Re: [SPAM] Re: God has no name
On 13 Aug 2012, at 06:42, meekerdb wrote: On 8/12/2012 1:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Let phi_i be an enumeration of the (partial) computable function. u is universal if phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y). (x,y) = some number code for the couple (x, y) So can y be some number code for a pair (a,b) and b a code for a pair (c,d),...? Why not? It can make sense in some circumstance, but by (x,y) I meant just a bijection between NxN and N. What the machine will do with the numbers is up to them. It is indeed frequent to code list of numbers like (x, y, z) by the couple (x, (y, z)). Similarly for longer sequence, by iterating that procedure. You wrote in another post: Evgenii: What does intelligence means in this context that life is unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock. Where there is more intelligence? Bruno: Bacteria are provably Turing complete, rocks are not. Brent: Bacteria a certainly smarter than rocks by any reasonable measure. But I don't think a bacterium has a semi-infinite tape. All machines, including the universal one, are finite object. Turing discovery is really the discovery of a finite Turing machine u such that phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y). Wolfram's problem consisted in finding the smallest possible Turing- universal machine coded in cellular automata language. Again he asked for something finite (even if needing an infinite plan to do any of its possible work). The infinite tape is only a rather misleading pedagogical folklore. Example of universal number are brain, computer, programming language interpreters, etc. Universal pattern in the game of life are finite pattern. The infinite tape here is the infinite plan. The infinite tape of the human has been provided by the wall of the cavern, the pebble, knots, the papers, the books and diaries, the magnetic tapes, the physical reality itself, etc. The infinite tape plays the role of a potential infinite neighborhood in which the memory of the machine can extend itself. It is not part of any machine, as the notion of machine requires finiteness. And in that sense bacteria have infinite tapes: the soil, or liquid, or gel in which they multiply. That is why I use the label universal *number*, to always keep in mind that those Turing universal being are finite entities. (By number I always mean natural number 0, 1, 2, ...). The universal machines are not God. In the arithmetical translation of Plotinus, they play the role of man, or discursive reasoner in Plotinus. yet, their canonical first person person attached with them (by incompleteness; or by the distinction between Bp and Bpp) is a sort of God, at least from the machine's point of view (it is infinite, in some sense, and not arithmetically definable). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: [SPAM] Re: God has no name
On 8/13/2012 7:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The infinite tape is only a rather misleading pedagogical folklore. Example of universal number are brain, computer, programming language interpreters, etc. Universal pattern in the game of life are finite pattern. The infinite tape here is the infinite plan. The infinite tape of the human has been provided by the wall of the cavern, the pebble, knots, the papers, the books and diaries, the magnetic tapes, the physical reality itself, etc. The infinite tape plays the role of a potential infinite neighborhood in which the memory of the machine can extend itself. It is not part of any machine, as the notion of machine requires finiteness. And in that sense bacteria have infinite tapes: the soil, or liquid, or gel in which they multiply. That's why I carfully wrote bacterium instead of bacteria. Bacteria can reproduce and evolve and so can be universal computers. But when Evgenii asked to compare rocks and bacteria, he meant a rock as compared to a bacterium. This seems to come back to my previous question about a robot. Yes, I can see that a bacterium *could be* a universal Turing machine, that is with the right code in it's DNA/RNA. But I don't see that it follows that if I pick a bacterium a random it will be a UTM or even that there is any bacterium on Earth that is a UTM. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: [SPAM] Re: God has no name
On 8/12/2012 1:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Let phi_i be an enumeration of the (partial) computable function. u is universal if phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y). (x,y) = some number code for the couple (x, y) So can y be some number code for a pair (a,b) and b a code for a pair (c,d),...? Brent So phi_u is able to compute phi_i for all i. In that case we say that u emulate x on y. u can emulate itself, as in phi_u(u, x) = phi_u(x), but u does not emulate itself per se, by its own functioning. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: God has no name
, and still less things like God told me to tell you to send me money or you will go to hell. God is more a project or a hope for an explanation. It cannot be an explanation itself. For a scientist: it is more a problem than a solution, like consciousness, for example. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/7/2012 Is life a cause/effect activity ? If so, what is the cause agent ? - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-07, 05:37:56 Subject: Re: God has no name Hi Stephen, On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Which is the definition I use. Any one that actually thinks that God is a person, could be a person, or is the complement (anti) of such, has truly not thought through the implications of such. [BM For me, and comp, it is an open problem. [SPK] ? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least, nameable. A person has always has a name. [BM] Why? Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability. OK. You are using name in the logician sense of definite description. With comp we always have a 3-name, but the first person have no name. Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case where it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What means would then exist for one entity to be distinguished from another? By the entity itself: no problem (and so this is not a problem for the personal evaluation of the measure). By some other entity? We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the purposes of identification, but this will not work because entities can change location and a list of all of the past locations of an entity would constitute a name and such is not allowed in our consideration here. Sure. What about the 1p content of an entity, i.e. the private name that an entity has for itself with in its self-referential beliefs? It has no such name. Bp p, for example, cannot be described in arithmetic, despite being defined in arithmetical terms. It is like arithmetical truth, we can't define it in arithmetic language. Since it is not communicable - as this would make the 1p aspect a non-first person concern and thus make it vanish - it cannot be a name. Names are 3p, they are public invariants that form from a consensus of many entities coming to an agreement, and thus cannot be determined strictly by 1p content. You might also note that the anti-foundation axiom is every graph has a unique decoration. The decoration is the name! It is the name that allow for non- ambiguous identification. A number's name is its meaning invariant symbol representation class... Consider what would happen to COMP if entities had no names! Do I need to go any further for you to see the absurdity of persons (or semi-autonomous entities) not having names? Say that it is X. There is something that is not that person and that something must therefore have a different name: not-X. What is God's name? ... It cannot be named because there is nothing that it is not! Therefore God cannot be a person. Transcendence eliminates nameability. The Abrahamist think that Satan is the anti-God, but that would be a denial of God's transcendence. There are reasons why Abrahamists do not tolerate logic, this is one of them. With comp if God exists it has no name, but I don't see why it would make it a non person. God is unique, it does not need a name. God is unique because there is no complement nor alternative to it. Ambiguously stated: God is the totality of what is necessarily possible. That is not bad in a first approximation. With comp, you can make it precise through the set of G鰀el numbers of the true arithmetical sentences. Obviously this is not a computable set, and it is not nameable by the machine (with comp), making set theory somehow too rich for comp. Of course, arithmetic contains or emulates a lot of entities believing in set theory, but we should not reify those beliefs in the ontology. It is better to keep them only in the machine epistemology. On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Is the translation or encoding a unique mapping? How many possible ways are available to encode B? There is an infinity of way to encode B. Some can be just intensionally equivalent (different codes but same logic), or extensionally equivalent but not intensionally equivalent, like Bp and Bp Dt. They prove the same arithmetical proposition, but obeys different logic. OK, do you not see that the infinity of ways that B can be encoded makes the name of B ambiguous? I don't see that at all. The name of B is at most 1p; a private name and thus subject to Wittgenstein's criticism. All the names of B are third person notion, even if B itself cannot recognize its body or code. It is only self-ambiguous, which is partially relevant
Re: God has no name
Hi Roger, On 07 Aug 2012, at 11:53, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal OUR FATHER, WHICH ART IN HEAVBEN, HALLOWED BE THY NAME. Luther said that to meditate of the sacredness of God according to this phrase is the oldest prayer. In old testament times, God's name was considered too sacred to speak by the Jews. The King James Bible uses YHWH, the Jews never say God as far as I know, they sometimes write it as G*d. We have relaxed these constrictions in the protestant tradition, use Jehovah and all sorts of other sacfed names. It is the problem with the notions of God, Whole, Truth, consciousness, etc. we can't define them. You can sum up Damascius by one sentence on the ineffable is already one sentence too much, it can only miss the point. (But Damascius wrote thousand of pages on this!). Like Lao Tseu said that the genuine wise man is mute, also. John Clark said it recently too! This is actually well explained (which does not mean that the explanation is correct) by computer science: a universal machine can look inward and prove things about itself, including that there are true proposition that she cannot prove as far as she is consistent, that machine-truth is not expressible, etc. My last paper (in french) is entitled la machine mystique (the mystical machine) and concerns all the things that a machine might know without being able to justify it rationally and which might be counter-intuitive from her own point of view. The word god is not problematical ... as long as we don't take the word too much seriously. You can say I search God, but you can't say I found God, and still less things like God told me to tell you to send me money or you will go to hell. God is more a project or a hope for an explanation. It cannot be an explanation itself. For a scientist: it is more a problem than a solution, like consciousness, for example. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/7/2012 Is life a cause/effect activity ? If so, what is the cause agent ? - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-07, 05:37:56 Subject: Re: God has no name Hi Stephen, On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Which is the definition I use. Any one that actually thinks that God is a person, could be a person, or is the complement (anti) of such, has truly not thought through the implications of such. [BM For me, and comp, it is an open problem. [SPK] ? