and it is different from physics, then the 3-1 person
associated to such machine will ... correctly know that they are zombie!
Dennett is just abandoning the problem, because he fail to solve it.
but with comp, we know that his error is in the physicalist, weakly
materialist, stance that he adopts. He is just denying the
contardiction he tend toward, between weak materialism and
computationalism (that he adopts too).
I was hoping you could see that, a part (at least) of the comp mind-
body problem is well formulated (at the least).
We'll know that if we fit the robot with IR retinas it will see IR.
If we program it to do drastic and dangerous things when frustrated,
we'll know it's angry.
I am not sure we can program that. It is more like we can't avoid
machine to introspect and become like that, through long and deep
histories.
Bruno
Brent
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