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least, nameable. A person has always has a name. [BM] Why? Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability. OK. You are using name in the logician sense of definite description. With comp we always have a 3-name, but the first person have no name. Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case where it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What means would then exist for one entity to be distinguished from another? By the entity itself: no problem (and so this is not a problem for the personal evaluation of the measure). By some other entity? We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the purposes of identification, but this will not work because entities can change location and a list of all of the past locations of an entity would constitute a name and such is not allowed in our consideration here. Sure. What about the 1p content of an entity, i.e. the private name that an entity has for itself with in its self-referential beliefs? It has no such name. Bp p, for example, cannot be described in arithmetic, despite being defined in arithmetical terms. It is like arithmetical truth, we can't define it in arithmetic language. Since it is not communicable - as this would make the 1p aspect a non-first person concern and thus make it vanish - it cannot be a name. Names are 3p, they are public invariants that form from a consensus of many entities coming to an agreement, and thus cannot be determined strictly by 1p content. You might also note that the anti-foundation axiom is every graph has a unique decoration. The decoration is the name! It is the name that allow for non-ambiguous identification. A number's name is its meaning invariant symbol representation class... Consider what would happen to COMP if entities had no names! Do I need to go any further for you to see the absurdity of persons (or semi-autonomous entities) not having names? Say that it is X. There is something that is not that person and that something must therefore have a different name: not-X. What is God's name? ... It cannot be named because there is nothing that it is not! Therefore God cannot be a person. Transcendence eliminates nameability. The Abrahamist think that Satan is the anti-God, but that would be a denial of God's transcendence. There are reasons why Abrahamists do
Re: God has no name
Yeah but you can't define what a set is either, so... On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 2:22 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Roger, On 07 Aug 2012, at 11:53, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal OUR FATHER, WHICH ART IN HEAVBEN, HALLOWED BE THY NAME. Luther said that to meditate of the sacredness of God according to this phrase is the oldest prayer. In old testament times, God's name was considered too sacred to speak by the Jews. The King James Bible uses YHWH, the Jews never say God as far as I know, they sometimes write it as G*d. We have relaxed these constrictions in the protestant tradition, use Jehovah and all sorts of other sacfed names. It is the problem with the notions of God, Whole, Truth, consciousness, etc. we can't define them. You can sum up Damascius by one sentence on the ineffable is already one sentence too much, it can only miss the point. (But Damascius wrote thousand of pages on this!). Like Lao Tseu said that the genuine wise man is mute, also. John Clark said it recently too! This is actually well explained (which does not mean that the explanation is correct) by computer science: a universal machine can look inward and prove things about itself, including that there are true proposition that she cannot prove as far as she is consistent, that machine-truth is not expressible, etc. My last paper (in french) is entitled la machine mystique (the mystical machine) and concerns all the things that a machine might know without being able to justify it rationally and which might be counter-intuitive from her own point of view. The word god is not problematical ... as long as we don't take the word too much seriously. You can say I search God, but you can't say I found God, and still less things like God told me to tell you to send me money or you will go to hell. God is more a project or a hope for an explanation. It cannot be an explanation itself. For a scientist: it is more a problem than a solution, like consciousness, for example. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/7/2012 Is life a cause/effect activity ? If so, what is the cause agent ? - Receiving the following content - *From:* Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-07, 05:37:56 *Subject:* Re: God has no name Hi Stephen, On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Which is the definition I use. Any one that actually thinks that God is a person, could be a person, or is the complement (anti) of such, has truly not thought through the implications of such. [BM For me, and comp, it is an open problem. [SPK] ? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least, nameable. A person has always has a name. [BM] Why? Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability. OK. You are using name in the logician sense of definite description. With comp we always have a 3-name, but the first person have no name. Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case where it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What means would then exist for one entity to be distinguished from another? By the entity itself: no problem (and so this is not a problem for the personal evaluation of the measure). By some other entity? We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the purposes of identification, but this will not work because entities can change location and a list of all of the past locations of an entity would constitute a name and such is not allowed in our consideration here. Sure. What about the 1p content of an entity, i.e. the private name that an entity has for itself with in its self-referential beliefs? It has no such name. Bp p, for example, cannot be described in arithmetic, despite being defined in arithmetical terms. It is like arithmetical truth, we can't define it in arithmetic language. Since it is not communicable - as this would make the 1p aspect a non-first person concern and thus make it vanish - it cannot be a name. Names are 3p, they are public invariants that form from a consensus of many entities coming to an agreement, and thus cannot be determined strictly by 1p content. You might also note that the anti-foundation axiom is every graph has a unique decoration. The decoration is the name! It is the name that allow for non-ambiguous identification. A number's name is its meaning invariant symbol representation class... Consider what would happen to COMP if entities had no names! Do I need to go any further for you to see the absurdity of persons (or semi-autonomous entities) not having names? Say that it is X. There is something that is not that person and that something must therefore have a different name: not-X. What is God's name? ... It cannot be named because there is nothing that it is not! Therefore God cannot
Re: God has no name
You live by symbols. You have made up names for everything you see. Each one becomes a separate entity, identified by its own name. By this you carve it out of unity. By this you designate its special attributes, and set it off from other things by emphasizing space surrounding it. This space you lay between all things to which you give a different name; all happenings in terms of place and time; all bodies which are greeted by a name. This space you see as setting off all things from one another is the means by which the world's perception is achieved. You see something where nothing is, and see as well nothing where there is unity; a space between all things, between all things and you. Thus do you think that you have given life in separation. By this split you think you are established as a unity which functions with an independent will. What are these names by which the world becomes a series of discrete events, of things ununified, of bodies kept apart and holding bits of mind as separate awarenesses? You gave these names to them, establishing perception as you wished to have perception be. The nameless things were given names, and thus reality was given them as well. For what is named is given meaning and will then be seen as meaningful; a cause of true effect, with consequence inherent in itself. This is the way reality is made by partial vision, purposefully set against the given truth. Its enemy is wholeness. It conceives of little things and looks upon them. And a lack of space, a sense of unity or vision that sees differently, become the threats which it must overcome, conflict with and deny. Yet does this other vision still remain a natural direction for the mind to channel its perception. It is hard to teach the mind a thousand alien names, and thousands more. Yet you believe this is what learning means; its one essential goal by which communication is achieved, and concepts can be meaningfully shared. This is the sum of the inheritance the world bestows. And everyone who learns to think that it is so accepts the signs and symbols that assert the world is real. It is for this they stand. They leave no doubt that what is named is there. It can be seen, as is anticipated. What denies that it is true is but illusion, for it is the ultimate reality. To question it is madness; to accept its presence is the proof of sanity. Such is the teaching of the world. It is a phase of learning everyone who comes must go through. But the sooner he perceives on what it rests, how questionable are its premises, how doubtful its results, the sooner does he question its effects. Learning that stops with what the world would teach stops short of meaning. In its proper place, it serves but as a starting point from which another kind of learning can begin, a new perception can be gained, and all the arbitrary names the world bestows can be withdrawn as they are raised to doubt. Think not you made the world. Illusions, yes! But what is true in earth and Heaven is beyond your naming. When you call upon a brother, it is to his body that you make appeal. His true Identity is hidden from you by what you believe he really is. His body makes response to what you call him, for his mind consents to take the name you give him as his own. And thus his unity is twice denied, for you perceive him separate from you, and he accepts this separate name as his. It would indeed be strange if you were asked to go beyond all symbols of the world, forgetting them forever; yet were asked to take a teaching function. You have need to use the symbols of the world a while. But be you not deceived by them as well. They do not stand for anything at all, and in your practicing it is this thought that will release you from them. They become but means by which you can communicate in ways the world can understand, but which you recognize is not the unity where true communication can be found. Thus what you need are intervals each day in which the learning of the world becomes a transitory phase; a prison house from which you go into the sunlight and forget the darkness. Here you understand the Word, the Name which God has given you; the one Identity which all things share; the one acknowledgment of what is true. And then step back to darkness, not because you think it real, but only to proclaim its unreality in terms which still have meaning in the world that darkness rules. Use all the little names and symbols which delineate the world of darkness. Yet accept them not as your reality. The Holy Spirit uses all of them, but He does not forget creation has one Name, one meaning, and a single Source which unifies all things within Itself. Use all the names the world bestows on them but for convenience, yet do not forget they share the Name of God along with you. _God has no name_. And yet His Name becomes the final lesson that all things are one, and at this lesson
Re: Re: God has no name
Hi Bruno Marchal OUR FATHER, WHICH ART IN HEAVBEN, HALLOWED BE THY NAME. Luther said that to meditate of the sacredness of God according to this phrase is the oldest prayer. In old testament times, God's name was considered too sacred to speak by the Jews. The King James Bible uses YHWH, the Jews never say God as far as I know, they sometimes write it as G*d. We have relaxed these constrictions in the protestant tradition, use Jehovah and all sorts of other sacfed names. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/7/2012 Is life a cause/effect activity ? If so, what is the cause agent ? - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-07, 05:37:56 Subject: Re: God has no name Hi Stephen, On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Which is the definition I use. Any one that actually thinks that God is a person, could be a person, or is the complement (anti) of such, has truly not thought through the implications of such. [BM For me, and comp, it is an open problem. [SPK] ? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least, nameable. A person has always has a name. [BM] Why? Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability. OK. You are using name in the logician sense of definite description. With comp we always have a 3-name, but the first person have no name. Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case where it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What means would then exist for one entity to be distinguished from another? By the entity itself: no problem (and so this is not a problem for the personal evaluation of the measure). By some other entity? We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the purposes of identification, but this will not work because entities can change location and a list of all of the past locations of an entity would constitute a name and such is not allowed in our consideration here. Sure. What about the 1p content of an entity, i.e. the private name that an entity has for itself with in its self-referential beliefs? It has no such name. Bp p, for example, cannot be described in arithmetic, despite being defined in arithmetical terms. It is like arithmetical truth, we can't define it in arithmetic language. Since it is not communicable - as this would make the 1p aspect a non-first person concern and thus make it vanish - it cannot be a name. Names are 3p, they are public invariants that form from a consensus of many entities coming to an agreement, and thus cannot be determined strictly by 1p content. You might also note that the anti-foundation axiom is every graph has a unique decoration. The decoration is the name! It is the name that allow for non-ambiguous identification. A number's name is its meaning invariant symbol representation class... Consider what would happen to COMP if entities had no names! Do I need to go any further for you to see the absurdity of persons (or semi-autonomous entities) not having names? Say that it is X. There is something that is not that person and that something must therefore have a different name: not-X. What is God's name? ... It cannot be named because there is nothing that it is not! Therefore God cannot be a person. Transcendence eliminates nameability. The Abrahamist think that Satan is the anti-God, but that would be a denial of God's transcendence. There are reasons why Abrahamists do not tolerate logic, this is one of them. With comp if God exists it has no name, but I don't see why it would make it a non person. God is unique, it does not need a name. God is unique because there is no complement nor alternative to it. Ambiguously stated: God is the totality of what is necessarily possible. That is not bad in a first approximation. With comp, you can make it precise through the set of G?el numbers of the true arithmetical sentences. Obviously this is not a computable set, and it is not nameable by the machine (with comp), making set theory somehow too rich for comp. Of course, arithmetic contains or emulates a lot of entities believing in set theory, but we should not reify those beliefs in the ontology. It is better to keep them only in the machine epistemology. On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Is the translation or encoding a unique mapping? How many possible ways are available to encode B? There is an infinity of way to encode B. Some can be just intensionally equivalent (different codes but same logic), or extensionally equivalent but not intensionally equivalent, like Bp and Bp Dt. They prove the same arithmetical proposition, but obeys different logic. OK, do you not see that the infinity of ways that B can be encoded makes the name of B ambiguous? I don't see that at all. The name of B is at most 1p; a private name and thus subject to Wittgenstein's
Re: God has no name
On 07 Aug 2012, at 21:03, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/7/2012 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Stephen, On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Which is the definition I use. Any one that actually thinks that God is a person, could be a person, or is the complement (anti) of such, has truly not thought through the implications of such. [BM For me, and comp, it is an open problem. [SPK] ? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least, nameable. A person has always has a name. [BM] Why? Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability. OK. You are using name in the logician sense of definite description. With comp we always have a 3-name, but the first person have no name. Dear Bruno, First I must tell you that however I might get frustrated at your seeming intransigence, I do appreciate your patience and thoughtfulness! :-) I am learning a lot from these exchanges. Now to the content of your reply. You are welcome. (My ideas are still evolving on this and my postulate of Identity is still not well formed.) UDA is build in a way such that we don't need to have a theory on personal identity. Yes, I see a name as a definite description and I see this as harmonious with my postulate that the best possible computational simulation of an autonomous system *is* the system itself. I remind you that this is not the computer science notion of simulation. Thus the name of an entity (an autonomous system) is dependent on autonomy Is not the name (program, body, definite-description) prior to the function of that name in some environment (universal number)? and thus independence from any particular embedding, This is functionalism, which is a consequence of comp. Comp implies functionalism at the substitution level. The independence of the physical, and the dependence of the physical from only the numbers (and their laws) is the object of the proof. but this independence is not separateness in general and this is where we disagree on Step 8. But you have still not address the reasoning itself. Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case where it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What means would then exist for one entity to be distinguished from another? By the entity itself: no problem (and so this is not a problem for the personal evaluation of the measure). By some other entity? What kind of entity might this other one be? We must show that there exist other similar entities and thus at least have to show (in our explanations and theories) how the otherness obtains. Comp makes all entities existing trivially in arithmetic. Only the laws of physics are no more trivial and can't be no more be assumed, by UDA. This is a version of the Other minds problem which is a corollary of the solipsism problem. Part of my reasoning is that I see the most necessary ability of consciousness is the ability to make distinctions. It is with the ability to make distinctions that allows an entity to even have beliefs. The idea of 1p indeterminacy speaks, IMHO, to this ability and you have shown in a very clever way how to make this ability vanish. ? It is for this reason that you can actually make the claim that I did provide a semi-axiomatic of God in a resent post, but you must understand that your claim is not a universal truth. It is only a finite approximation. We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the purposes of identification, but this will not work because entities can change location and a list of all of the past locations of an entity would constitute a name and such is not allowed in our consideration here. Sure. OK! What about the 1p content of an entity, i.e. the private name that an entity has for itself with in its self-referential beliefs? It has no such name. Bp p, for example, cannot be described in arithmetic, despite being defined in arithmetical terms. It is like arithmetical truth, we can't define it in arithmetic language. Right! and I claim (without proof at the moment) that this prohibits certain kinds of beliefs from possibly being true. In particular, it prevents absolute truth valuations from being associated with entities that cannot be named. This has profound implications! I would even go so far as to say that it even implies that phrases like arithmetical truth are meaningless iff they are not stated in association with a named theory. You lost me, Stephen. I think that John Clark's contentions about free will could be made coherent in this context. ? John Clark attacks only a notion of free will which makes no sense as the start. Not the high level compatibilist notion. Since it is not communicable - as this would make the 1p aspect a non-first person concern and thus make it vanish -
Re: God has no name
Hi Stephen, On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Which is the definition I use. Any one that actually thinks that God is a person, could be a person, or is the complement (anti) of such, has truly not thought through the implications of such. [BM For me, and comp, it is an open problem. [SPK] ? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least, nameable. A person has always has a name. [BM] Why? Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability. OK. You are using name in the logician sense of definite description. With comp we always have a 3-name, but the first person have no name. Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case where it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What means would then exist for one entity to be distinguished from another? By the entity itself: no problem (and so this is not a problem for the personal evaluation of the measure). By some other entity? We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the purposes of identification, but this will not work because entities can change location and a list of all of the past locations of an entity would constitute a name and such is not allowed in our consideration here. Sure. What about the 1p content of an entity, i.e. the private name that an entity has for itself with in its self-referential beliefs? It has no such name. Bp p, for example, cannot be described in arithmetic, despite being defined in arithmetical terms. It is like arithmetical truth, we can't define it in arithmetic language. Since it is not communicable - as this would make the 1p aspect a non-first person concern and thus make it vanish - it cannot be a name. Names are 3p, they are public invariants that form from a consensus of many entities coming to an agreement, and thus cannot be determined strictly by 1p content. You might also note that the anti-foundation axiom is every graph has a unique decoration. The decoration is the name! It is the name that allow for non-ambiguous identification. A number's name is its meaning invariant symbol representation class... Consider what would happen to COMP if entities had no names! Do I need to go any further for you to see the absurdity of persons (or semi-autonomous entities) not having names? Say that it is X. There is something that is not that person and that something must therefore have a different name: not-X. What is God's name? ... It cannot be named because there is nothing that it is not! Therefore God cannot be a person. Transcendence eliminates nameability. The Abrahamist think that Satan is the anti-God, but that would be a denial of God's transcendence. There are reasons why Abrahamists do not tolerate logic, this is one of them. With comp if God exists it has no name, but I don't see why it would make it a non person. God is unique, it does not need a name. God is unique because there is no complement nor alternative to it. Ambiguously stated: God is the totality of what is necessarily possible. That is not bad in a first approximation. With comp, you can make it precise through the set of Gödel numbers of the true arithmetical sentences. Obviously this is not a computable set, and it is not nameable by the machine (with comp), making set theory somehow too rich for comp. Of course, arithmetic contains or emulates a lot of entities believing in set theory, but we should not reify those beliefs in the ontology. It is better to keep them only in the machine epistemology. On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Is the translation or encoding a unique mapping? How many possible ways are available to encode B? There is an infinity of way to encode B. Some can be just intensionally equivalent (different codes but same logic), or extensionally equivalent but not intensionally equivalent, like Bp and Bp Dt. They prove the same arithmetical proposition, but obeys different logic. OK, do you not see that the infinity of ways that B can be encoded makes the name of B ambiguous? I don't see that at all. The name of B is at most 1p; a private name and thus subject to Wittgenstein's criticism. All the names of B are third person notion, even if B itself cannot recognize its body or code. It is only self-ambiguous, which is partially relevant for the measure problem. This is why I use modal logic to handle that situation, besides the fact that incompleteness leaves no real choice in the matter. The experiences are strictly 1p even if they are the intersection of an infinity of computations, but this is what makes then have a zero measure! Ah? A finite and semi-closed consensus of 1p's allows for the construction of diaries and thus for the meaningfulness of shared experiences. But this is exactly what a non-primitive material world is in my thinking
Re: God has no name
On 8/7/2012 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Stephen, On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Which is the definition I use. Any one that actually thinks that God is a person, could be a person, or is the complement (anti) of such, has truly not thought through the implications of such. [BM For me, and comp, it is an open problem. [SPK] ? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least, nameable. A person has always has a name. [BM] Why? Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability. OK. You are using name in the logician sense of definite description. With comp we always have a 3-name, but the first person have no name. Dear Bruno, First I must tell you that however I might get frustrated at your seeming intransigence, I do appreciate your patience and thoughtfulness!:-) I am learning a lot from these exchanges. Now to the content of your reply. (My ideas are still evolving on this and my postulate of Identity is still not well formed.) Yes, I see a name as a definite description and I see this as harmonious with my postulate that the best possible computational simulation of an autonomous system *is* the system itself. Thus the name of an entity (an autonomous system) is dependent on autonomy and thus independence from any particular embedding, but this independence is not separateness in general and this is where we disagree on Step 8. Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case where it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What means would then exist for one entity to be distinguished from another? By the entity itself: no problem (and so this is not a problem for the personal evaluation of the measure). By some other entity? What kind of entity might this other one be? We must show that there exist other similar entities and thus at least have to show (in our explanations and theories) how the otherness obtains. This is a version of the Other minds problem http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/ which is a corollary of the solipsism problem. Part of my reasoning is that I see the most necessary ability of consciousness is the ability to make distinctions. It is with the ability to make distinctions that allows an entity to even have beliefs. The idea of 1p indeterminacy speaks, IMHO, to this ability and you have shown in a very clever way how to make this ability vanish. It is for this reason that you can actually make the claim that I did provide a semi-axiomatic of God in a resent post, but you must understand that your claim is not a universal truth. It is only a finite approximation. We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the purposes of identification, but this will not work because entities can change location and a list of all of the past locations of an entity would constitute a name and such is not allowed in our consideration here. Sure. OK! What about the 1p content of an entity, i.e. the private name that an entity has for itself with in its self-referential beliefs? It has no such name. Bp p, for example, cannot be described in arithmetic, despite being defined in arithmetical terms. It is like arithmetical truth, we can't define it in arithmetic language. Right! and I claim (without proof at the moment) that this prohibits certain kinds of beliefs from possibly being true. In particular, it prevents absolute truth valuations from being associated with entities that cannot be named. This has profound implications! I would even go so far as to say that it even implies that phrases like arithmetical truth are meaningless iff they are not stated in association with a named theory. I think that John Clark's contentions about free will could be made coherent in this context. Since it is not communicable - as this would make the 1p aspect a non-first person concern and thus make it vanish - it cannot be a name. Names are 3p, they are public invariants that form from a consensus of many entities coming to an agreement, and thus cannot be determined strictly by 1p content. You might also note that the anti-foundation axiom is every graph has a unique decoration. The decoration is the name! It is the name that allow for non-ambiguous identification. A number's name is its meaning invariant symbol representation class... Consider what would happen to COMP if entities had no names! Do I need to go any further for you to see the absurdity of persons (or semi-autonomous entities) not having names? Say that it is X. There is something that is not that person and that something must therefore have a different name: not-X. What is God's name? ... It cannot be named because there is nothing that it is not! Therefore God cannot be a person. Transcendence eliminates nameability. The Abrahamist think that Satan is the anti-God, but that would be a denial of God's transcendence.
Re: God has no name
On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Which is the definition I use. Any one that actually thinks that God is a person, could be a person, or is the complement (anti) of such, has truly not thought through the implications of such. [BM For me, and comp, it is an open problem. [SPK] ? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least, nameable. A person has always has a name. [BM] Why? Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability. Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case where it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What means would then exist for one entity to be distinguished from another? We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the purposes of identification, but this will not work because entities can change location and a list of all of the past locations of an entity would constitute a name and such is not allowed in our consideration here. What about the 1p content of an entity, i.e. the private name that an entity has for itself with in its self-referential beliefs? Since it is not communicable - as this would make the 1p aspect a non-first person concern and thus make it vanish - it cannot be a name. Names are 3p, they are public invariants that form from a consensus of many entities coming to an agreement, and thus cannot be determined strictly by 1p content. You might also note that the anti-foundation axiom is every graph has a unique decoration. The decoration is the name! It is the name that allow for non-ambiguous identification. A number's name is its meaning invariant symbol representation class... Consider what would happen to COMP if entities had no names! Do I need to go any further for you to see the absurdity of persons (or semi-autonomous entities) not having names? Say that it is X. There is something that is not that person and that something must therefore have a different name: not-X. What is God's name? ... It cannot be named because there is nothing that it is not! Therefore God cannot be a person. Transcendence eliminates nameability. The Abrahamist think that Satan is the anti-God, but that would be a denial of God's transcendence. There are reasons why Abrahamists do not tolerate logic, this is one of them. With comp if God exists it has no name, but I don't see why it would make it a non person. God is unique, it does not need a name. God is unique because there is no complement nor alternative to it. Ambiguously stated: God is the totality of what is necessarily possible. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: God has no name
On 06.08.2012 19:29 Stephen P. King said the following: On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ... ? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least, nameable. A person has always has a name. [BM] Why? Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability. Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case where it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What means would then exist for one entity to be distinguished from another? We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the purposes of identification, but this will not work because entities can change location and a list of all of the past locations of an entity would constitute a name and such is not allowed in our consideration here. What about the 1p content of an entity, i.e. the private name that an entity has for itself with in its self-referential beliefs? Since it is not communicable - as this would make the 1p aspect a non-first person concern and thus make it vanish - it cannot be a name. Names are 3p, they are public invariants that form from a consensus of many entities coming to an agreement, and thus cannot be determined strictly by 1p content. You might also note that the anti-foundation axiom is every graph has a unique decoration. The decoration is the name! It is the name that allow for non-ambiguous identification. A number's name is its meaning invariant symbol representation class... Consider what would happen to COMP if entities had no names! Do I need to go any further for you to see the absurdity of persons (or semi-autonomous entities) not having names? I am afraid that a name as such cannot solve the problem of personal identity. A nice overview on personal identity is here, see 8.1 to 8.4 http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/general-philosophy Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
